Recent Case Comments by Staff, Law Review
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 16 
Issue 1 Issue 1 - December 1962 Article 10 
12-1962 
Recent Case Comments 
Law Review Staff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Law Review Staff, Recent Case Comments, 16 Vanderbilt Law Review 193 (1962) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol16/iss1/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
Conflict of Laws-Full Faith and Credit-Prior
Conflicting Divorce Decrees
This was an attack in Nevada on a Nevada divorce. A Nevada ex
parte divorce was entered against the petitioner, a Maryland domi-
ciliary.1 Later, in a Maryland divorce proceeding, in which the
petitioner's wife personally appeared, the court found that she had
not been a bona fide domiciliary of Nevada and granted the petitioner
a divorce a mensa et thoro.2 Subsequently, the petitioner commenced
the present Nevada action to vacate and set aside the Nevada divorce. 3
On appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court from a summary judgment
of the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada declaring the Nevada
divorce null and void,4 held, reversed. The complaint does not state a
claim for relief amounting to extrinsic fraud nor is a claim for relief
stated under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act; in addition, the
subsequent Maryland divorce is not entitled to full faith and credit,
for the Nevada divorce was a final and conclusive determination of
the marital status of the parties in Nevada. Colby v. Colby, 369 P.2d
1019 (Nev.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962).
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
two cases of Williams v. North CarolinaP have provided the founda-
tion for the recognition of ex parte divorces in foreign states.6 The
first Williams case established the principle that an ex parte divorce
granted by the domiciliary state of only the plaintiff is entitled to full
faith and credit in foreign states.7 The second Williams case held that
1. The petitioner's wife had met the statutory requirements for residence under
NEv. REv. STAT. § 125.020 (1961). "Divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be
obtained . . . (e) If the plaintiff shall have resided 6 weeks in the state before
suit be brought."
The petitioner was personally served in Maryland pursuant to NEv. RutLs C.P.
4(e) (2), but did not appear in the Nevada proceedings.
2. Colby v. Colby, 217 Md. 35, 141 A.2d 506 (1958).
3. Prior to the commencement of the second Nevada action, the petitioner sought
to have his marital status determined in a Florida declaratory judgment action. The
action was dismissed, for declaratory relief is not available to adjudicate rights of
parties who have obtained a previous determination of their rights. Colby v. Colby,
120 So. 2d 797 (Fla. App. 1960).
4. Colby v. Colby, 369 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Nev. 1962).
5. This case involved two Supreme Court decisions, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (full faith
and credit) and 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (determination of domicile).
6. Summer, Full Faith And Credit For Divorce Decrees-Present Doctrine And
Possible Changes, 9 VAim. L. REv. 1 (1955).
7. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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a second state may determine whether the plaintiff was actually
domiciled in the state granting the divorce;8 if he was not, the second
state need not grant full faith and credit to the divorceY On the other
hand, a defendant is precluded from attacking the basis of jurisdiction
(domicile) 10 if he personally appeared." The question (as in the
instant case) of the inter partes effect of an earlier ex parte divorce
on a subsequent divorce, where both parties appeared, has not been
determined by the Supreme Court. In an analogous situation involv-
ing two conflicting judgments, it was held in Treinies v. Sunshine
Mining Co. that the latest judgment in time is entitled to full
faith and credit. 12 A fortiori, a subsequent divorce, in which both
parties appeared, overrides an earlier ex parte divorce and is entitled
to full faith and credit.13
Though the Nevada court dismissed the petitioner's complaint for
failure to state a claim for relief based on either extrinsic fraud or the
Declaratory Judgment Act, the question of conflicting divorces was
avoided, for Nevada said that its courts were not competent 4 because
Nevada had previously determined the marital status of the parties
8. "[T]he decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication of everything except the
jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded, and domicile is a jurisdictional fact."
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945).
9. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
10. See, e.g., GooDmcH, CoN Lscr OF LAWS §§ 128-29 (3d ed. 1949); LEFLAiI,
CoNFLIcT OF LAWs §§ 162-63 (1959); Summer, supra note 6.
11. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). "It is one thing to recognize as permissible
the judicial re-examination of findings of jurisdictional fact where such findings have
been made by a court of a sister State which has entered a divorce decree in ex parte
proceedings. It is quite another thing to hold that the vital rights and interests involved
in divorce litigation may be held in suspense pending the scrutiny by courts of sister
States of findings of jurisdictional fact made by a competent court in proceedings
conducted in a manner consistent with the highest requirements of due process and
in which the defendant has participated." Id. at 355-56. See Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S.
32 (1938); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); Pratt
v. Miedema, 311 Mich. 64, 18 N.W.2d 279, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 739 (1945); Norris
v. Norris, 200 Minn. 246, 273 N.W. 708 (1937).
12. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); Garden Suburbs Golf Club
v. Murrel, 180 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 822 (1950); California
Bank v. Traeger, 215 Cal. 346, 10 P.2d 57 (1932); Johnson v. Johnson, 199 Md. 520,
86 A.2d 520 (1952) (application of the Treinies principle in a divorce case);
Ambatielos v. Foundation Co., 203 Misc. 470, 116 N.Y.S.2d 641, 648 (Sup. Ct. 1952);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 42 (1942), "Where in two successive actions between
the same parties inconsistent judgments are rendered, the judgment in the second
action is controlling in a third action between the parties"; 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §
629 (5th ed. 1925). Contra, Hammell v. Britton, 19 Cal. 2d 72, 119 P.2d 333 (1941);
Marthin Bros. Box Co. v. Fitz, 228 Iowa 482, 292 N.W. 143 (1940); Kessler v.
Fauguier Nat'l Bank, 195 Va. 1095, 81 S.E.2d 440, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 834 (1954).
13. New York has applied the Treinie principle in a case similar to the present
case. Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N.Y. 193, 97 N.E.2d 748 (1951). Cf. Johnson v. Johnson,
199 Md. 520, 86 A.2d 520 (1952).
14. Colby v. Colby, 369 P.2d 1019 (Nev. 1962). Subject to constitutional limita-
tions, a state has the legal power to determine the competence of its courts; thus it is
questionable whether Nevada had to entertain this action.
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in Nevada. By dicta, the Nevada Supreme Court refuted the petition-
er's full faith and credit argument and rejected the Treinies principle."5
Implicit in the court's rationale is the principle that a Nevada divorce
is based on something less than domicile-a principle that has not
been passed on by the Supreme Court, though the problem has been
mentioned several times.
16
The decision of the Nevada court is unfortunate, for the purpose of
litigation is to adjudicate the controversy between the litigants. The
Nevada court, by refusing to follow the Treinies principle, has not
determined the effect of the Maryland divorce on the earlier ex
parte divorce of Nevada, but has continued the controversy.'1 The
application of the Treinies principle in this action would: (1) en-
courage the successful litigant in the first action to plead his judgment
as a defense in the second action; (2) promote uniformity of judg-
ments among the neighboring states; and (3) clarify the litigants'
status.
Conflict of Laws-Tax Claims of One State Held
Not Enforceable in Another State
Plaintiff, a municipality in Pennsylvania, assessed a tax deficiency
against defendant and gave him notice of it pursuant to provisions of
a municipal ordinance.' Defendant did not appeal from the assess-
ment within the time prescribed by the ordinance,2 and subsequently
15. Colby v. Colby, 369 P.2d 1019, 1023 (Nev. 1962). The petitioner's full faith
and credit argument was predicated on Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952), where
the petitioner, Sutton, divorced the respondent, Leib, in Illinois, after which the
petitioner married Henzel, who had on the day of marriage obtained a Nevada divorce
from his wife. Thereafter New York, in a separate proceeding brought by Henzel's
wife, declared Henzel's Nevada divorce null and void; then, the petitioner's marriage
to Henzel was annulled in a subsequent New York proceeding in which Henzel per-
sonally appeared. Later, the petitioner brought an action to collect alimony, pursuant
to the Illinois divorce decree, in a federal court. Subsequently, on certiorari in the
Supreme Court, it was held that the New York decree annulling the Nevada marriage
was entitled to full faith and credit throughout the Nation, although Illinois law will
determine the question of alimony. Sutton v. Leib was distinguished from the present
case in that the Supreme Court did not say that the Nevada divorce was invalid in
Nevada and the marital status of Mrs. Leib was never determined in Nevada. Colby
v. Colby, 369 P.2d 1019, 1022, 1023 (Nev. 1962).
16. See LEFLAA, CONFLICT OF LAws § 163 (1959).
17. See note 11 supra.
1. PHILADELPRIA, PA. CODE OF GENRAL ORDnANCs, ch. 9-601, subd. (4) chapter
19-1200 required parties in defendant's business, operation of parking lot, to obtain
a license and file monthly gross receipts returns on which a 10% tax was to be paid.
An audit by the city disclosed that defendant's actual receipts exceeded his reported
returns.
2. Id. § 19-1702, allowed defendant 60 days for appeal of the assessment.
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moved to New York. .Plaintiff brought this action in a New York
state court for the collection of the tax. The trial court dismissed the
complaint and the appellate division affirmed.3 On appeal to the Court
of Appeals of New York, held, affirmed. The courts of one state are
not required by full faith and credit nor by principles of conflict of
laws to enforce tax claims of a sister state. City of Philadelphia v.
Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d 401, 184 N.E.2d 167 (1962), cert. denied, 83 Sup.
Ct. 306 (1963).
The traditional rule that one state will not enforce taxes due an-
other state is derived from eighteenth century English dicta in cases
involving not collection of taxes, but enforcement of private contracts
where violation of a revenue law was rejected as a defense.4 The rule
was transplanted to the United States without considering whether
the economic and international policies prompting its adoption in
England were applicable among states that form a single economic
and political unit.5 The rule, though still applied in England,6 has
begun to recede in the United States under attack on three fronts:
common law principles of intranational conflict of laws,7 reciprocity
statutes,8 and constitutional full faith and credit requirements.' Al-
3. City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 15 App. Div. 2d 464, 222 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1961).
4. In Boucher v. Lawson, 1 Cases T. Hard. 85, 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734),
plaintiff sued on a private contract to recover gold smuggled out of Portugal in con-
travention of Portugal's tariff laws. In rejecting the defense of participis criminis,
Hardwick by dictum first stated the rule. Accord, Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 342,
98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1775); Planche v. Fletcher, 1 Doug. 251, 99 Eng. Rep. 164
(K.B. 1779). For contemporary criticism of the rule see 3 KENT, ComMmNTAiuEs 434,
435 (14th ed. 1896). For more modem criticisms see, e.g., Freeye, Extraterritorial
Enforcement of Revenue Laws, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 321 (1937).
5. See, e.g., Ludlow v. Van Rensselear, 1 Johns. R. 94 (N.Y. 1806); Henry v.
Sargeant, 13 N.H. 321, 40 Am. Dec. 146 (1843) (rule stated in dictum); Maryland v.
Turner, 75 Misc. 9, 132 N.Y. Supp. 173 (App. Div. 1911) (first application of rule).
The case of Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921) is cited as con-
trolling authority in New York, but the rule is only one of five possible grounds for
the holding; for discussion of possible holdings see 25 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 341, 344
(1951). In City of Detroit v. Procter, 44 Del. 193, 61 A.2d 412 (1948), the court
said: "Michigan's sovereignty is as foreign to Delaware as Russia's." 61 A.2d at 416.
Contra, J. A. Holshouser Co. v. Gold Hill Copper Co., 138 N.C. 248, 50 S.E. 650
(1905).
6. See, e.g., Government of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491.
7. See, e.g., Ohio ex re. Duffy v. Arnett, 314 Ky. 403, 234 S.W.2d 722 (1950) (rec-
iprocity statute immaterial). In State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers,
238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946), the court examined the reasons for the
rule and found them inapplicable to the modem United States. See Roesken, Out-of-
State Tax Collection, 27 TAXEs 955 (1949); cf. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99,
120 N.E. 198 (1918), where the court said: "The courts are not free to refuse to enforce
a foreign right at pleasure of judges . . . . They do not close their doors unless help
would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of
good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal." 120 N.E. at 202.
8. E.g., State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Neely, 225 Ark. 230, 282 S.W.2d
150 (1955); cf. City of Detroit v. Gould, 12 Ill. 2d 297, 146 N.E.2d 61 (1957).
9. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935) (judgment for taxes
within full faith and credit); City of New York v. Shapiro, 129 F. Supp. 149 (D.
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though enforcement of tax claims appears warranted by conflict of
laws principles and should be accorded treatment similar to other
causes of action,' courts adhering to the rule treat a revenue law as
similar to a penal law or as being violative of public policy." Twenty-
two states have in part dealt with the problem by enacting reciprocity
statutes. 12 A broader method of attack is the claim that under the
Constitution 13 "full faith and credit" must be given the tax statutes
and administrative determinations of the taxing state. Although article
IV section 1 makes no distinction between judgments and public
acts, the latter stand on less well established ground. The Supreme
Court has held that a judgment for taxes is entitled to full faith and
credit but has expressly left open the question whether a tax statute
is so protected.'4 The question whether an administrative determina-
tion of tax liability is complete enough to be considered a judicial pro-
ceeding or a record within full faith and credit is also an open one,
although a federal district court has so held,15 and the Supreme Court
Mass. 1954) (administrative determination of taxes within "full faith and credit");
cf. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939) (dictum); Hughes v. Fetter, 341
U.S. 609 (1951).
10. Various types of state statutes enjoy extraterritorial application by conflict of laws
principles; there appears to be no legitimate reason for distinguishing between an action
by a state on a tax statute and an action by an individual on a right founded on a
state statute. See, e.g., Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927);
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 7; Comment, 47 Micrr. L. REV. 796 (1949).
11. Judge Learned Hand concurring in Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir.
1929), aff'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 18, (1930), said, "To pass upon the provisions
for the public order of another state . . . should be, beyond the powers of a court; it
involves the relations between the states themselves .... It may commit the domestic
state to a position which would seriously embarrass its neighbor." 30 F.2d at 604. See
Note, 41 ILL. L. REv. 439 (1946) for a list of standard justifications for the rule.
For criticism of these justifications see State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers,
supra note 7; Lefler, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46
HAav. L. REv. 193, 203, 204 (1932); Comment, 47 MicH. L. REv. 796 (1948);
46 COLum. L. REv. 1013 (1946).
12. For a list of the states see 23 STATE TAX REviE-v, No. 38, p. 1 (Sept. 17, 1962).
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." The
implementing legislation, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, 1739 (1958), brings "nonjudicial records
and books" within the scope. For discussion that this is the framework for a national
conflict of laws rule see Cheatham, A Federal Nation and Conflict of Laws, 22 RocK'
MT. L. Rxv. 109 (1949); Note, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 984 (1955). See also Daum,
Interstate Comity and Governmental Claims, 33 ILL. L. REv. 249 (1938).
14. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., supra note 9. But see Hughes v. Fetter,
supra note 9 (statute within full faith and credit); Bradford Elec. Co., v. Clapper,
286 U.S. 145 (1931); RESTATEm:ENT, CoNFUcT OF LAws § 610 (Supp. 1948).
15. In City of New York v. Shapiro, supra note 9, the court said: "Nor can it be
justly said that there is some reason of policy for distinguishing between a State's duty
to give effect to a sister State's court judgment for taxes and its duty to give effect
to a sister State's binding administrative determination of taxes." 129 F. Supp. at 154.




has held16 some administrative proceedings are within it. The old
rule has not been rejected in the majority of states, but the present
trend is toward the enforcement of sister state taxes.17
The court in the instant case was faced directly with the argument
that full faith and credit requires enforcement of a tax in the form of
an unappealed assessment. The majority rejected this argument, even
though they assumed that the ordinance was a public act, that defend-
ants liability was complete in Pennsylvania, and that the ordinance
is not repugnant to the laws of New York.18 The court said it would
be an intrusion to judge a controversy between another state and a
former citizen. The dissent, agreeing that full faith and credit does
not include a tax claim, maintained that the administrative determi-
nation was tantamount to a judgment and should be accorded full
faith and credit under Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.'9
A rule that a person who has enjoyed the protection and privileges
of a government can avoid payment of his share of the taxes by merely
crossing a boundary line has no place in the United States. This is
inequitable to the taxing state whose tax is ineffectual if it cannot be
collected and to the fellow taxpayers who must pay the evader's
share; moreover, it is against public policy in that it sanctions tax
evasion. In a period of increased governmental spending and in-
creased costs the power to collect a tax is essential to the financial
stability of the state. Whether it would be an intrusion for one state
to judge a controvery between another state and a former citizen,
as stated by the court, is immaterial, because it is the taxing state
requesting the intrusion; the taxing state which is suing for the taxes
would certainly be less offended by an intrusion plus collection than
by no intrusion and no collection. With the Supreme Court slowly
expanding the scope of federal control of conflict of laws,20 it is now
appropriate to include revenue laws and administrative determina-
tions within this scope. Another solution of the difficulty is the
16. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943). This case was
commented on and the problems discussed by Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full
Faith and Credit Clause: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 44 COLum. L. REv. 330
(1944). In Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935), the Court held that full faith
and credit was not to be denied because the assessment was derived from an adminis-
trative officer.
17. Goldstein, Interstate Enforcement of the Tax Laws of Sister States, 30 TAXES
247 (1952).
18. 184 N.E.2d at 169.
19. 296 U.S. 268 (1935). The dissent said that the policy considerations applying to a
judgment for taxes are applicable to administrative determinations of tax liability. 184
N.E.2d at 170-71.
20. See Hughes v. Fetter, supra note 9; Cheatham, supra note 13. But see Wells v.
Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
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application of the Hess v. Pawloski2' rationale, Which has expressly
been done in one case;2 i.e., the operation of a business within a
state is sufficient to confer continued jurisdiction over the taxpayer
by the taxing state allowing it to enter against the fleeing taxpayer a
judgment which is protected by full faith and credit. Whether the
abolition of the rule is accomplished through common law principles,
legislative action, or constitutional fiat, its abandonment would
strengthen financial stability of states and apportion the tax burden
equitably.
Constitutional Law-Discrimination-Statute Prohibiting
Racial Discrimination in Renting of Private
Apartment Houses Does Not Violate Due Process
Defendants, the owner and the rental agent of an apartment house
which was privately financed with no governmental assistance,' re-
fused to rent an apartment to a Negro. Alleging that defendants had
discriminated against him unlawfully because of his color in violation
of a Massachusetts statute,2 the Negro filed a complaint with the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.3  At the com-
mission's hearing the defendants contested the statute's constitution-
21. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The Court stated that due process is satisfied by a statute
making operation of automobiles on public roads of a state equivalent to appointment of
the secretary of state to accept service for any action arising out of said operation.
22. Ohio Dep't of Taxation v. Kleitch Bros., Inc., 357 Mich. 504, 98 N.W.2d 636
(1959). See McElroy, The Enforcement of Foreign Tax Claims, 38 U. DET. L.J. 1
(1960) for discussions of this case and suggested methods for setting up such a
machinery.
1. There was no governmental guaranty, insurance, or other assistance in any form.
2. "It shall be an unlawful practice: . . . 6. For the owner, lessee, sublessee,
licensed real estate broker, assignee or managing agent of publicly assisted or multiple
dwelling or contiguously located housing accommodations or other person having
the right of ownership or possession or right to rent or lease, or negotiate for the
sale of such accommodations, or any agent or employee of such a person:-(a) to
refuse to rent or lease or sell or negotiate for sale or otherwise to deny to or withhold
from any person or group of persons such accommodations because of the race, creed,
color or national origin of such person or persons; (b) to discriminate against any
person because of his race, creed, color or national origin in the terms, conditions or
privileges of such accommodations or acquisition thereof, or in the furnishing of
facilities and services in connection therewith .... ." MAss. GEN. LAws c. 151B, § 4,
as amended, (Supp. 1961). The statute defines "multiple dwelling" as "a dwelling
which is usually occupied for permanent residence purposes and which is either
rented, leased, let or hired out, to be occupied as the residence or home of three
or more families living independently of each other." MAss. GEN. LAws c. 151B, § 1
(Supp. 1961).
3. The commission was established pursuant to MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 6, § 56 (1951).
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ality on the ground that it deprived them of liberty and property4
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The commission ruled
against the defendants and subsequently an injunction was granted
to enforce its cease and desist order.5 On appeal to the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, held, affirmed.6 A state statute pro-
hibiting racial discrimination by persons renting units in private
apartment houses with which there has been absolutely no govern-
mental assistance does not deprive the owner of "liberty, or property
without due process of law."7 Massachusetts Comm'n Against Dis-
crimination v. Colangelo, 182 N.E.2d 595 (Mass. 1962).
The Massachusetts statute here sustained indicates a current evolu-
tionary development in some state legislatures extending the statutory
perimeter of prohibited racial discrimination from public housing
and publicly assisted housing to private housing.8 The rights under
these state anti-discrimination statutes must be distinguished clearly
from the constitutional right to be free of discriminatory governmental
action. The major constitutional attack on all of these state housing
statutes is that they violate the due process clause in the fourteenth
amendment by depriving the owner of liberty and property in re-
stricting his right to rent or sell the property to whomever he chooses.9
In addition, the statutes10 solely affecting publicly assisted housing
4. Specifically, the owner alleged (1) a deprivation of the rights to acquire,
possess, and protect property, (2) a deprivation of the liberty to contract, and (3)
the appropriation of his property without compensation; the rental agent alleged that
(1) his liberty to contract, (2) his freedom of association, and (3) his freedom from
coercion had been infringed.
5. Among other things, it ordered the defendants to make an apartment available
to the Negro and to cease discrimination in renting apartments.
6. The court actually modified the order by eliminating one paragraph because of
a technicality. The effect of the order remained unchanged.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. "Public housing" means governmental housing projects built with tax money;
"publicly assisted housing" includes all housing built by private individuals who
financed construction with any form of governmental assistance; and "private housing"
refers to the houses which were built and financed without governmental assistance.
See statutes cited notes 37-39 infra.
9. See, e.g., New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall
Apartments, 10 Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958), where an anti-
discrimination prohibition which affected publicly assisted housing was held to be
within the police power and not to be an unconstitutional deprivation of property.
10. Statutes prohibiting racial discrimination in publicly assisted housing have
been enacted in numerous northeastern and western states and usually have been
found to be constitutional. For recent developments in that area, see O'Meara v.
Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, 58 Wash. 2d 793, 365 P.2d 1 (1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962). In that case, although a five-to-four decision
declared such a statute unconstitutional because it denied equal protection of the
laws, three judges in the majority intimated that the statute would be valid except
for the unreasonable classification, i.e., publicly assisted housing versus private housing.
However, a similar California statute withstood all attacks on its constitutionality. Burks
v. Poppy Construction Co., 370 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1962). These cases are scrutinized in




have been attacked as denying equal protection of the laws, i.e., that
publicly assisted housing is an unreasonable, arbitrary classification
since there is no difference among housing owners' ability to dis-
criminate or the effect of the discrimination." State courts have held
generally that such a restriction of an individual's right to contract
freely and to dispose of or manage his property freely is not un-
reasonable since property rights are not absolute and since some
"state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain
[the legislation]. " 12 In short, the courts have held that these statutory
regulations are within the state police power as a reasonable regula-
tion of local matters and that the wisdom and determination of the
need for such regulation is left to the legislature, not the courts.
Unfortunately, the courts have neither articulated the factors of
reasonableness nor precisely defined police power in this area.13 In-
stead, they give almost complete and unquestioning efficacy to the
presumption of constitutionality as the answer to the legal question
without analyzing the elements of reasonableness of the restriction.14
In this new area affecting private housing, the New York City
Council acted first by passing the Sharkey-Brown-Isaacs ordinance 5
in December, 1957. On the state level Colorado and Massachusetts
in April, 1959, enacted the first statutes. 6 Connecticut, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania
followed this innovation with similar statutes 7 affecting private hous-
ing, making a total of nine states with such legislation. Of course,
the scope of all these enactments varies, but the broadest law, the
11. See, e.g., Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514,
158 A.2d 177, appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 418 (1960). See generally note 10 supra.
12. The quote is from Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)
where the Court stated its four-step test concerning the equal protection clause. The
test was used expressly in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1957).
13. Concerning police power, see Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911),
where Mr. Justice Holmes wrote: "It may be said in a general way that the police
power extends to all the great public needs. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518.
It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing
morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary
to the public welfare." 219 U.S. at 111.
14. In contrast, note the Court's analysis, for example, of the reasonableness of
another economic restriction on realty in Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), which
upheld a state statute requiring the removal of cedar trees to prevent the communica-
tion of cedar rust, a plant disease, to apple trees.
15. Niv YoRK Crr, N.Y. Anrm. CODE c. 41, tit. X, § X41-1.0 (1957). Almost
a year later, the City Council of Pittsburgh, Pa., enacted a similar ordinance. Pitts-
burgh, Pa., Ordinance 523, Dec. 8, 1958.
16. CoLo. REv. STAT. c. 68, art. 7 (Supp. 1960); MAss. GFNs. LAws c. 151B, §§ 1, 4,
as amended (Supp. 1961).
17. CoNN. GEN. STAT. c. 939, §§ 53-35, -36, as amended (Supp. 1961); MiNN. STAT.
AN. §§ 363.01-13, as amended (Supp. 1961); N.H. RBE. STAT. ANN. § 354.1-.4, as
amended (1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:25-1 to -28, as amended (Supp. 1961); N.Y.
ExEcuT=VE LAw §§ 290-99, as amended (Supp. 1962); OnE. RFv. STAT. § 659.010-.115
(1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63, as amended (Supp. 1961).
1962]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
New York City ordinance as amended in 1961,18 covers all rental of
housing except one apartment of a duplex where the other apartment
is owner-occupied. The constitutionality of four statutes and of the
original New York City ordinance has been contested in the respective
state courts.19 These decisions sustained the statutes on reasoning
analogous to that applied in the cases concerning publicly assisted
housing as discussed above.20 All these courts failed to distinguish
legally between publicly assisted housing and private housing. They
treated the private housing statutes as presenting the same constitu-
tional issues as publicly assisted housing statutes, except that the issue
of equal protection of the laws was not raised. However, one can argue
that this distinction is significant because the stated objectives of the
governmental assistance indicates a special public interest in the hous-
ing which justifies state regulation or because the basis of state regula-
tory power over publicly assisted housing is the owner's acceptance of
governmental assistance. In summary, although this new area of civil
rights is still in the formative stage, attacks on the regulations' con-
stitutionality have been generally unsuccessful.
The reasoning of the Massachusetts court is not unique, but follows
the general arguments outlined above. After reaffirming basic princi-
ples, including the presumption of constitutionality and of valid statu-
tory objectives, the court discussed the constitutional protection of
property rights.21 Stating that the constitutional right of property
is not absolute, the court merely needed to discern valid statutory
objectives in order to sustain the statute. Yet the court never expressly
stated a possible specific objective of the statute. The opinion glossed
over this step in its reasoning with generalities by saying, "[T]here is
no constitutional distinction between legislating in these areas [public
accommodations, employment, and publicly assisted housing] and
legislating in the field of [private] multiple-dwelling housing."22 Then
18. Naw YoRx Crr, N.Y. ADmiN. CODE c. 41, tit. X, § X41-10, as amended, (1961).
19. Martin v. City of New York, 201 N.Y.S.2d 111 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Massachusetts
Comm'n against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 182 N.E.2d 595 (Mass. 1962); Case
v. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n, No. 19988, Sup. Ct. Colo., 1962; Swanson v.
Commission on Civil Rights, No. 94802, Super. Ct. Conn., July 11, 1961, Jones
v. Haridor Realty Corp., 181 A.2d 481 (N.J. 1962). Although the facts of this New
Jersey case concerned publicly assisted housing, the rationale of the supreme courts
decision clearly encompassed the statute's sections regulating private housing.
20. See note 9 supra.
21. 182 N.E.2d at 600. Here the court quotes from Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 523 (1934) where the Supreme Court held a New York milk price regulation
constitutional: "But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment
of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally funda-
mental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest."
22. 182 N.E.2d at 599.
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the opinion enumerated "certain possible findings which the legisla-
ture could have made to support valid objectives."2 These surmises
were that housing discrimination might restrict Negroes to a small
area thereby encouraging slums, might impede relocation affected by
urban redevelopment programs, or might cause Negroes to suffer
more in a housing shortage. To fortify the argument, the court
pointed to cases in other areas-e.g., public accommodations,2 private
employment,25 and union membership26-as analogous situations in
which courts have upheld anti-discrimination statutes; it also pointed
to cases upholding restrictions on the free and most profitable use of
realty-e.g., zoning,27 compelled remodeling, historic districts,29 and
temporary rent control3°-to emphasize that the constitutional property
right is not absolute. Although one dissenting justice raised some im-
portant, relevant questions 3' the majority's discussion of the consti-
tutional issue concurs with the arguments and conclusions of the few
cases on this subject.
The importance of this case is twofold: (1) it will influence
greatly both legislatures and courts when they are confronted
with similar problems; and (2) it indicates the rapid evolutionary
trend of legislation extending state regulation into numerous areas to
prevent racial discrimination. Concerning the first factor, racial dis-
crimination in housing now is probably the most acute race relations
problem outside the South.3 The housing problem also inherently
affects other phases of race relations such as integration of educational
institutions. As other legislatures extend anti-discrimination regula-
tion to private housing, the courts will be called on to scrutinize
23. Ibid.
24. See, e.g., Pickett v. Kuchan, 323 Ill. 138, 153 N.E. 667 (1926) (theater); People
v. King, 110 N.Y. 418, 18 N.E. 245 (1888) (roller rink).
25. See, e.g., City of Highland Park v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 364
Mich. 508, 111 N.W.2d 797 (1961); Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d
581 (1954).
26. See, e.g., Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
27. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Lamarre
v. Commissioner of Pub. Works, 324 Mass. 542, 87 N.E.2d 211 (1949).
28. See, e.g., Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946); Paquette v.
City of Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155 N.E.2d 775 (1959).
29. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557
(1955).
30. See, e.g., Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922); Marcus
Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921).
31. 182 N.E.2d at 605-07 (dissenting opinion).
32. See generally Gr.zim & McErmE, STuDms IN HousiNG AND MiNoiury GRoups
(1960); McENimnR, REsuDENCE AN RACE (1960).
33. NE W YORK CrrY, N.Y. AmDnN. CODE c. 41, tit. X § X41-1.0(a) (1957). See
generally GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AmRIcAN LAw 275-312 (1959).
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the Massachusetts court's conclusion that a state can regulate rental
and sales practices of a private house owner without violating his
constitutional right not to be deprived of property by the state
without due process of law. Concerning the second factor, the trend
of expanding anti-discrimination legislation has reached such areas
as public accommodations, educational institutions,35 labor unions,36
employment,37 and housing. As implied above, even within the
housing field, the legislation has evolved and expanded from public
housing to publicly assisted housing3 9 and now to some private
housing.40 Courts have held that legislation in all these areas is a
valid exercise of state police power. Yet, while our federal constitution
indicates the existence of state governmental powers in various areas,
this power is restricted by positive prohibitions such as those in the
fourteenth amendment. Where is the undefined line of demarcation
in housing regulation across which there is no governmental power?
Since the regulation was upheld in this case, is a regulation of private
single housing constitutional? With the current paramount emphasis
on minority groups' civil rights, such state regulations of private single
housing probably will come and probably will be declared constitu-
tional by using arguments similar to those of this decision. However,
as they have done in other areas, courts should analyze more acutely
all the elements of the regulation's reasonableness-e.g., the relation-
ship between the regulation's effect and its actual purpose, the real
social need for such regulation, and its economic effect on property
owners-giving less importance to the presumption of validity, al-
though the same result may be reached when this is done. Based on
the general precedent of cases4' holding that anti-discrimination
statutes are constitutional and on the United States Supreme Court's
dismissal of the Levitt case, that Court probably also will uphold all
of these housing statutes. However, the decisions now rest in the
twilight zone, the penumbra of constitutionality.
34. See, e.g., MASs. GEN. LAws c. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (1959); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:1-2 to 7, 18:25-5 (Supp. 1960).
35. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 151C (1959); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:14-2
(Supp. 1960); WASH. REv. CoDE § 9.91.010 (1957).
36. See, e.g., N.Y. Cirv. Riirrs LAw § 43.
37. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-24-1 to -8 (Supp. 1960); MASS. GEN.
LAWs c. 151B, § 1-10 (Supp. 1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-4 to -6 (Supp. 1960).
38. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LANWs c. 121, § 26 FF(e) (Supp. 1961); R.I. GE. LAws
AN.. § 11-24-3 (1956).
39. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws c. 151B, §§ 1,4,6 (Supp. 1961); WAsm. Rv. CoDa,
§§ 49.60.030-.040 (1958).
40. See notes 15-17 supra.
41. See, e.g., cases cited note 26 supra. See also cases cited notes 27, 28 & 30 supra.
42. Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d
177, appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 418 (1960).
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Constitutional Law-Establishment of Religion-
Recitation of State Composed Prayer in Public
Schools Held Unconstitutional
The New York Board of Regents composed the following prayer
and recommended its daily recital in the state's public schools:
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and
we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our
country."' Respondent board of education adopted a resolution
directing the prayer's use in the schools of its district. Petitioners, tax-
payers of the district and parents of pupils, enrolled therein, instituted
proceedings2 to obtain an order compelling discontinuance of the
practice. They insisted that the use of the prayer was contrary to the
religious beliefs and practices of themselves and their children, and
contended that thd board's action constituted a violation of the first
amendment to the United States Constitution as made applicable to
the states by the fourteenth amendment. 3 The trial court held4 .
that the "establishment" clause of the first amendment5 did not pro-
hibit the non-compulsory saying of the prayer.6 The appellate division7
and the court of appeals8 affirmed. On certiorari in the Supreme Court
of the United States, held, reversed. The prayer program was a
religious activity, and the use of the state's school system to promote
1. The Regents Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools, adopted
November 30, 1951. This was later supplemented by The Regents' Recommenda-
tions for School Programs on America's Moral and Spiritual Heritage, adopted March
25, 1955. The regents suggested that the prayer be joined with the act of allegiance
to the flag at the beginning of each school day.
2. The action was brought under article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Act,
which provides for a statutory proceeding in the nature of mandamus.
3. Petitioners also contended that the state constitution prohibited the practice.
The trial court held that the "free exercise" part of the state constitution (N.Y. CONST.
art. 1, § 3) was no broader in its prohibitions than the "free exercise" clause of the
United States Constitution (compare note 5 infra), and added, although the point was
not argued, that the "establishmene' part of the state constitution, which prohibits
public aid to a school "in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught"
(N.Y. CONsT. art. 11, § 4), did not apply because the prayer was not denominational.
Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453, 496 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
4. Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc. 2d 659, 191 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
5. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. Engel v. Vitale, supra note 4, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 461. The trial court also held
that the "free exercise" clause required the board to take affirmative steps to avoid any
element of compulsion on those who might choose not to participate. Thus, the
board's unpublicized practice of permitting non-participation by those students who
expressed such a desire was not sufficient. A procedure had to be established whereby
each parent would be informed of the text of the prayer and the nature of the
program, and left to indicate whether or not his child would participate. 191 N.Y.S.2d
at 491. This part of the holding was not raised on appeal.
7. Engel v. Vitale, 11 App. Div. 2d 340, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1960).
8. Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 176 N.E.2d 579, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1961).
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the saying of a prayer composed and endorsed by a state agency was
a violation of the "establishment" clause. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962).
The constitutionality of non-compulsory religious activity9 in the
public schools has been tested numerous times in the state courts.
10
9. Compulsion renders the activity unconstitutional. E.g., holding compulsory Bible
reading unconstitutional under state constitutions, People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81
Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927); People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 Ill. 334,
92 N.E. 251 (1910); State ex rel. Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853, 91 N.W. 846
(1902); State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 226 N.W. 348 (1929). Contra,
Spiller v. Inhabitants of Woburn, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 127 (1866); Church v. Bullock,
104 Tex. 1, 109 S.W. 115 (1908). The compulsory features of the program in tie
instant case were held invalid by the state courts. Note 6 supra.
10. Such activity often takes the form of Bible reading, either practiced alone
or in conjunction with the recitation of prayer and perhaps the singing of hymns.
Sustaining non-compulsory Bible reading programs: People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley,
81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927); Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Inst.,
143 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1962); Wilkerson v. City of Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 110 S.E. 895
(1922); Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20 N.W. 475 (1884); Billard v. Board of
Educ., 69 Kan. 53, 76 Pac. 422 (1904); Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School Dist.,
120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792 (1905); Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698
(1962); Pfeiffer v. Board of Educ., 118 Mich. 560, 77 N.W. 250 (1898); Kaplan v.
Independent School Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 214 N.W. 18 (1927); Doremus v. Board
of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 429 (1952);
Lewis v. Board of Educ., 247 App. Div. 106, 286 N.Y. Supp. 174 (1936); Board of
Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872); Nessle v. Hum, 2 Ohio Dec. 60 (Mahoning
County C.P. 1894); Stevenson v. Hanyon, 7 Pa. Dist. 585 (Lackawanna County C.P.
1898); Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. 665, 288 S.W.2d 718 (1956). Holding non-compulsory
Bible reading invalid: Herold v. Parish Bd. of School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 68 So.
116 (1915); State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890). Cf.
State ex rel. Clithero v. Showalter, 159 Wash. 519, 293 Pac. 1000 (1930) (refusal of
mandamus to force school board to institute Bible reading program). For an extensive
treatment of the use of the Bible in public schools, see BOLES, THE BIBLE, RELIGION,
THE PuBLIc ScHooLs (1961). Also useful are Harrison, The Bible, the Con-
stitution and Public Education, 29 TENN. L. R~v. 363 (1962); Comment, Bible
Reading in the Public Schools, 22 ALBANY L. REv. 156 (1958); Note, Bible Reading
in Public Schools, 9 VAND. L. REv. 849 (1956); 13 VAND. L. REV. 550 (1960).
On the other hand, religious literature may not be distributed in the classroom,
even if given only to those children whose parents requested that they receive it.
Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Inst., 128 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1960); Tudor v.
Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953); Miller v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 355, 244
P.2d 520 (1952). See Note, The First Amendment and Distribution of Religious
Literature in the Public Schools, 41 VA. L. REv. 789 (1955).
An early Massachusetts case held that a teacher incurred no liability for punishing a
child who refused to recite the Ten Commandments. Commonwealth ex rel. Wall v.
Cooke, 7 Am. L. REGlSam 417 (Boston Police Ct. 1859).
One court has held unconstitutional the distribution in school of cards for children
to take home on which the parents were to indicate whether or not their child should
take part in a "released time" program. Perry v. School Dist., 54 Wash. 2d 886, 344
P.2d 1036 (1959). Contra, Gordon v. Board of Educ., 78 Cal. App. 2d 464, 178
P.2d 488 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N.Y. 195, 156
N.E. 663 (1927).
A related problem is raised when teachers wear distinctive religious garb to school.
Some courts uphold the teacher's right to wear these garments, on the ground that
it does not constitute sectarian instruction. New Haven v. Torrington, 132 Conn. 194,
43 A.2d 455 (1945); State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 28 N.E.2d 256
(1940); Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 444, 267 N.W. 127 (1936). Other courts have
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The majority of jurisdictions considering the question have held that
such activity does not violate state constitutional prohibitions against
the use of public funds for sectarian purposes." They have felt that
these prohibitions were intended to prevent governmental support
of specific religious bodies, not non-discriminatory encouragement to
religion (or Christianity) in general. 2 In recent years, however,
recognition that the first amendment to the United States Constitution
applies directly to the states13 has resulted in a slight trend in the
opposite direction.'4 Furthermore, when called upon to apply Su-
held the practice unconstitutional, on the ground that it inspires sympathy and
respect for the religious sect to which the instructor belongs. Knowlton v. Baumhover,
182 Iowa 691, 166 N.W. 202 (1918); Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949
(1951); O'Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N.Y. 421, 77 N.E. 612 (1906). Pennsylvania
originally upheld the teacher's right to wear distinctive garments, Hysong v. School
Dist., 164 Pa. 629, 30 At. 482 (1894), but later ruled constitutional a statutory
reversal of that position, Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 Adt. 68 (1910). See
Comment, Religious Garb in the Public Schools-A Study in Conflicting Liberties, 22
U. Cm. L. REv. 888 (1955).
11. Almost every state has a constitutional prohibition against the use of public
funds for sectarian purposes. There is considerable variation in the wording of the
various provisions, but the wording has been unimportant in affecting the outcome
of cases involving similar fact situations. Cushman, The Holy Bible and the Public
Schools, 40 CoaRNx. L.Q. 475, 477-78 & n.12 (1955). On the various state pro-
visions, see BoLES, op. cit. supra note 10, at 43-46; Fellman, Separation of Church
and State in The United States: A Summary View, 1950 Wis. L. Rav. 427, 443-44;
Note, Public Aid to Establishment of Religion, 96 U. PA. L. Rv. 230, 234 (1947).
It has already been seen that a majority of cases uphold religious activity in the
schools. See note 10 supra.
12. E.g., in Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. 665, 288 S.W.2d 718 (1956), the court
upheld a prayer and Bible reading program, saying: "With all deference to counsel for
the complainants, we feel that they have taken a rather narrow and dogmatic view
of these constitutional inhibitions. In their commendable zeal in behalf of liberty of
conscience, and of religious worship, they have overlooked the broader concept that
religion per se is something which transcends all man-made creeds. Id. at 677, 288
S.W.2d at 723. In Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950),
another Bible reading case, the court said that the practice did "not constitute sectarian
instruction or sectarian worship but . . . [was] a simple recognition 'of the Supreme
Ruler of the Universe ...... 5 N.J. at 453-54, 75 A.2d at 889.
13. The so-called "Magna Carta of religious liberty in the United States" is Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The Court announced its position in no uncertain
terms: "The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting
the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth
Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress, to
enact such laws .... ." 310 U.S. at 303. Since Cantwell was a "free exercise" case,
it remained for a later case, Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S.
203 (1948), to actually apply the "establishment' clause to a state. In the instant
case the New York court recognized applicability of the first amendment. 191 N.Y.S.2d
at 477.
14. Of the post-1948 cases involving non-compulsory religious activity in public
schools, five have invalidated the practice and four have upheld it. Holding it in-
valid: Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Inst., 128 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1960);
Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953); Miller v. Cooper, 56
N.M. 355, 244 P.2d 520 (1952); Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951);
Perry v. School Dist., 54 Wash. 2d 886, 344 P.2d 1036 (1959). Sustaining it: Cham-
berlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Inst., 143 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1962); Murray v.
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preme Court rulings on the first amendment, some state courts have
used the opportunity to broaden the scope of their own state "estab-
lishment" prohibitions. 15
Sometimes showing a reluctance to enter into the stream of cases
dealing with religious activity in the schools, 16 the Supreme Court has
interpreted the "establishment" clause as barring all governmental aid
to religion, whether given to a particular sect or to religion in general,
and as erecting a "wall of separation"Z 7 between church and state.18
In applying this interpretation the Court has left a tortuous record.10
Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698 (1962); Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435,
75 A.2d 880 (1950); Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. 665, 288 S.W.2d 718 (1956).
15. The Brown, Tudor, and Perry cases, note 14 supra, held that the activity which
violated the first amendment also breached the state constitution.
16. The Court has twice refused on highly technical grounds to reach the merits
of Bible reading cases. In Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952), plaintiffs
were found to lack standing, on the grounds that the complaint was insufficient in
setting up taxpayer standing, and that parent standing was destroyed by the child's
graduation before the case came up. Again in School Dist. v. Schempp, 364 U.S. 298
(1960), a district court decision holding unconstitutional a Bible reading program in
Pennsylvania was vacated, and the case sent back down, on the ground that the
offending statute had been amended while appeal was pending. It has been suggested
that these results were largely due to the Court's reluctance to enter this area.
BOLES, op. cit. supra note 10, at 133-35. It is certainly noteworthy that in the instant
case the Court was unconcerned with standing. Cf. note 43 infra.
On the rehearing of the Schempp case the district court again held the statute
unconstitutional. Schempp v. School Dist., 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Sub-
sequent to the decision in the instant case, the Court has noted probable jurisdiction
on the appeal of Schempp, School Dist. v. Schempp, 371 U.S. 807 (1962), and has
also granted certiorari in a Maryland Bible reading case, Murray v. Curlett, 371 U.S.
809 (1962).
17. The phrase originated in a letter written by Jefferson in 1802 to a Baptist
association. It was picked up by the Court in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 164 (1878), and declared to be an authoritative declaration of the meaning
of the first amendment. The expression has seen active duty in almost every case
concerned with the "establishment" clause.
18. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court used the following
oft-quoted language: "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of
any religious organization or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a 'wall of
separation between church and State."' 330 U.S. at 15-16.
It has been recognized that the "establishment" clause has an impact far broader than
merely to prohibit a national church (in the Church of England sense). Concurring in
the McCollum case, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), Mr. Justice Frankfurter said: "We are all
agreed that the First and the Fourteenth Amendments have a secular reach far more
penetrating in the conduct of Government than merely to forbid an 'established
church."' 333 U.S. at 213.
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Thus, the reimbursement at public expense of school bus costs to
parents of parochial school pupils was upheld in Everson v. Board
of Education 0 where the separation doctrine was first announced.
21
To be sure, a year later the Court in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educationz- held unconstitutional a program whereby upon
parental request students were released from regular classes to attend
religious instruction on school premisesP- However, a comparable
program was subsequently upheld in Zorach v. Clauson, the Court
distinguishing McCollum on the basis that in the later case the re-
ligious instruction was given off the school premises' 5 In two recent
After its application in the McCollum case, the Everson interpretation of the first
amendment received considerable criticism. See, e.g., BRADY, CONFUSION TwicE CoN-
FOUNDED passim (1955); O'NEmr., RELG ION AND EDUCATION UNDER =ii CoNsTrruToN
passim (1949); Corwin, The Supreme Court as a National School Board, 14 LAW &
CoNrmsrP. PRoB. 3 (1949). But see, e.g., PFEFFER, CHuRcH, STATE AND FREEDOM
passim (1953); Konvitz, Separation of Church and State: The First Freedom, 14 LAw
& CoNaxrp. PROB. 44 (1949).
19. Professor Cahn expresses bafflement in an article, The "Establishment of Religion"
Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1274-77 (1961). See also Pfeffer, Some Current Issues in
Church and State, 13 WEs-ErN Rs. L. REv. 9, 11-12 (1961), where the leading
advocate of the separation of church and state suggests that the "released time" cases,
McCollum, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), are
irreconcilable.
20. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
21. Note 18 supra.
22. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
23. "The . . . facts . . . show the use of tax-supported property for religious in-
struction and the close co-operation between the school authorities and the religious
council in promoting religious education. The operation of the State's compulsory
education system thus assists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction
carried on by separate religious sects. Pupils compelled by law to go to school for
secular education are released in part from their legal duty upon the condition that they
attend the religious classes. This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-
established and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread
their faith. And it falls squarely under the ban of the First Amendment . . .. 333
U.S. at 209-10.
24. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
25. "This 'released time' program involves neither religious instruction in public
school classrooms nor the expenditure of public funds. All costs, including the applica-
tion blanks, are paid by the religious organizations." 343 U.S. at 308-09. "In the
McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious instruction and the force of the
public school was used to promote that instruction. Here, as we have said, the public
schools do no more than accommodate their schedules to a program of outside religious
instruction. We follow the McCollum case." 343 U.S. at 315.
Often quoted from the majority opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas are the following
phrases: "The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects
there shall be a separation of Church and State." 343 U.S. at 312. "We are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." 343 U.S. at 313.
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Black pointed to McCollum: "We said: 'Here not only are
the State's tax-supported public school buildings used for the dissemination of religious
doctrines. The State also affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps
to provide pupils for their religious classes through use of the State's compulsory public
school machinery. This is not separation of Church and State.' (Emphasis supplied.)
McCollum v. Board of Education, . . . [333 U.S. at 212]. McCollum thus held that
Illinois could not constitutionally manipulate the compelled classroom hours . . . so
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cases, McGowan v. Maryland26 and Torcaso v. Watkins,2 the Court
reaffirmed its reliance upon the Everson separation doctrine,' and
went on to hold in the first case that Sunday closing laws could be
enforced without effecting an establishment of religion 9 and in the
second that a declaration of belief in the existence of God could not
be required as a qualification for state public office without so doing. 0
Throughout these cases the Court failed to distinguish between two
distinct lines of approach to the "establishment" clause, sometimes
treating it as an adjunct or auxiliary to the "free exercise" clause,
and at other times giving it the status of a self-sufficient and inde-
pendent imperative.31
as to channel children into sectarian classes. Yet that is exactly what the Court
holds New York can do." 343 U.S. at 316-17.
Mr. Justice Jackson also dissented, using stronger language: "The distinction at-
tempted between that case [McCollum] and this is trivial, almost to the point of
cynicism, magnifying its nonessential details and disparaging compulsion which was
the underlying reason for invalidity .... The wall which the Court was professing
to erect between Church and State has become even more warped and twisted than I
expected. Today's judgment will be more interesting to students of psychology and
of the judicial process than to students of constitutional law." 343 U.S. at 325.
26. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Three other cases with similar facts were decided at the
same time: Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market,
366 U.S. 617 (1961). The last two cases involved stores owned by Orthodox Jews
who abstained from business activity on Saturday; the other two dealt with discount
stores which sought to be open for business seven days a week.
27. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
28. 366 U.S. at 443; 367 U.S. at 492-93.
29. "Throughout this century and longer, both the federal and state governments
have oriented their activities very largely toward improvement of the health, safety,
recreation and general well-being of our citizens. Numerous laws affecting public
health, safety factors in industry, laws affecting hours and conditions of labor of
women and children, week-end diversion at parks and beaches, and cultural activities
of various kinds, now point the way toward the good life for all. Sunday Closing Laws,
like those before us, have become a part and parcel of this great governmental concern
wholly apart from their original purposes or connotations. The present purpose and
effect of most of them is to provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens; the fact
that this day is Sunday, a day of particular significance for the dominant Christian
sects, does not bar the State from achieving its secular goals. To say that the States
cannot prescribe Sunday as a day of rest for these purposes solely because centuries
ago such laws had their genesis in religion would give a constitutional interpretation of
hostility to the public welfare rather than one of mere separation of church and
State." 366 U.S. at 444-45.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in this case (compare his position in Zorach, note 25
supra) saying that the laws in question were a governmental sanction of the practices
of religious groups. 366 U.S. at 576.
30. The opinion is devoted to a discussion of the meaning and applicability of the
"establishment" clause. The last sentence, however, states that the test oath "un-
constitutionally invades the appellant's freedom of belief and religion ..... 367 U.S.
at 496.
31. Cahn, supra note 19, especially at 1281-82. Cf. Pfeffer, supra note 19, at 32.
Pfeffer points out that in the Sunday law cases, note 26 supra, the "establislment"
clause was treated as independent of and on a par with the "free exercise" clause,
whereas in Torcaso, decided in the same term of court, the implication was that the
two clauses were unitary (as Pfeffer puts it, "two sides of the same coin."),
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The Court in the instant case adopted the view that the "establish-
ment" clause is independent in objective of the "free exercise" clause,
and, unlike the latter, prohibits governmental support of religion
even when the element of compulsion is absent. 1 The purpose of
the "establishment' clause is to prevent the civil disorder and de-
basement of religion which tends to follow from a union of church
and state.33 But the history of 16th and 17th century England shows
that official prescription of prayer is such a union as to produce those
very evils.-4 And, since the founders were aware of and influenced by
the English experience, the Court concluded that this control of prayer
must have been at least one of the practices the first amendment was
designed to prohibit.- Thus, the New York program is invalid be-
cause of the state government's role in composing and encouraging
the recitation of the regents' prayer.3 That this unquestioned religious
activity 7 is prohibited, said the Court, does not prevent reference
being made to a Supreme Being on patriotic or ceremonial occasions.
However, the fact that the program in question does not establish one
sect to the exclusion of all others will not save it; sectarianism is no
longer the test, and, in the words of Madison, "[I]t is proper to
The state courts seem to have taken the position that an "establishment" prohibition
is a mere means to effecting free exercise. At least, as we have seen, note 10 supra,
few state courts have invalidated a religious activity in the public school when
compulsion was absent.
32. 370 U.S. at 430-33. The Court recognized that the two clauses would overlap
in some instances, but declared that they were designed to prohibit two quite different
kinds of governmental encroachment.
33. Id. at 431.
34. Id. at 425-27, 432-33.
35. Id. at 429-30. "The First Amendment was added to the Constitution to stand
as a guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Government
would be used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people
can say .... Id. at 429.
36. The Court formulated its holding several times throughout the opinion, with
varied wording:
"We think that by using its public school system to encourage recitation of the
Regents' prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent
with the Establishment Clause ... ." Id. at 424.
"[W]e think that the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establish-
ment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the
business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American
people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government." Id. at 425.
"[E]ach separate government in this country should stay out of the business of
writing or sanctioning official prayers ...... Id. at 435. It is seen that in the first
passage the Court found recitation of the prayer objectionable, in the second compo-
sition and recitation were the offending features when used in conjunction, and in the
third composition alone invalidated the practice. These passages, however, read in
the light of that set out above, note 35 supra, indicate that the Court was concerned
,with any governmental control exercised over prayer, whether it be by composition of
an official state prayer, or by the setting up of a state-backed prayer recitation program.
37. Id. at 424-25.
38. Id. at 435 n.21.
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take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties." 9 Concurring
separately, Mr. Justice Douglas saw the principal issue to be whether
or not government could constitutionally finance a religious exercise.40
He found that it could not, for the reason that such financing would
make government a divisive influence in our society.41 Mr. Justice
Stewart was the lone dissenter; he could not see "how an 'official
religion' is established by letting those who want to say a prayer say
it."
42
The historical technique employed by the Court gives this case
both its principal strength and its principal weakness. 43 Its strength
lies in the clear-cut adoption of the "independent imperative" view of
the "establishment" clause; here, history showed the Court that the
framers had a broader purpose when they prohibited "establishment"
than merely to preserve free exercise of religious belief.44 In applying
the newly independent "establishment" clause, however, the Court
used an approach which, if followed, will cast a rigidity into the
clause that may negate its purpose. The Court's test seems to be:
Does history tell us that the practice in question was one the framers
must have had in mind to prevent when the first amendment was
written?4 5 The weakness of this test is apparent, apart from its super-
39. Id. at 436.
40. Id. at 437.
41. Id. at 442. It is significant that Mr. Justice Douglas, who voted with the
majority in the five-to-four decision of the Everson case, note 20 supra, stated in the
instant case that he now feels Everson was wrongly decided. Id. at 443-44.
42. Id. at 445. Justices Frankfurter and White took no part in the decision.
43. There are other difficulties with the opinion. Standing, which was such a big
factor in the Doremus case, note 16 supra, was not raised here. Petitioners had stand-
ing in the Now York courts by virtue of their position as parents, but here, where
their complaint was founded on the "establishment" clause, it might be thought that
fourteenth amendment requirements would require them to establish taxpayer standing.
The answer to this problem is probably that the Court no longer feels itself limited in
applying the first amendment to the states by the requirements of the fourteenth
amendment, and that any type of standing will suffice to enable petitioners to attack
any first amendment violation. See The Supreme Court, 1951 Term, 66 HAnv. L. REv.
89, 120-21 (1952).
A bigger difficulty is raised by the Court's "patriotic and ceremonial occasion"
exclusion, note 38 supra. It is hard to imagine a more patriotic ceremony than that
used by New York here: The Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag (which includes
reference to God) followed by a short, set prayer in which God's blessings are
begged for, inter alia, the country. It is submitted that what the Court was
struggling with was the fact that the same act may constitute an "establishment" in
one context, and not in another. As suggested in the text below, a more fruitful
approach would be to consider whether or not the activity in question introduced a
divisive note, and to be aware that what may be a divisive influence in a public school-
room may be no more than a pro forma routine in the halls of Congress.
44. This is what Calm calls the Madisonian view of the first amendment. Calm,
supra note 19, passim. The opposite view is called the Jeffersonian view. Note that
the Court makes extensive footnote reference to Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance,
and no reference at all to the writings of Jefferson.
45. This is the same approach which the Court used in the Torcaso case, note 27
supra. There the historical inquiry was directed at test oaths, and the Court found
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ficiality; activities once dangerous have lost their threat, while others
unknown to the past have become potent, thus making it an often use-
less criterion. The weakness stems from the fact that the Court, in
formulating the test, avoided inquiry into the underlying policy of
the "establishment" clause, and failed to take proper account of
modem changes in social institutions (e.g., the rise of the public
school). It is submitted that a more profitable approach is that sug-
gested by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Mc-
Collum,6 and hinted at in the instant case by Mr. Justice Douglas. 47
The civil disorder produced by the entrance of government into
religious affairs results from the divisive influence that such inter-
ference exerts on the community. The "establishment" clause is a
command to eliminate this divisiveness. But it must be recognized that
a limited amount of intertwining of government and religion is in-
evitable in our society." The question is where to draw the line so
as to assure the elimination of divisive influence without doing
unnecessary harm to existing social institutions. The answer will vary
as time changes the impact of the activity in question and the charac-
ter of the institutional context, and, at any given time, the answer will
vary from one context to another. That which constitutes a real
divisive force in the schoolroom may be no more than a pro forma rou-
tine when practiced in the halls of Congress. And nowhere must
divisiveness be weighed more critically than in the public schools,
that such oaths were in use in pre-Revolutionary days, and were among the specific
items that the first amendment was designed to eliminate.
46. It would be presumptive to do more than quote certain pertinent passages
from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion:
"Designed to serve as perhaps the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion
among a heterogenous democratic people, the public school must keep scrupulously
free from entanglement in the strife of sects. The preservation of the community from
divisive conflicts, of Government from irreconcilable pressures by religious groups, of
religion from censorship and coercion however subtly exercised, requires strict con-
finement of the State to instruction other than religious, leaving to the individual's
church and home, indoctrination in the faith of his choice." McCollum v. Board of
Educ., supra note 22, at 216-17. "The children belonging to these non-participating
sects will .. . have inculcated in them a feeling of separatism when the school should
be the training ground for habits of community .... ." 333 U.S. at 227. "[Tlhe
public school system of Champaign actively furthers inculcation in the religious tenets
of some faiths, and in the process sharpens the consciousness of religious differences at
least among some of the children committed to its care. These are consequences not
amendable to statistics .... ." Id. at 228. (Emphasis added.) "Separation means
separation, not something less. Jefferson's metaphor in describing the relation between
Church and State speaks of a 'wall of separation,' not of a fine line easily overstepped.
The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive
means for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more
vital to keep out divisive force than in its schools, to avoid confusing, not to say
fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep strictly apart." Id. at 231.
47. 370 U.S. at 442.
48. A marked decline in religious interest would, of course, completely alter the
situation. An area where a non-Christian religion predominates may also be confronted
with a far less serious problem (e.g., Hawaii).
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which have perhaps the key role in our society in fostering national
unity. Both by the Court's test and by that proposed here the Bible
reading programs now on their way up49 should be invalidated; Bible
reading is a traditional technique for teaching religious doctrine, 0
and it certainly generates a divisive force.51 As to the myriad of other
activities52 which are yet to be tested, it is submitted that the proposed
method for approaching the problem will prove more fruitful than
that used by the Court in the instant case.
Criminal Law-Narcotics-Criminal Prosecution for
Addiction Is a Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Violating Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
Defendant, a resident of the city of Los Angeles, was prosecuted
in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles under section 11721 of the
California Health and Safety Code.' The court instructed the jurors
49. The cases referred to are the Murray and Schempp cases, note 16 supra. The
Miami Bible reading case, Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Inst., 143 So. 2d
21 (Fla. 1962), will also be brought up for the Court's attention.
50. Most Protestant church services consist in part of reading, without comment,
from the Bible. In fact, Bible reading without comment is one of the geneses and
characteristic features of Protestantism.
51. Recall the large number of Bible reading cases which have been brought in
the state courts, note 10 supra.
52. Wearing of religious garb, distribution of religious literature, released time,
recitation of the Lord's Prayer, and similar activities, note 10 supra, will no doubt
make their appearance before the Court in due time. A number of other problems
have been suggested: baccalaureate programs on school premises; meetings of student
religious organizations before or after school on school premises; timing of school
holidays to coincide with Christian religious observances; Christmas and Easter dis-
plays in the schoolroom; etc. No pat solution may be given for these questions, but
it is suggested that the Court's test in the instant case will prove of little use in tackling
many of these situations.
Another difficulty is to determine the status of the McCollum-Zorach duo. If the
method of approach proposed herein were followed, Zorach would be overturned.
Abolition of released time and relegation of off-campus religious instruction to after-
school hours will surely not seriously hamper either the school system or religious
education; the manipulation of compelled classroom hours so as to channel children
into religious classes clearly sets apart those channeled, and is thus a divisive influence.
Potentially the hottest issue is raised by Mr. Justice Douglas' repudiation of
Everson, note 41 supra. Aid to parochial schools is a very live question. An answer
cannot be attempted here, other than to say that the Court will again be forced to
penetrate to a deeper level than that heretofore reached in the consideration of such
cases.
1. "No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of
narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a person
liscensed by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be the burden
of the defense to show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted of
violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced
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that they were to find the defendant guilty if they all agreed either:
(a) that defendant had used illegally obtained narcotics in Los
Angeles County, or (b) that while in the city of Los Angeles de-
fendant was addicted 2 to the use of such narcotics.3 The jury returned
a verdict of guilty. In accordance with the provisions of the statute,4
defendant was sentenced to ninety days in jail. The Appellate De-
partment of the Los Angeles Superior Court affirmed the conviction.5
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed.
A state statute classifying as criminal the status of being addicted
to the use of illegally obtained narcotics and imposing as punishment
confinement in jail without medical treatment violates the "cruel and
unusual punishment' prohibition of the eighth amendment of the
United States Constitution made applicable to the states by the
fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 7
This decision by the nation's highest Court compels a re-evaluation
of federal and state statutes which employ criminal sanctions as a
means of coping with the problem of narcotics addition.8 With
to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the county jail.
The court may place a person convicted hereunder on probation for a period not to
exceed five years and shall in all cases in which probation is granted require as a
condition thereof that such person be confined in the county jail for at least 90 days.
In no event does the court have the power to absolve a person who violates this
section from the obligation of spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county
jail." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721.
2. "The court instructed the jury that, 'The word "addicted" means, strongly dis-
posed to some taste or practice or habituated, especially to drugs. In order to inquire
as to whether a person is addicted to the use of narcotics is in effect an inquiry
as to his habit in that regard. . . .To use them often or daily is, according to the
ordinary acceptance of those words, to use them habitually."' 370 U.S. at 686 n.2.
3. In distinguishing addiction from use, the trial judge instructed the jury, "'To be
addicted to the use of narcotics is said to be a status or condition and not an act.
It is a continuing offense and differs from most other offenses in the fact that [sic]
is chronic rather than acute; that it continues after it is complete and subjects the
offender to arrest at any time before he reforms."' Id. at 662.
4. See note 1 supra.
5. This was the highest state court to which appeal could be taken. Habeas corpus
relief was denied by the California District Court of Appeal and by the California
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the United States noted probable jurisdiction
of the appeal, 368 U.S. 918 (1961).
6. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
7. Appellees petitioned for a rehearing on the grounds that the defendant had
died, apparently from an overdose of narcotics, ten months prior to the Court's
consideration of his appeal. Rehearing was denied, 83 Sup. Ct. 202 (1962).
8. In recent years dissatisfaction has been expressed with the criminal approach
to the problem of narcotics addiction. "The present policy . . . enforces the pro-
hibition of all narcotics for the satisfaction of addiction. Since, at the time of its
inauguration, there was a sizeable addict population . .. this prohibition policy ap-
parently assumed that total abstinence was a feasible goal for all addicts. . . .The
adoption of this policy confronted every addict with the dilemma of either seeking to
cure his addiction or violating the law and, thus, exposing himself to criminal prose-
cution, conviction, and incarceration. The fact that many thousands, chose the latter
course, despite the threat of imprisonment and the destructive personal and social
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respect to their direct effect on the narcotic addict,9 these statutes fall
into two general categories: (1) those which make a criminal offense
of the condition or status of addiction,10 and (2) those which make a
criminal offense of an act essential to this status-acquisition, posses-
sion, or use of narcotics. In addition to California, fifteen states and
consequences of addict status, raises some question as to the practicality of a policy
that attempts to enforce total abstinence on the part of addicts." Finestone, Narcotics
and Criminality, 22 LAw & CoNmEmP. PROB. 69, 79 (1957).
This dissatisfaction is due to two factors which are closely related. One, as men-
tioned above, has been the inability of the criminal approach to sufficiently reduce
the number of persons addicted to narcotics. See Cantor, The Criminal Law and the
Narcotics Problem, 51 J. Cum. L., C. & P.S. 512 (1960-61); King, Narcotic Drug
Laws and Enforcement Policies, 22 LAW, & CoNTEMP. Pon. 113 (1957); Note,
Narcotics Regulation, 62 YALE L.J. 751 (1953). Contra, ANS.INGER & To,,%PKINS,
THE TAAuFic nN NAnco-ncs (1953).
The second factor is the belief that the narcotic addict cannot overcome his desire
for narcotics without appropriate medical and psychiatric treatment, i.e., addiction is
an illness. NyswnAND, ThE DRUG ADDICT AS A PATIENT (1956); Winick, Narcotics
Addiction and its Treatment, 22 LAw & CoNTEMp. PROB. 9 (1957).
The narcotics problem was the subject of a recent study by a joint committee of the
American Bar Association and the American Medical Association. Among the con-
clusions reached by this committee were the following:
"1. There appears to have been a considerable increase in drug addiction in the
United States immediately following World War II ....
"2. As a result, the federal government and many states passed legislation im-
posing increasingly severe penalties upon violators of the drug laws, as a means of
dealing with the apparent increase in addiction.
"3. This penal legislation subjects both the drug peddler and his victim, the addict,
to long prison sentences, often imposed by mandatory statutory requirements without
benefit of the probation and parole opportunities afforded other prisoners.
"4. Though drug peddling is acknowledged to be a vicious and predatory crime,
a grave question remains whether severe jail and prison sentences are the most rational
way of dealing with narcotic addicts ...
"5. The narcotic drug addict because of his physical and psychological dependence
on drugs and because of his frequently abnormal personality patterns should be as
much a subject of concern to medicine and public health as to those having to do with
law enforcement ...... ABA-AMA Jonr CoMMrrTEE ON NAcoTIc DRUGS, FINAL
REPORT, as reproduced in DRUG ADDICTION: CiME oR DISEASE 163 (1961). For com-
ments by the Bureau of Narcotics on this committee's interim report see ADvSAnY
CoMm. To FED. BUREAU OF NAconcs, C MMENTS ON NARCOTIC DRUGs (1958).
9. Not all jurisdictions employ the definition of "addiction" adopted by the California
court, supra note 2. Some require a greater degree of dependence on narcotics:
"habitually uses . . . to such an extent as to create a tolerance for such drugs," LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 961 (1951); "so far addicted to the use of such habit-
forming narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self control with reference to his
addiction," D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-602(a) (1961).
10. Generally an essential element of a criminal offense is an act. See HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIViNAL LAW 18, 171-211 (2d ed. 1960). Nevertheless
persons have been subjected to criminal prosecution merely for being in a particular
status. "Vagrancy is the principal crime in which the offense consists of being a
certain kind of person rather than in having done or failed to do certain acts. Other
crimes of this nature include being a common drunkard, common prostitute, common
thief, tramp, or disorderly person." Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal
Condition, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1203 (1953). Statutes which make an offense of the
status of vagrancy "are generally looked upon as regulatory measures to prevent crime
rather than as ordinary criminal laws which prohibit and punish certain acts as crimes."
People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 148, 190 N.E. 301, 303 (1934).
[VoL. 16
RECENT CASES
the District of Columbia subject the addict to criminal prosecution
because of his status. In two states, treatment is an essential feature
of the addict's confinement." In the remaining jurisdictions, statutes
either make no provision for treatment 2 or provide for treatment at
the discretion of the court.13 If the addict is discovered with narcotics
in his possession, he is subject to criminal prosecution under federal
statutes which make possession prima facie evidence of violation of
the statute.14 Unauthorized possession is a criminal offense in every
state.'5 Only in New York is the addict given statutory protection
from criminal prosecution. A measure passed by the New York
legislature in 1962 entitles the addict charged with possession to
undergo a thirty-six month program of institutionalized and environ-
mental treatment.16 The criminal charge is held in abeyance and is
dismissed when the addict completes the treatment program.'
7
In the present decision, the Court expressly limited its considera-
11. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 18.1124 (1957); WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 69.32.080-90 (Supp.
1959).
12. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 22-40 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
195.020, .200 (1962); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-8 (Supp. 1961); OLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, §§ 470.11, -12 (Supp. 1962); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63-338(9), -339 (1950).
13. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-5-5 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 33.416a (1961);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3538a (Supp. 1962); Ky. REv. STAT. § 218.250 (Supp. 1962);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 961, 981 (1951); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.250 (Supp.
1961); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 475.625-45 (Supp. 1961); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-42-9
(Supp. 1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 161.02(3) (1957).
14. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4724(c); 70 Stat. 570 (1956), as amended, 21
U.S.C. § 174 (1958).
15. For a list of the states with appropriate code sections which have prohibited
possession through enactment of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act see 21 Wis. STAT.
ANN. at 262 (1957). States omitted from this list also prohibit possession. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFmY CODE § 11500; MAss. ANN. LAws c. 94, § 205 (Supp. 1961);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 6846 (1942); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 318:49 (1955); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 780-4 (Supp. 1961).
16. N.Y. MENTAL HYGmNE LAW §§ 211-213 (Supp. 1962).
17. In enforcing the statutes which subject the addict to criminal prosecution, the
courts have afforded the addict little protection prior to the present decision. As a
general rule, courts have been reluctant to set aside as so excessive as to be cruel
and unusual, punishment imposed by a legislative body. "Whatever views may be
entertained regarding severity of punishment, whether one believes in its efficacy or
its futility . . . these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy." Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958). In affirmfng sentences imposed for violation of
federal narcotic statutes, the federal courts have adhered to this rule. E.g., Black v.
United States, 269 F.2d 38 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 938 (1959); Smith
v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 846 (1959);
Hagan v. United States, 256 F.2d 34 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850
(1958). In the courts of the states the addict has not fared much better. In two
jurisdictions state courts have indicated that an addict possessing narcotics for his
own use could not be prosecuted under state statutes prohibiting possession. State
v. Reed, 62 N.J. Super. 303, 162 A.2d 873 (App. Div. 1960), rev'd o other grounds,




tion18 and its holding19 to that aspect of the California statute which
subjected the addict to criminal prosecution and imprisonment be-
cause of his status. In the majority opinion and at greater length in
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, the proposition was
developed that the condition of being addicted to narcotics is an
illness. The Court then held that to brand a person a criminal and
imprison him because he is in such a status is a cruel and unusual
punishment. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in holding the statute
unconstitutional but disagreed with the use of the cruel and unusual
punishment prohibition as incorporated in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. He did not think that the present state of medi-
cal knowledge justified the categorical conclusion that narcotic addic-
tion is an illness, thereby making it a cruel and unusual punishment
for the state to subject narcotics addicts to its criminal law.20 His ob-
jection to the statute centered upon the fact that it did not require
an act but made a criminal offense of the addict's status. Although he
did not mention the fourteenth amendment, it was clear that he would
have preferred striking the statute down via the due process clause
alone as an "arbitrary imposition which exceeds the power that a
State may exercise in enacting its criminal law."21
Although the Court expressly limited its holding to those statutes
which make a criminal offense of the addict's status, its reliance upon
the substance of the eighth amendment?2 tends to broaden the effect
of the holding to include statutes which subject the addict to criminal
prosecution because of an act essential to his status. The use of the
eighth amendment raises the question of whether it would be any
less cruel and unusual to imprison an addict for acquiring, possessing,
18. "This statute, therefore, is not one which punishes a person for the use of
narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for anti-social or disorderly behavior
resulting from their administration. It is not a law which even purports to provide
or require medical treatment. Rather, we deal with a statute which makes the 'status'
of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may be prosecuted,at any time before he reforms."' 370 U.S. at 666.
19. "We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal,
even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty
of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 667.
20. Id. at 678.
21. Id. at 679.
22. This is the first time that the Court has held the eighth amendment applicable to
the states although it has previously indicated a willingness to do so. Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910), the Court extended the scope of the eighth amendment to include dis-
proportionate punishment as well as intrinsically cruel and unusual punishment. The
present use of the eighth seems to follow that interpretation to its logical conclusion.
For a discussion of cases interpreting the eighth amendment see Sutherland, Due
Process and Cruel Punishment, 64 HAzv. L. RFv. 271 (1951); Note, The Effectiveness




or using narcotics. Logic dictates a negative answer. Mr. Justice
Harlan suggested grounds for holding the California statute uncon-
stitutional which very clearly would have limited the effect of the
holding to the status statutes. If the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment without the incorporation of the eighth amendment
would have provided a satisfactory basis for striking the statute down,
the Court's choice of the eighth would appear to indicate a present
willingness to expand the holding to include the act statutes. How-
ever, it seems that the fourteenth amendment alone would not have
been adequate. As noted by Mr. Justice White in his dissenting
opinion, conviction authorized by the statute did not rest on "sheer
status."2 "As defined by the trial court, addiction is the regular use
of narcotics and can be proved only by evidence of such use."24 In
addition, making the status of addiction a criminal offense is not an
"arbitrary imposition." Such legislation has the same purpose as that
which subjects those in the status of vagrancy to criminal prosecution
-the prevention of criminal acts.' Indeed, in six jurisdictions the
addict is classified either a vagrant2 or a disorderly person.2 7 The
reasonableness of placing the addict in the same category as the
vagrant becomes apparent when one considers the close relationship
between narcotics addiction and crime. Not only must the addict
transgress state and federal law in acquiring, possessing, and using
narcotics, but "for most narcotic addicts, predatory crime . . . is a
necessary way of life."2
Thus, it appears that it may have been necessary for the Court to
utilize the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition in its attack
on the status aspect of,.the California statute. The effect of the de-
cision on similar statutes which make no provision for treatment is
clear. They have been struck down.29 The effect of the decision on
the status statutes which do provide for treatment is not clear beyond
the fact that if these statutes are valid, the courts may have lost the
right to exercise their discretion with regard to treatment for the ad-
dict. It may very well be that these statutes have also been struck
down since the Court objected to branding the addict a criminal.
23. 370 U.S. at 685.
24. Id. at 686.
25. See note 10 supra.
26. D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-416a (1961); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-61-1(12) (1953);
VA. CODE ANN. § 63-338(9) (1950); WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.87.010(12) (Supp. 1957).
27. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 48-6-20(5) (Supp. 1960); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:170-8
(Supp. 1961).
28. DRuG ADDICTION: CRIUE on DISEASE 64 (1961); accord, ANSLINGER & TomI'KINs,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 267-78.
29. The present decision has already been cited by the Supreme Court of Missouri
in striking down that state's statute (see note 12 supra) which subjected the addict




In that event, the only avenue open to the states for confining an
addict without proof -of an act is civil commitment. Even though the
use of the eighth amendment in the present decision may have been
justified, the broad implications of the holding remain and cannot be
ignored by Congress or the legislatures of the states. There may be
no indication that the Court will apply the eighth amendment to the
act statutes in the immediate future, but the present decision has
established a basis for doing so at a later date. The decision calls
for further modification of the criminal approach to the problem of
narcotics addiction. This modification might take the form of the
legislation recently enacted by New York.
Damages-Collateral Source Rule-Value of Medical
Services Plaintiff Received as a Gratuity Not
Allowed as Special Damages
Plaintiff, a physician, was injured as a result of defendant's negli-
gence. Plaintiff's fellow doctors rendered him medical services with-
out charge, and the necessary physiotherapy treatments were given
him by his regularly-employed office nurse during regular office hours.
In his bill of particulars plaintiff claimed as special damages the
reasonable value of medical and nursing care. The trial court ruled
that these were not proper items of damages. The supreme court,
appellate division, affirmed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of
New York, held, affirmed. Since a plaintiff in a personal injury action
is entitled only to compensation from the defendant, he cannot
further recover as special damages the value of services which he
received as a gratuity. Coyne v. Campbell, 183 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y.
1962).
Damages at early common law proposed to do no more than make
the plaintiff whole.' The plaintiff in a personal injury action was en-
titled to reimbursement for any out-of-pocket expense incurred as a
result of the defendant's wrong, as well as general damages for pain
and suffering.2 But he was entitled to no more than this, and if, as a
result of the defendant's wrong, he received any benefits which tended
to reduce out-of-pocket expenses, such benefits were considered by
the courts in determining the amount of the plaintiff's damages. A
rather limited exception was recognized when the benefit was "col-
1. McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES § 137 (1935); OLEci, DAMAGES TO PERSON AND PRoP-
ERTY § 1 (1961).
2. OLEcK, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1.
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lateral to the defendant," that is, was only remotely connected with
the wrong, in which case evidence of the benefit was considered
irrelevant.3 English tort law is still largely controlled by this rule,
4
although some revision is apparently now in process.5 In the United
States, however, this "collateral source" exception has been ex-
tended in personal injury cases to exclude evidence of almost all pay-
ments and services received by a plaintiff from any source other than
the defendant.6 In a personal injury action a defendant is not allowed
to benefit by sums paid or services rendered the plaintiff, whether
gratuitously or not.7 The broadening of the exception began with life
and accident insurance cases8 and was later extended to cases in-
volving continuation of wages, 9 pension plans,10 workman's compensa-
tion and other statutory benefits," gratuitious medical and nursing
services, and gifts given plaintiff by friends,'12 members of the family,13
and charity.14 In life and accident insurance cases the collateral source
3. MAYNE, DAMAGES 149, 151 (11th ed. 1946). The limited scope of this exception
is shown in the following discussion by Young, L. J., differentiating between a pension
given a widow and a gift to the widow by her husband's fellow workers. The case
involved a wrongful death statute, but the common law of damages in this area is
well illustrated. "[W]hile the fatal accident to the deceased was in these cases the
causa sine qua non of the subscription, it was the occasion but not the causa causans
of its payment. I conceive that normally in such cases the amount of the subscrip-
tion is largely personal to the beneficiaries, and is materially affected by their merit
in the eyes of the subscribers or the reverse. Such considerations have no place in
the pension payment, and if a case were to occur where such subscriptions as I have
referred to were shown to be motived solely on the death of the deceased and were
handed over for his widow and children solely because of their relationship to him
and irrespective entirely of any personal qualification or merit or otherwise of their
own, I should be of opinion that these payments too, like the pension payment must
be brought into account against the defendant's liability. And the reason is that, as
Lord Watson says, the right to recover damages is restricted to the actual pecuniary
loss sustained by each individual entitled to sue." Baker v. Dalgleish Steam Shipping
Co., [1922] 1 K.B. 361, 380-81 (1921).
4. See British Transp. Comm'n v. Gourley, [1956] A.C. 185 (1955); Jenner v.
Allen West & Co., [1959] 1 Weekly L.R. 554 (C.A.), noted in 75 L.Q. REv. 298
(1959); Mead v. Clarke Chapman & Co., [1956] 1 Weekly L.R. 76 (C.A.); Baker
v. Dalgleish Steam Shipping Co., supra note 3.
5. See Judd v. Hammersmith Hosp. Bd., [1960] 1 Weekly L.R. 1328 (Q.B.), noted in
76 L.Q. REv. 345 (1960) (plaintiff's benefits from contributing pension, cannot aid
defendant); Schneider v. Eisovitch, [1960] 2 Q.B. 430, noted in 76 L.Q. REv. 187
(1960) (recovery for gratuitous services of plaintiff's brother where plaintiff intends
to repay him); Peacock v. Amusement Equip. Co., [1954] 2 Q.B. 347 (aid given
plaintiff by his stepchildren irrelevant to question of amount of damages).
6. 1 SuTm , DAMAGES § 158 (4th ed. 1916).
7. Ibid.
8. E.g., Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536 (1870).
9. E.g., Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Miller, 120 Ga. 453, 47 S.E. 959 (1904);
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Porter, 117 Tenn. 13, 94 S.W. 666 (1906).
10. E.g., Sinovich v. Erie R.R., 230 F.2d 658 (3d Cir. 1956).
11. E.g., Sheffield Co. v. Phillips, 69 Ga. App. 41, 24 S.E.2d 834- (1943).
12. E.g., Clark v. Berry Seed Co., 225 Iowa 262, 280 N.W. 505 (1938).
13. E.g., Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, 122 Minn. 327, 142 N.W.
706 (1913).
14. E.g., Mobley v. Garcia, 54 N.M. 175, 217 P.2d 256 (1950).
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rule is applied in all jurisdictions. A few American courts still do
not apply the doctrine in all areas: New York'5 and Alabama 16 seem
to hold to the early common law; Missouri17 and Pennsylvania' 8
allow recovery where the aid is gratuitous, but not when paid under
a contract other than insurance; and other courts have made special
rules in special fact situations.19 However, the collateral source rule,
disallowing evidence of any mitigating benefits from a source other
than the defendant, is now broadly applied in all personal injury
cases in the great majority of states.20
The instant case reaffirms the New York rule that a plaintiff may
not recover for medical expenses for which he incurred no legal
liability. The court follows Drinkwater v. Dinsmore,2' the leading
New York case decided in 1880, declaring it still to be the law of
New YorkYP Drinkwater held that evidence that plaintiff's employer
had paid him regular wages during his incapacity was admissible. By
way of dictum, the Drinkwater court also purported to rule that only
out-of-pocket medical expenses are recoverable as special damages.2
The court in the instant case points out that in 1957 the New York
Law Revision Committee recommended legislation specifically de-
signed "to abrogate the rule of Drinkwater v. Dinsmore,"24 which it
15. See Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N.Y. 390 (1880). But see Healy v. Rennert,
9 N.Y.2d 202, 173 N.E.2d 777 (1961), discussed note 31 infra.
16. See Note, 14 ALA. L. R v. 148 (1961).
17. Moon v. St. Louis Transit Co., 247 Mo. 227, 152 S.W. 303 (1912).
18. Pensak v. Peerless Oil Co., 311 Pa. 207, 166 AUt. 792 (1933); Quigley v.
Pennsylvania Ry., 210 Pa. 162, 59 AUt. 958 (1904). But cf. Schwoerer v. City of
Philadelphia, 167 Pa. Super. 356, 74 A.2d 755 (1950) where it is said: "since the
plaintiff rendered to his employer no service of any kind (during the period of disa-
bility), the sums paid to the plaintiff by his employer must be a gift or gratuity." 74
A.2d at 757.
19. Connecticut: Di Leo v. Dolinsky, 129 Conn. 203, 27 A.2d 126 (1942) (no recovery
for value of services rendered by charity hospital); Massachusetts: Daniels v. Celeste,
303 Mass. 148, 21 N.E.2d 1 (1939) (no recovery for nursing rendered by wife since
wife could enforce no claim against plaintiff); Colorado: United States v. Gaidys, 194
F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1952) (no recovery for value of medical services, hospitalization,
or loss of time where these were furnished serviceman by government); Publx Cab
Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 338 P.2d 702 (1959) (plaintiff's health
and hospital insurance cannot aid defendant); City of Englewood v. Bryant, 100 Colo.
552, 68 P.2d 913 (1937) (recovery for value of nursing by plaintiff's mother without
expectation of pay, but no recovery for medical treatment rendered gratuitously by
county hospital).
20. See Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Conley v. Foster, 335
S.W.2d 904 (Ky. 1960); Plank v. Summers, 203 Md. 552, 102 A.2d 262 (1954);
RESTATEmmu, TORTS § 920, comment e, § 924, comment f (1939) (exception made
in the charity hospital cases).
21. 80 N.Y. 390 (1880).
22. "Although decided more than 80 years ago, the Drinkwater case has continuously
been and still is recognized as the prevailing law of this State ..... 183 N.E.2d at
891.
23. "[T]he plaintiff must show what he paid the doctor, and can recover only so
much as he paid or was bound to pay." 80 N.Y. at 393, quoted in 183 N.E.2d at 891.
24. 1957 REPoRT oF N.Y. LAw REvIsION Comm'N 223.
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criticized as "unfair, illogical, and unduly complex,as but that the
legislature "declined to enact ' 2 the proposed amendment to the Civil
Practice Act.27 The court treats this inaction as a manifestation of
legislative intent to leave the Drinkwater rule in effect. Plaintiff
argued that the services rendered him were not actually gratuitous,
since he is under a moral obligation to reciprocate with free services
should his fellow doctors ever need them; however, the court rejected
this contention.28 The court apparently assumes that the fact that
plaintiff's nurse was paid no additional compensation for treating
plaintiff is equivalent to the services being gratuitous? 9 Finally, the
court rejects the contention that Healy v. Rennert,30 a recent case
applying the collateral source rule to a fireman's pension and health
insurance benefits, abrogates Drinkwater.31 According to the court,
to depart from Drinkwater would be to adopt a rule which would do
more than compensate plaintiff "where damages are compensatory
and not punitive,"3 and would "in the end simply require a defendant
to pay a plaintiff the value of a gift."-" A concurring opinion also dis-
tinguishes the Healy case and applies the early common law limita-
tion to the scope of that which is to be regarded as a "collateral
source."m A vigorous dissenting opinion is based primarily on the
Healy case and the Law Revision Committee Report.
The court in the instant case apparently confines the application of
"collateral source" rule in New York to services for which plaintiff has
paid or is bound to pay.- If this is now the New York rule, however,
it seems to be wrongly applied to the claimed damages for the nurse's
services. The services of a salaried nurse are not a gratuity to her
employer when they become part of the duties of her regular work
25. Id. at 227.
26. 183 N.E.2d at 891.
27. See generally Legislation, 26 FomniAm L. REv. 372, 380 (1957).
28. "[I]n any event such a moral obligation is not an injury for which tort damages,
which 'must be compensatory only ... may be awarded. A moral obligation, without
more, will not support a claim for legal damages." 183 N.E.2d at 892.
29. "Plaintiff does not claim that he was required to or in fact did pay any addi-
tional compensation to his nurse for her performance of these duties, and, therefore,
this has not resulted in compensable damage to plaintiff." 183 N.E.2d at 892.
30. 9 N.Y.2t 202, 173 N.E.2d 777 (1961).
31. The Healy case makes no mention of Drinkwater; it merely recognizes that the
majority view in the United States allows recovery and then applies that rule to the
facts.
32. 183 N.E.2d at 893.
33. Ibid.
34. "If this were-and it is not-a case of 'payment from collateral source,' Healy
v. Rennert ...would be authority for recovery." 183 N.E.2d at 893.
35. "In short, insurance, pension, vacation and other benefits which were contracted
and paid for are not relevant here. Gratuitous services rendered by relatives, neighbors
and friends are not compensable." 183 N.E.2d at 892.
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week.s3 The holding as to the medical services, while definitely
against the weight of authority, seems to be a desirable result. The
function served by the collateral source rule at its early stages was to
save judicial time and trouble in having to hear evidence and argu-
ments which could do no more than point up the basic conflict be-
tween two equally attractive ideas of justice: that civil damages
should be compensatory only, and that the defendant should not
receive the benefit of the plaintiff's friends' generosity or provident
contracts with which the defendant's only connection is his wrong to
the plaintiff. Perhaps the collateral source rule is the best solution to
the problem in those areas where the background remains unchanged
by modem developments and where the arguments on either side
merely emphasize this conceptual difficulty. 37  But unfortunately,
while new "collateral sources" have been brought into the courts as
society has become more complex, the courts have continued to speak
in terms of "compensation" and the established "collateral source'
exception. Rather fine distinctions as to the definition of a "collateral
source" have resulted in confusion and uncertainty in the law of the
jurisdictions which more or less follow the common law view with its
emphasis on compensation;38 the more liberal jurisdictions avoid this
evil by applying the rule to all relief from sources other than the de-
fendant, apparently overlooking other important considerations. A
better approach in these cases would be to examine the rather clearly
defined areas in which the collateral source rule has been applied
and to consider, in addition to the theoretical distinctions, the in-
terests of society served by allowing or disallowing recovery. It is
fairly clear that public policy demands that recovery from the de-
fendant not be precluded by insurance coverage, not so much because
the source is collateral to the defendant as because to hold otherwise
36. These services consumed two hours a week for some three and a half years.
Brief for Appellant, p. 6, Coyne v. Campbell, 183 N.E.2d 891 (N.Y. 19062). Plaintiff
paid his nurse for these services just as he paid for her office duties; she certainly did
not work for plaintiff gratuitously. The nurse did not spend extra time for the same salary
because of plaintiff's injury; on the contrary, plaintiff lost the value of her services to
his business during the two hours a week she was treating him.
37. The usual reason given for the collateral source rule here is that "where a gift
is intended to be made to the injured person its benefits should not inure to the
tortfeasor." RE-sTATMmNT, TORTS § 924, comment f (1939). This argument usually
ignores the fact that the plaintiff would still be benefited considerably by being
relieved of worry over the uncertainities of litigation and by having the use of the
money when he most needs it. And to allow recovery from the defendant does more
than compensate. A gift at any other time would be completely irrelevant, but here
the gift was caused or occasioned by the accident. Proximate cause (policy) questions
might enter the discussion, as well as the question of the intent of the donor. 2
HAnPER & Jvmsas, TORTS § 25.22 (1956). These arguments and discussions do no
more than point up the fact that a conflict exists.
38. Le., the criticisms in the 1957 REPoRT oF N.Y. LAw R1wsroN COMM'N, Op. Cit.




might tend to encourage persons to leave themselves unprotected and
would increase the cost of insurance protection by eliminating rights
of subrogation.39 The same would seem to apply to cases in which
the plaintiff has protected himself by contract with his employer,
especially where subrogation is provided.40 In those states in which a
right of subrogation is given the insurer under workmen's compensa-
tion statutes, the legislature has made the policy determination that
defendant, rather than the public, will be made to bear the burden
of compensating the injured party, with the public bearing the risks
of non-recovery.4' In other cases, however, the application of the
collateral source rule can have no other result than to allow the
plaintiff damages which are not needed to compensate him for his
injuries. For example, the charity hospital cases and cases under those
workmen's compensation statutes which have no subrogation pro-
visions42 give the plaintiff the necessary services or payments as a
matter of right with no obligation to pay for them. These "collateral
sources" are today part of the social background in which the injury
occurs. Nothing in these cases demands that the plaintiff be allowed
to recover from the defendant.43 The only results of the collateral
source rule here are punishment of the defendant and giving the
plaintiff a profit, both of which are contrary to the general theory of
civil liability. In the present case, the medical services received by
the plaintiff seem to come within this area. At the time of the acci-
dent there was little danger of plaintiff's having to pay for medical
treatment. This aspect of professional courtesy was one of the facts
of life as far as plaintiff was concerned. Plaintiff had paid nothing for
this protection. The services were available to plaintiff as a practical
certainty, although not as a matter of right. The collateral source
rule is perhaps the best solution to the problems arising in cases of
unexpected gifts by friends and family, where arguments do no more
than emphasize the basic conflict.44 In the future, however, it is
39. If subrogation is not provided, perhaps the policy of preventing insurance
wagers might be considered strong enough to confine recovery from the defendant to
the amount of premiums paid.
40. These considerations are in addition to the fact that the plaintiff has in one way
or another paid for the protection, and the compensation idea is not stretched much
by allowing recovery.
41. Legislative intent will be an important consideration in all cases where the right
of action or the collateral sources is a statutory creation.
42. Originally the Veterans Hospital cases might have been brought within this
class. Today, however, the Veterans' Administration Regulations require that an assign-
ment of the plaintiff's rights be made to the administration. 38 C.F.R. § 17.48 (f)
(Supp. 1962).
43. The defendant does not keep the plaintiff from receiving the entire amount of
the plaintiffs friends' generosity; there is no subrogated right, no expense to the
plaintiff, no taking advantage of the plaintiff's provident contracts.
44. A recent English case, however, seems to have solved this basic conflict by
allowing the plaintiff to recover provided she promised the court to use the money re-
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hoped that the courts will take a broader, more discerning look at
both the interests of society and the principles of civil liability rather
than confining their inquiry to definitions of "collateral source."45
Due Process-Taxation of Insurance Premiums
Paid to Foreign Insurers on Property Within State
A Texas statute' levied a five per cent tax on premiums paid under
insurance contracts made with an insurer not licensed to do business
in Texas. Plaintiff-insured paid the tax under protest and brought suit
for recovery. The policies were negotiated and paid for outside of
Texas. The insurers were not licensed to do business in Texas, had no
agents or offices in Texas, and neither solicited business nor investi-
gated risks or claims in Texas. The plaintiff-insured was a New York
corporation domiciled in New York and doing business in Texas.
Losses under the policies were payable to plaintiff at its principal
office in New York City. The insured property was located in Texas.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals declared the statute unconstitu-
tional.2 On certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States, held,
affirmed. A state may not tax premiums on an out-of-state insur-
ance contract when the only contacts between the state and the
insurance transactions are the presence of the insured property in the
state and the fact that the insured is doing business in the state. State
Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
In Allgeyer v. Louisiana3 the Supreme Court invalidated a Louisi-
ana statute levying a fine on any person insuring property located in
the state with an insurance company that had not compiled with
Louisiana law. The Court ruled that a state had no power to regulate
a contract effected beyond its borders since this would abridge liberty
of contract without due process of law. The Court later ruled that
a state could not tax insurance premiums under similar circum-
stances.4 A state, however, could tax insurance contracts if the forma-
tion of the contract could be physically connected with the state by
covered under this head to repay her generous benefactor. Schneider v. Eisovitch,
supra note 5.
45. See generally, 2 HAREa & JAmEs, TORTS §§ 2-5.22, .23 (1956); Maxwell, The
Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MUnN. L. REv. 669
(1962).
1. TEx. INS. CODE art. 21.38, § 2(e) (Supp. 1962).
2. 340 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
3. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
4. St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922).
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an act taking place within its borders,5 or if the insurance company
were licensed to do business in the jurisdiction so that the tax could
be construed as being levied on the general right of doing business
in the jurisdiction.6 Under the Allgeyer doctrine the presence of the
insured property in the state and the fact that the insured was a resi-
dent of the state were held to not constitute a sufficient basis for
regulation or taxation by the statel.7 The Court seems to have been
even more reluctant to allow state regulation of the terms of an extra-
state insurance contract than to permit taxation. Thus, the Court held
that a state could not modify the terms of an out-of-state contract
insuring local property although the insurer was licensed to do busi-
ness in the state and the insured was a resident of the state.8 In
Osborn v. Ozlin9 and Hoopeston Canning Co. V. Cullen,0 however,
the Court shifted abruptly from the conceptualistic Allgeyer place-of-
the-contract criterion to a "sufficient state interest" test. In Osborn
the Court upheld a Virginia statute requiring all insurance companies
authorized to do business in the state to insure Virginia risks through
resident agents even though the contract was negotiated outside of
the state. The Court held that the state had sufficient interest in the
contracts to warrant such regulation." In Hoopeston, regulation by
New York of out-of-state reciprocal insurance associations was de-
clared constitutional although the contracts of insurance were ex-
ecuted in Illinois and claims were paid by mail from Illinois. The
5. Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 272 U.S. 295 (1926). Palmetto entered into a
contract in Michigan with the Chrysler Corporation in which Chrysler automobiles
were insured from the date of the sale. The Court ruled that such insurance on
cars sold in Ohio was subject to the Ohio taxing power since: "When a man bought
a car in Ohio, by that act he made effective the agreement of the Company to
insure future purchasers, and imposed upon it an obligation that did not exist before.
It is true that the obligation arose from a contract made under the law of another
State, but the act was done in Ohio and the capacity to do it came from the law of
Ohio, so that the cooperation of that law was necessary to the obligation imposed."
Id. at 304.
6. Compafiia General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87 (1927)
(premiums paid to the London Company): "We may properly assume that this tax,
placed upon the assured, must ultimately be paid by the insurer, and treating its real
incidence as such, the question arises whether making and carrying out the policy does
not involve an exercise or use of the right of the London Company to do business
in the Philippine Islands under its license, because the policy covers fire risks on
property within the Philippine Islands which may require adjustment and the activities
of agents in the Philippine Islands with respect to settlement of losses arising there-
under." Id. at 98.
7. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938); Compaiiia
General de Tabacos v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87 (1927) (premiums paid to the Paris
Company) St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922).
8. Boseman v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 301 U.S. 196 (1937); Hartford Acc.
& Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
9. 310 U.S. 53 (1943).
10. 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
11. "For it is clear that Virginia has a definable interest in the contracts she seeks
to regulate ..." 310 U.S. at 65.
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Court recognized New York's substantial interests in the regulation. 12
In 1944, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn,13 the
Supreme Court unexpectedly ruled that the insurance business is
interstate commerce, impliedly subjecting state regulation to
commerce clause restrictions. But in 1945 Congress passed the
McCarren Act,14 thereby removing the commerce clause barrler
against state regulation and taxation of insurance.
In the present case Texas argued that the vitality of the Allgeyer
doctrine had been destroyed by the state interest theory of Osborn
and Hoopeston.15 Texas contended that her vital interest in regulating
the insurance of Texas risks with unauthorized companies was suffi-
cient to overcome due process objections to the taxing statute. How-
ever, the Supreme Court distinguished the instant case from Osborn
and Hoopeston on the grounds that the insurers in this case carried
on no activities in the state. Without deciding whether the Allgeyer
line of cases is incompatible with Osborn and Hoopeston, the majority
found an express intention by Congress in the McCarren Act to con-
fine the power of the states over insurance to the limitations set forth
in the specific cases of Allgeyer v. Louisiana,6 St. Louis Cotton Com-
press Co. v. Arkansas,'7 and Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.
v. Johnson.18 The Court then reasoned that, even though "Congress
...does not have the final say as to what constitutes due process
. .. 9 f there is a strong congressional policy present in a close
constitutional question, the Court will be reluctant to upset that
12. "In determining the power of a state to apply its own regulatory laws to
insurance business activities, the question in earlier cases became involved by con-
ceptualistic discussion of theories of the place of contracting or of performance.
(Footnote omitted.) More recently it has been recognized that a state may have
substantial interests in the business of insurance of its people or property regardless
of these isolated factors." 318 U.S. at 316.
13. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
14. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1958): "The business of insurance,
and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business."
15. "To the petitioner, it is clear ...that the test of validity for state regulation
is no longer a conceptualistic one, but rather the test is one of determining the degree
of interest in the insurance contracts by the regulating state." Petition for Certiorari,
p. 10, State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
16. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
17. 260 U.S. 346 (1922). See text accompanying notes 4 & 7 supra.
18. 303 U.S. 77 (1938). See text accompanying note 7 supra. "We need not
decide de novo whether the results (and the reasons given) in the Allgeyer, St. Louis
Cotton Compress, and Connecticut General Life Insurance decisions are sound and
acceptable. For we have in the history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act an explicit,
unequivocal statement that the Act was so designed as not to displace those three
decisions." 370 U.S. at 455. The opinion then quotes from H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945).
19. 370 U.S. at 457.
RECENT CASES
policy.20 Mr. Justice Black dissented vigorously on the policy grounds
that the majority's interpretation of the McCarran Act would threaten
the "whole foundation of the Texas regulatory program .... ,"1
A more reasonable interpretation of the McCarren Act would seem
to be that it was intended simply to remove the commerce clause
impediment against state regulation and taxation of the insurance
business impliedly imposed by the South-Eastern Underwriters case.22
The Court's interpretation of the act to avoid overruling Allgeyer
seems contrived, especially since Osborn and Hoopeston were also
decided before the South-Eastern Underwriters. In refusing to rule
on the validity of the reasoning of the Allgeyer line of cases, the
instant case seems to leave two conflicting constitutional theories of
due process in the field of state taxation and regulation of insurance.
For the basic principle of Allgeyer is that a state has no power to
tax or regulate a contract made beyond its borders. The basic prin-
ciple of Osborn and Hoopeston is that a state has such a concern in
the insurance field that it has the constitutional power reasonably to
tax or regulate a particular insurance contract if its interest in that
contract is vital enough. Eventually, a choice between these two
theories must be made.2 3 Perhaps in this case the Court would have
been more influenced by the Osborn and Hoopeston decisions if it
could have found more contacts between Texas and the insurance
transactions. However, under the interest analysis theory it is the
gliUty, not the quantity, of the contacts that is important. And there
is hardly a more important contact than the presence of the insured
real property in the taxing state. For example, a state is certainly
substantially interested in the restoration of its real property if it is
injured. Moreover, plaintiff-insured was a corporation doing business
in Texas and therefore could be considered a resident of Texas. As
Mr. Justice Black points out in his dissent:
This holding seems to me to threaten the whole foundation of the Texas
regulatory program for it plainly encourages Texas residents to insure their
property with unregulated companies and discourages out-of-state corn-
20. "When, therefore, Congress has posited a regime of state regulation on the
continuing validity of specific prior decisions . . .we should be loathe to change
them." 370 U.S. at 457.
21. 370 U.S. at 459.
22. "[W] e give to the States no more powers than they previously had, and we take
none from them." 370 U.S. at 456, quoting from 91 CONG. REc. 1442 (1945) (re-
marks of Senator McCarran).
23. The Court has made such a shift in constitutional rationale in other due process-
conflict of laws fields. Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (in personam jurisdiction
of foreign corporations); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S.
532 (1935) (workmen's compensation). See Note, 35 COLUm. L. REv. 751 (1935).
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panies from qualifying to do business in and subjecting themselves to
regulation and taxation by the State of Texas.24
According to the petition for the writ of certiorari, twenty-two other
states have statutes similar to the statute in question.25 The Supreme
Court, however, by its strained interpretation of the McCarran Act,
never reached the point of considering the state's interests in the tax.
There is possibly another approach to the problem of the present
case. Since the statute in question merely places a tax on the insur-
ance premiums and does not seek to regulate or modify the terms of
the contract itself, it would seem reasonable simply to consider this
tax in relation to the broader field of general state taxing power under
the due process clause. The Supreme Court has held that the taxation
of intangibles by two different states is not in itself a denial of due
process.26 Later, the Court upheld a Wisconsin tax upon dividends of
a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the state even
though the dividends were declared outside of the state to non-resi-
dents. The tax was measured by the Wisconsin earnings of the
corporation. The Court said:
[The] test is whether property was taken without due process of law, or, if
paraphrase we must, whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears
fiscal relation to the protection, opportunities and benefits given by the
state. The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given
anything for which it can ask return.
2 7
Since the Court has recognized that the ultimate economic incidence
of a tax on insurance premiums is on the insurer a it must be de-
termined whether the insurance companies, although not doing busi-
ness in Texas, received commensurate benefits from Texas to sustain
the tax. It can well be argued that they did on the grounds that the
insured property, from which their liability would arise, was subject
to Texas fire and police protection. This approach to the case, how-
ever, was not dealt with either in petitioner's brief or in the Court's
opinion.
24. 370 U.S. at 459.
25. Petition for certiorari, p. E-1, State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370
U.s. 451 (1962).
26. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
27. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940); accord, International
Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944) (upholding same
statute); see Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
465 (1959) (quoting generally with approval).




Against Officers of the Federal Government
Defendant, a Forest Service officer of the United States Department
of Agriculture, was required in the discharge of his official duties to
be in possession of certain land in Jasper County, Georgia. Plaintiffs
brought suit in ejectment, alleging that they held legal title to the
property as remaindermen under a will which had devised a life estate
in the property to one Martha Sanders. The United States had pur-
chased the land from its supposed owners in fee, who had obtained it
by devise from Mrs. Sanders; plaintiff asserted that these devisees had
received nothing under Mrs. Sanders' will, because having only a life
estate, she had nothing to devise. The action was removed to the
federal district court by defendant,' whose motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction was granted on the ground that his possession of the
property was pursuant to his authority as an officer of the United
States Government.2 The court of appeals reversed.3 On certiorari
in the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. A federal
court has no jurisdiction over an officer of the federal government in
an action ensuing from acts performed within the scope of the officer's
statutory authority, unless the statute granting such authority is un-
constitutional in its application to the facts of the particular case.
Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
The doctrine that the United States is immune to suit without its
consent has been a continuing source of judicial obfuscation through-
out the history of this country.4 That the germinal idea for the ap-
plication of this principle in the United States came from England,
where it had become firmly established under the common-law
monarchy5 (though quite possibly under a misconception of the
maxim "the king can do no wrong"6 ), cannot be seriously questioned,7
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (a) (1958) provides in part:
"A civil action ... commenced in a State court against any of the following persons
may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
¢'(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof . . . for any act
under color of such office .. "
2. Sub nom. Doe v. Roe, 186 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Ga. 1959).
3. Bowdoin v. Malone, 284 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1960).
4. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682, 706 (1949) (dissenting opinion) observed that "consciously or unconsciously
the pronouncements in an opinion too often exceed the justification of the circumstances
on which they are based, or, contrariwise, judicial preoccupation with the claims of
the immediate leads to a succession of ad hoc determinations making for eventual
confusion and conflict."
5. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, VI, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 17-37 (1926).
6. Bracton states that the maxim meant simply that the king was not privileged to do
wrong. 1 BRAcroN, DE LEGIBUS ET CoNsUmuns ANGLIXA 39, 269 (Twiss ed. 1878).
See also Borchard, supra note 5, at 22.
7. Borchard, supra note 5, at 39-40; see Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine
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although a monarchial basis for the principle is certainly inapplicable
to our republican system of government.8 Of major significance in
the development of the confusion concerning the scope of the doctrine
is the fact that while the scope is largely determined by the basis
arrived at, eminent authorities have been totally unable to agree
as to such basis in this country.9 It seems clear, however, that prior
to 1949 sovereign immunity was not a jurisdictional bar to the type
of action here involved-that in which a plaintiff alleged a colorable
claim to title to specific property in the possession of an officer of
the United States'Q-despite the fact that specific relief was involved.
In the first four cases of this class which reached the Supreme Court,"
no indication was given by the Court that the doctrine had any
application whatsoever to such a situation.12  The first vigorous at-
tempt to defeat such an action on the basis of sovereign immunity
was specifically rejected in United States v. Lee.13 The holding of this
of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REv. 476 (1953).
8. Borchard, supra note 5, at 37-41.
9. Mr. Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)
suggested that the basis is "the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."
Mr. Justice Field, however, in The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868) stated
that "the doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy; the inconvenience and danger
which would follow from any different rule. It is obvious that the public service
would be hindered, and the public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could
be subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen, and consequently controlled in
the use and disposition of the means required for the proper administration of the
government." Mr. Chief Justice Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478
(1793) reasoned that "in all cases of actions against States or individual citizens, the
National Courts are supported in all their legal and Constitutional proceedings and
judgments, by the arm of the Executive power of the United States; but in cases of
actions against the United States, there is no power which the Courts can call to their
aid." The suggestion has been made that "the exemption [from suits without consent],
as one of the attributes of sovereignty" is in some vague manner retained as being
outside the broad language of article III of the Constitution. THE FEazALs No.
81, at 567-68 (Dawson ed. 1864) (Hamilton).
10. A judgment on the merits in favor of the plaintiff was not res judicata against
the United States, since the United States could not be made a party defendant;
such judgment simply had the effect of putting the plaintiff in possession. The
United States, if it so desired, could then bring its own action to try title. See
discussion on this point in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 222 (1882).
11. Meigs v. McClung's Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11 (1815); Wilcox v. Jackson,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 496 (1839); Brown v. Huger, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 305 (1858);
Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 363 (1867).
12. In three of the cases the question was clearly before the Court because set out
in the bill of exceptions. Meigs v. McClung's Lessee, supra note 11, at 13; Brown v.
Huger, supra note 11, at 308; Grisar v. McDowell, supra note 11, at 365. In Wilcox
v. Jackson, supra note 11, the issue was apparently never raised. See discussion on
these cases in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. at 210-15. It should be noted here
that the Court in these four cases did not peek around the question of sovereign
immunity to look at the merits; in the Wilcox, Brown, and Grisar cases the plaintiff
lost.
13. 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (5-to-4 decision). The suit was in ejectment against military
officers of the United States. The property involved had been the Arlington estate of
the wife of Robert E. Lee but was occupied at the time by the defendants, one
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landmark case was controlling authority for almost seventy years. 14
In 1949, however, in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.15
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for the majority,16 stated after a
lengthy discussion of previous cases' 7 that historically the only two
instances in which recovery had been allowed in suits against officers
of the United States were (1) when the statute purporting to grant
authority to the officer was itself unconstitutional, 8 and (2) when
the officer was acting outside the scope of his validly-granted statutory
authority.19 The Lee case was distinguished 2° on the ground that it
was decided at a time when, if jurisdiction had been denied, the plain-
tiff would have had no remedy for the taking of his land21 and that
part of the land serving as a military station and the other part as a national cemetery.
Both the majority opinion (id. at 204-23) and the dissent (id. at 226-51) contain
exhaustive discussions of the history and scope of the doctrine in this country, the
dissent placing great emphasis on the development of the doctrine in England. Id. at
227-38. The majority concludes that "the proposition that when an individual is sued
in regard to property which he holds as officer or agent of the United States, his
possession cannot be disturbed when that fact is brought to the attention of the court,
has been overruled and denied in every case where it has been necessary to decide it,
and that in many others where the record shows that the case as tried below actually
and clearly presented that defence, it was neither urged by counsel nor considered
by the court here, though, if it had been a good defence, it would have avoided
the necessity of a long inquiry into plaintiff's title and of other perplexing questions,
and have quickly disposed of the case. And we see no escape from the conclusion
that during all this period the court has held the principle to be unsound . ...
Id. at 215-16.
14. See, e.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82
(1937); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp.,
258 U.S. 549 (1922); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900). In Land v. Dollar,
supra, the Court concluded that "where the right to possession or enjoyment of
property under general law is in issue, and the defendants claim as officers or agents
of the sovereign, the rule of United States v. Lee, supra, has been repeatedly
approved." 330 U.S. at 737.
15. 337 U.S. 682 (1949). The case involved a contract for the sale of surplus
coal to plaintiff by the War Assets Administration. Plaintiff sought an injunction to
prevent the War Assets Administrator, who was about to breach the contract, from
selling the coal to anyone other than plaintiff. The suit was, therefore, essentially for
specific performance.
16. The decision was 6-to-3, but Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred only in the
result; and Mr. Justice Douglas concurred on the grounds that "the principles an-
nounced by the Court are the ones which should govern the selling of government
property. Less strict applications of those principles would cause intolerable interference
with public administration." 337 U.S. at 705.
17. 337 U.S. at 692-705. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a lengthy dissent in which
he also attempted to classify the types of actions in which the defense of sovereign
immunity had been defeated. 337 U.S. at 705-32.
18. 337 U.S. at 690 (dictum).
19. 337 U.S. at 689 (dictum). The holding of the Larson case is summarized at
695 as follows: "We hold that if the actions of an officer do not conflict with the
terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are the actions of the sovereign,
whether or not they are tortious under general law, if they would be regarded as the
actions of a private principal under the normal rules of agency."
20. 337 U.S. at 696-97.
21. The Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.)
was not passed until five years after the Lee decision.
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such taking would, therefore, have been unconstitutional.22 Since
the Larson decision there has been considerable conjecture concern-
ing the outcome of the obvious conflict between the majority opinion
in that case and the line of cases following Lee.-3
In the instant case the Court resolved this conflict in favor of Lar-
son, expressly approving the rule set down in the majority opinion of
that case.24 The plaintiff having alleged neither of the requisite bases
of jurisdiction, his action necessarily failed. The Lee case was dis-
tinguished on the same grounds as in Larson.5 Mr. Justice Douglas
dissented, reaffirming the principle upon which his concurrence was
based in Larson.26 He determined that prior decisions are irreconcil-
able because of the weight covertly given to policy considerations27
and suggested that the decision as to jurisdiction in suits against
government officials should be the resultant of balancing the interests
of the individual with those of the Government according to the
nature of the particular suit. 8 He then concluded that in this situa-
tion the balance was with the plaintiff.29
There is no question but that this decision has emasculated Lee3"
by limiting it to a situation which will never again arise because of the
availability of a remedy for damages in the Court of Claims. The
majority's unquestioning acceptance of the rule stated in Larson3' is
somewhat surprising. In that case some of the distinctions drawn in
regard to the type of action here involved were particularly feeble.32
22. The Chief Justice characterized the holding of Lee as "a specific application
of the constitutional exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity." 337 U.S. at
696 (dictum). In fact the question of due process was not raised in Lee. That
case was nothing more than an ordinary ejectment action. It should be noted, more-
over, that the contention that the availability of a remedy in the Court of Claims,
as such, bars an action at law had twice been specifically rejected by the Supreme
Court. Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v.
United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1922).
23. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Remedies against the United States and
Its Officials, 70 Hav. L. RIv. 827, 854-61 (1957); Note, Sovereign Immunity and.
Specific Relief against Federal Officers, 55 CoLum. L. Rlv. 73 (1955).
24. "[TIhe action of a federal officer affecting property claimed by a plaintiff
can be made the basis of a suit for specific relief against the officer as an individual
only if the officer's action is 'not within the officer's statutory powers or, if within those
powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in the particular case, are constitutionally
void.' 337 U.S. at 702." 369 U.S. 643, 647 (1962).
25. See note 22 supra.
26. 369 U.S. at 649-50 (dissenting opinion); see note 16 supra.
27. Id. at 650.
28. Id at 653.
29. Ibid. Of course, if for any reason the United States desires immediate possession,
"it can bring its arsenal of power into play," including eminent domain. Id. at 650.
30. See note 22 supra. In fact the instant case is on all fours with Lee.
31. See note 19 supra.
32. 337 U.S. at 702 n.26. The Court distinguished Land v. Dollar, supra note 14,
on the grounds that the complaint alleged that the officers acted outside the scope
of their authority; the Court in Land, however, made it clear that sovereign immunity
would not bar the suit even if the officers' action was within the scope of their
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If, as seems much more likely, the majority in Larsoni determined
that the irreconcilable hodge-podge of decisions in suits against
federal officers necessitated a revaluation of the principles controlling
such actions and then decided that the announced rule was that
which should govern, it should have so stated and avoided the re-
sulting confusion. If the plaintiff's interest in realty to which he
claims title is weighed against the slight interference with any gov-
ernmental activity which would result from an exercise of jurisdiction
in this case, it is seen that the case presents a situation most strongly
favoring such exercise. But the Court's adoption of the Larson rule
precludes the suit against the officer; thus it seems clear that the
rule now covers the full breadth of suits against an officer of the
federal government.34 From the point of view of judicial administra-
tion the rule seems relatively simple to apply, and it instills a hereto-
fore almost unknown quality of predictability into this area of the law.
But the announced rule undeniably broadens the scope of a doctrine
which the Court at least professes to frown upon;35 the federal govern-
ment's increasing involvement in commercial activity has certainly
contributed to this attitude. The rigidity of the rule, with its consequent
relief from prior judicial confusion, is its greatest liability. It is sub-
mitted that sovereign immunity is a judicially created anachronism
which should now be judicially abolished. The scope of remedies
available to a private litigant in a suit against an officer of the United
States should be the same as those available in an action against
authority. The case was remanded with the instruction that the property was to be
returned to plaintiffs "if it is decided on the merits either that the contract was illegal
or that [plaintiffs] are pledgors." 330 U.S. at 739. (Emphasis added.) Sloan Ship-
yards Corp. v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., supra note 14, was
distinguished on the ground that the "officer" was in that case a corporation, when
in fact the basis of the holding was an analogy between the Fleet Corporation and
an individual officer, who, according to Mr. Justice Holmes, would unquestionably not
be protected by sovereign immunity. 258 U.S. at 567. The fact that the government
officer is a corporation rather than an individual is irrelevant in determining liability.
33. See note 16 supra.
34. For an interesting example of an extreme application of the Larson rule, see
Andrews v. White, 121 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tenn. 1954), aff'd per curiam, 221 F.2d
790 (6th Cir. 1955).
35. "[T]he immunity enjoyed by the United States as territorial sovereign is a
legal doctrine which has not been favored by the test of time. It has increasingly
been found to be in conflict with the growing subjection of governmental action to
the moral judgment. A reflection of this steady shift in attitude toward the American
sovereign's immunity is found in such observations in unanimous opinions of this
Court as 'Public opinion as to the peculiar rights and preferences due to the
sovereign has changed,' Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315, 318; 'There is no doubt an
intermittent tendency on the part of governments to be a little less grasping than they
have been in the past . . . ' White v. Mechanics Securities Corp., 269 U.S. 283, 301;
'... the present climate of opinion ... has brought governmental immunity from
suit into disfavor . . . ,' Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S.




another private litigant unless the government officer can show
that the activity in which he is engaged is such that the granting of
specific relief would jeopardize the performance of a governmental
function which by its nature requires freedom from such interfer-
ence.3 Only when a substantial probability of such a threat is shown
can sufficient reason be found for denying a litigant the full scope
of normally available remedies.37 Whenever it is shown that the
officer is acting outside the scope of his authority or that the statute
granting authority is unconstitutional, the officer would unavoidably
fail to carry his burden of showing the necessity of unhampered
operation.
Federal Tort Claims Act-Recovery by Federal
Prisoner for Negligence of Prison Employees
Plaintiff, a prisoner in a federal penitentiary, sustained injuries as a
result of alleged negligent treatment by prison doctors.' Plaintiff
brought this action against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. The district court sustained defendant's motion to dis-
miss. On appeal, held, reversed (2-1, and on rehearing en banc, 5-4).
The Federal Tort Claims Act authorizes recovery by a federal prisoner
from the United States for injuries sustained during his incarceration
as a result of the negligence of prison employees. Winston v. United
States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962).
The Federal Tort Claims Act authorizes claims in the district courts
for injuries caused by the negligent acts or omissions of federal em-
ployees within the scope of their employment under circumstances
36. The facts of the Larson case present an example of a situation in which a re-
fusal to exercise jurisdiction under the proposed rule would be justified. See note 15
supra. The War Assets Administration was involved in a tremendous number of trans-
actions; its efficiency would have been greatly impaired had it been unable to dispose
of its property every time someone with whom it dealt was unsatisfied.
37. An acceptance of the proposed rule could have a possible derivative effect
of encouraging the courts to re-evaluate the doctrine of common law unreviewability
which has plagued litigants in actions against administrative agencies. See 4 DAvis,
ADmnSTAsnv LAW §§ 28.01, -. 08 (1958). Although sovereign immunity seems to
go unnoticed in such decisions, the two doctrines are not dissimilar. It is thought
that an abandonment of the traditional view of sovereign immunity might well compel
the courts to ascertain the reasons for a refusal to review, in which case the problem
would at least be placed in proper perspective and a rational promulgation of stand-
ards for reviewability would be facilitated; such standards would, moreover, prove
quite helpful to the agencies themselves as bases for future action.
1. Plaintiff contracted a brain tumor which prison doctors failed to discover in the
course of examinations over a two year period. As a result of the delay in treatment,
he was made permanently blind.
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where the United States, if a private person, would be liable under
local law.2 It is further provided that the United States is liable "in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances."3 Congress then listed twelve specific exceptions
to the act.4 The Supreme Court held in Feres Ex'rx v. United States5
that soldiers cannot recover under the act for injuries negligently
inflicted by military personnel where such injuries "arise out of or are
in the course of activity incident to service."6 The great majority of
the lower federal courts which have considered the problem have
held that Feres, by analogy, is controlling in the prisoner-jailer situa-
tion.7 In Feres, the Court reasoned that there was no analogous
liability under local law since a soldier had never been allowed to
recover for negligence from his superiors or from the government he
served,8 and that there was no liability "under like circumstances"
since no private person can maintain an army.9 Apparently feeling
that the plain meaning of the act was not conclusive against recovery,
the Court proceeded to a discussion of various policy considerations.
The Court premised that the soldier-government relationship, being
"distinctively federal," required uniformity ° and that there was no
need for recovery under the act since Congress had provided an
adequate system of compensation for soldiers which was "simple, cer-
tain, and uniform."" The courts which have followed Feres in dis-
allowing prisoner claims have reasoned that the prison system, like
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958) provides, in part: "[T]he district courts . . . shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for
money damages, . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958) provides: "The United States shall be liable, respecting
the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1958).
5. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
6. Id. at 146. A serviceman on leave can recover if injured by military personnel.
Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). This would seem to indicate that it is
not the status of either party which precludes recovery, but the nature of the relation-
ship between soldier and Government.
7. Lack v. United States, 262 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958); Jones v. United States, 249
F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1957); Berman v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 107 (E.D.N.Y.
1959); Van Zuch v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); Shew v.
United States, 116 F. Supp. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1953); Sigmon v. United States, 110 F.
Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953). Contra, Lawrence v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 243
(N.D. Ala. 1961).
8. The Court seemed to imply that where state sovereign immunity was a bar to
recovery in an analogous situation under state law, such immunity would preclude
recovery under the Tort Claims Act. 340 U.S. at 141.
9. Ibid.
10. Id. at 143.
11. Id. at 144.
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the military, is "distinctively federal" and requires uniformity. They
have found further similarity in the fact that private persons do not
operate prisons just as they do not maintain armies, so that they would
not be "under like circumstances." All except three of these cases,
however, were decided prior to two Supreme Court decisions which
appear to have largely undermined the Feres reasoning. In Indian
Towing Co. v. United States12 the Government was held liable for
the negligent operation of a lighthouse. The Government contended
that there was no liability "under like circumstances" since private
persons do not operate lighthouses, but the Court rejected this argu-
ment as irrelevant and found analogous liability in the "Good Samari-
tan" doctrine 3 of tort law. In Rayonier, Inc. v. United States'4 the
Government was held liable for the negligence of the Forest Service
in fighting a fire even though there was no cause of action at common
law for negligent fire fighting by a state or local government. The
Court held that the test was not whether some similar local govern-
mental agency would be liable for negligence, but whether a private
person would be liable for similar negligence. 15
The court in the instant case based its decision primarily upon a
literal interpretation of the act. It found analogous liability under
local law in two situations, 6 the liability of a doctor or hospital
for negligent care of a patient,17 and the liability of a jailer individu-
ally to a prisoner.'8 Invoking the familiar expressio unius doctrine, the
court reasoned that since Congress had listed twelve specific excep-
tions, 19 additional exceptions were precluded. The court had little
difficulty in distinguishing Feres on several grounds: (1) there was
analogous local liability here,20 (2) the need for uniformity in a
"distinctively federal" relationship expressed in Feres was based on
12. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
13. The Court based liability on the settled principle that one who voluntarily
undertakes to warn the public and thereby induces reliance is liable for a failure to
give warning. Id. at 64-65.
14. 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
15. Id. at 319. In other words, the test is not whether an employee would be liable
under local law as a member of some analogous local governmental group or agency,
but whether he would be liable as an individual. It would appear that under this
test, a prison doctor would be liable for a failure to exercise the standard of care
required of private doctors. The circumstance that he was a prison doctor might be
relevant in determining negligence, but not liability.
16. 305 F.2d at 265. The court applied the law of Indiana where the tort occurred.
17. Worster v. Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 110 N.E.2d 337 (1953).
18. Magenheimer v. State ex rel. Dalton, 120 Ind. App. 128, 90 N.E.2d 813 (1950).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1958).
20. Even applying the strict test of Feres, there was analogous liability since federal
and state jailers had traditionally been liable as individuals. See Hill v. Gentry, 280
F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1960); Asher v. Cabell, 50 Fed. 818 (5th Cir. 1892); Smith v.




considerations of military efficiency not here pertinent,2 1 and (3)
the compensation system for prisoners is limited to one class of
prisoners and is inadequate as to that class22 whereas the compen-
sation act for soldiers is broad in scope and adequate in amount.
The court was unable to distinguish the Feres objection that a soldier's
recovery was dependent on geographic chance over which he had no
control, but did not consider this objection to be conclusive.23 In
answer to the Government's contention that discipline would be
impaired, the court reasoned that this was a matter of policy within
the sphere of Congress and not the courts; and even if it were a proper
consideration, it had little merit since jailers' personal liability had
not adversely affected discipline nor had the state's waiver of immunity
in New York.24 And finally, the contention that Congress had ex-
pressly recognized the lower federal court interpretation of the act2
and had acquiesced in such interpretation was disposed of on the
theory that the opinion of one Congress as to the intent of a prior
Congress is of little significance,.2 especially when expressed in con-
nection with private legislation.
The decision in the instant case seems to be in accord with the
plain meaning of the Tort Claims Act and with the liberal construction
given the act by the Supreme Court in the Indian Towing Co. and
Rayonier cases. Congress expressly excepted twelve types of claims,
and the Supreme Court added another in the Feres decision. If an
additional exception is to be made in the present situation, it must
be by analogy to the Feres situation. But it is submitted that Feres
was grounded upon a proper judicial reluctance to allow claims
which might hamper the efficient operation of the military. There
appear to be no such vital policy considerations against the allowance
of claims by prisoners. Since Feres was primarily a policy decision,
21. 305 F.2d at 256.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1958), as amended, 75 Stat. 681 (1961). This act provides
a remedy for only those prisoners who are injured while working in prison industries.
Only a small percentage of the injuries are incurred in this manner.
23. The court reasoned that Congress has envisioned such a lack of uniformity in
expressly making local law applicable as had the Erie doctrine and the Bankruptcy Act,
which depends in many cases on state priority and contract law. 305 F.2d at 256.
24. Id. at 270.
25. The House Committee on the Judiciary, in considering legislation to compensate
prisoners injured in the course of employment, reported: "Presently there is no way
under the general law to compensate prisoners while so engaged. Their only recourse
has been to appeal to Congress, and this Committee has reported numbers of private
relief bills for such prisoners." H.R. REP. No. 534, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961).
26. The court cited as authority for this proposition Rainwater v. United States, 356
U.S. 590 (1958) wherein it was said: "At most, the 1918 amendment is merely an
expression of how the 1918 Congress interpreted a statute passed by another Congress
more than a half century before. Under these circumstances such interpretation has
very little, if any, significance." Id. at 593. The present court's reasoning appears to
be sound in view of this case.
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it should not be extended to a new situation where the same con-
siderations do not pertain. Congress did not except prisoners from
the coverage of the act and neither should the courts.
Insurance-Products Liability Policy-Coverage
Includes Damages Sustained While Replacing
Defective Product
The plaintiff, a manufacturer of tubing used as material for radiant
heating, was the insured under policies of liability insurance issued
by the defendant. These policies contained a "products hazard"
coverage which provided that the insurer would pay damages which
the insured incurred as a result of property destruction "caused by
accident,"' excluding recovery for injury to any products manufac-
tured or sold by the insured. Suits alleging negligence and breach of
warranty were brought against the plaintiff by dealers who had
purchased and installed his product seeking damages sustained by
reason of defective tubing.2 The insurer refused to pay for the
removal and replacement of the concrete flooring necessitated by the
installation of new tubing, contending that damage to the old concrete
flooring had not been "caused by accident' and that liability was
excluded under the policy.3 This action was brought by the insured to
recover costs of settling and defending these suits. The trial court
found for the defendant. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, held, re-
versed. A products liability policy, excluding recovery for injury to
goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or distributed by the
insured, should be construed to exclude liability for damage to the
product itself, but not damage to the property of others caused either
directly or indirectly by failure of the product. Bundy Tubing Co. v.
Royal Indemnity Co., 298 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1962).
1. The insuring clause of the policy provided: "To pay on behalf of the insured
all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by acci-
dent." The exclusion clause was as follows: "This policy does not apply: .. . (d)
Under Coverage B, to injury to or destruction of . .. (3) any goods or products
manufactured, sold, handled or distributed . . . by the named insured, or work
completed by or for the named insured, out of which the accident arises .... " Bundy
Tubing Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 298 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1962).
2. The insurance company defended the suits in California but refused to defend
suits brought in Michigan.
3. The company conceded that it was liable for damage to household furnishings




Because products liability insurance has only recently come of age,
no general rule can be deduced from the cases involving these policies
and dealing with the construction of the various terms used therein,
except that they will be construed most strongly against the insurer.
4
The principal problem arising in the cases seems to be a failure to
understand the scope of the insured risks.5 "Caused by accident" as
used in most products liability policies has been uniformly held to
mean any unexpected and unintended event;6 the fact that the event
resulted from any negligence or breach of warranty on the insured's
part has not been held to prevent the damage from being considered
accidental.7 It is usually expressly provided that damage sustained by
any goods or products manufactured or sold by the named insured is
excluded. 8 As a general rule it is conceded that a policy containing
such an exclusion would not reimburse the insured for the cost of
the replacement he provides for a defective product,9 and it is also
4. See, e.g., Smith v. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n, 175 Kan. 68, 258 P.2d
993 (1953); Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Guthrie, 148 Kan. 907, 84 P.2d 891 (1938);
Bader v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 102 Minn. 186, 112 N.W. 1065 (1907); Boswell
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 38 N.J. Super. 599, 120 A.2d 250 (Super. Ct. 1956). Contra,
Kendall Plumbing, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 189 Kan. 528, 370 P.2d 396, 400
(1962). "We find nothing ambiguous in the words or phrases used in the exclusion
clause and this court should not search for ambiguities where the words used in the
contract have a common and well understood meaning.' Teeples v. Tolson, 207 F.
Supp. 212 (D. Ore. 1962). See also 7a APPLEmAN, INsURANCME LAw Aim PnActc. §
4508 (1962); HumsH, AiERIcAN LAw Or ProDucrs LLmsnxr- § 10 (1961).
5. See 7a APPLEmvAN, op. cit. supra note 4; Arnold, Products Liability Insurance, 25
INs. CouNsEa. J. 42 (1958).
6. See, e.g., C. Y. Thomason Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 183 F.2d 729
(4th Cir. 1950); Gilliland v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771,
180 Pac. 793 (1919) (undesigned, sudden, and unexpected); Hauenstein v. St. Paul
Mercury Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354, 65 N.W.2d 122 (1954) (unexpected, unforeseen,
or undesigned happening or consequence from either known or unknown cause);
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 205 Okla. 618, 239 P.2d 754 (1951)
(accident defined according to its common usage; has no technical meaning.). See
also Neale Constr. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 199 F.2d. 591 (10th Cir.
1952) (results which are the natural and probable consequences are not accidents,
even though they were not intended or anticipated.); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Gerrits, 65 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1953).
7. Cross v. Zurich Gen. Ace. & Liab. Ins. Co., 184 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1950);
Swillie v. General Motors Corp., 133 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1961); Diefenbach v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 280 Mich. 507, 273 N.W. 783 (1937); Rex Roofing
Co. v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Co., 280 App. Div. 665, 116 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1952). But see
Volf v. Ocean Ace. & Guar. Corp., 316 P.2d 651 (Cal. 1957) (use of defective
materials in the construction of a building not an accident); Womack v. Employer's
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 233 Miss. 110, 101 So. 2d 107 (1958) (defective garage work
on a car not an accident).
8. Note 1 supra.
9. See, e.g., L. L. Jarrell Constr. Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 130 F. Supp. 436 (S.D.
Ala. 1955) (no recovery for damage to building completed by the insured); Liberty
Building Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 2 Cal. Reptr. 329, 346 P.2d 444 (1959) (no re-
covery allowed for defective plaster); Kendall Plumbing, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury
Indem. Co., 189 Kan. 528, 370 P.2d 396 (1962) (recovery denied when an electric
starter and refrigerator unit installed by the insured were damaged when the starter
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clear that the insurer is liable for damages to the property of others
directly resulting from the accident.' The most difficult problems
encountered by the courts have been in cases where the damages
sustained did not fall within either of these clear-cut areas, but were
expenses made necessary by the repair or replacement of the defective
product." Although there are very few cases dealing with this prob-
lem, the majority of the courts hold that such a policy covers injury
or loss to others caused by the defective condition of the product, but
does not reimburse the insured for replacement of his product or any
expenses incurred as a result thereof.'2 These courts do not feel that
the words, "damages because of injury to or destruction of property
... caused by accident,"13 should be construed to include the manu-
hung and caused the refrigeration unit to burn up); Hauenstein v. St. Paul Mercury
Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354, 65 N.W.2d 122 (1954) (no recovery allowed for defective
plaster); Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Cal. App. 2d 558,
334 P.2d 881 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (no recovery for defective aluminum doors manu-
factured by the insured), the court said, "It is not disputed that injury to or destruction
of the doors themselves was excluded." 344 P.2d at 885. But see Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 281 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1960) (recovery allowed for
defective paint sold by insured); Meiser v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 233,
98 N.W.2d 919 (1959) (insured allowed recovery for negligent work done by his
employees). See also 7a A.PLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 4; Arnold, supra note 5.
10. See, e.g., McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Machine Co., 214 F.2d 608 (3d Cir.
1954); Cross v. Zurich Gen. Ace. & Liab. Co., 184 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1950) (re-
covery allowed for damages to customer's windows); Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St.
Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Cal. App. 2d 558, 334 P.2d 881 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(damages to houses where defective aluminum doors were installed); Hauenstein v.
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354, 65 N.W.2d 122 (1954) (recovery allowed
for damage to the building.); Meiser v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 233, 98
N.W.2d 919 (1959) (recovery allowed for damage to windows caused by insured
employee's negligence). In Liberty Building Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 2 Cal. Reptr.
329, 346 P.2d 444, 446 (1959) the court said, "if the accident also caused damage to
some other property or caused personal injury, the insured's liability for such damage
or injury becomes a liability of the insurer under the policy, and is not excluded."
11. See 7a APPLEmAN, op. cit. supra note 4; HuRsH, op. cit. upra note 4.
12. See, e.g., Heyward v. American Cas. Co., 129 F. Supp. 4 (E.D.S.C. 1955);
"This exclusion means that the policy will not protect the insured if he has to repair
or replace some product or work which proved defective and caused an accident."
129 F. Supp. at 8; Liberty Building Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 2 Calif. Reptr. 329, 346
P.2d 444 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959). "This exclusion means that if the insured becomes
liable to replace or repair any goods or products . . . or work completed after the
same has caused an accident because of a defective condition, the cost of such replace-
ment or repair is not recoverable under the policy." 346 P.2d at 446; Volf v. Ocean
Acc. & Guar. Corp., 316 P.2d 651 (Cal. 1957) (cost of replacement or repair not
recoverable under the policy); Ritchie v. Anchor Cas. Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 286
P.2d 1000 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Gaddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem.
Go., 51 Cal. App. 2d 558, 334 P.2d 881 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (recovery denied in-
sured for the cost of removal of the defective product, costs of handling, loss of profits,
loss of good-will); Kendall Plumbing, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 189 Kan.
528, 370 P.2d 396 (1962); "It is clear that the policy was intended to cover only
damage to property or items which had not been handled by appellant. Goods or
products handled by it, or work completed by it, -were specifically excluded." 370
P.2d at 397.
13. Note 1 supra.
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facturer's liability for the cost of repair or replacement of its product.
A minority of the courts deciding this question would allow recovery
for all damage except that to the product itself, reasoning that ex-
penses incurred in replacement and repair-such as the tearing up of
the concrete flooring in the instant case-are indirectly "caused by
accident" whenever the event is unforeseen, unexpected, and unin-
tended, regardless of any negligence on the insured's part.' 4 A few
courts have gone so far as to allow recovery for cost of the defective
product itself, when it is so attached to another finished product as to
be inseparable.
15
Following the minority view,16 the court in the instant case allowed
the insured to recover the cost of replacing the concrete in which
the defective tubing was imbedded, although it denied recovery for
the tubing itself.17 The insurer contended that the damage to the
concrete had not been "caused by accident" and, secondly, that liabili-
ty was excluded under the exclusion clause. Because the failure of
the tubing in a relatively short time was unforeseen, unexpected, and
unintended the court said the damage was "caused by accident" and
therefore recoverable under the policy.18 The clause eliminating
recovery for "any goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or
distributed"19 was found to be irrevelant,20 the court deciding that
this applied only to the defective product, and not to recovery for
other damages sustained. A well written dissenting opinion2' ex-
pressed a fear that the court had gone too far and thus converted a
public liability policy into an agreement to indemnify the insured
14. See, e.g., Hauenstein v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 242 Minn. 354, 65 N.W.2d
122 (1954). The court said, "The measure of damages is the diminution in the
market value of the building, or the cost of removing the defective plaster and re-
storing the building to its former condition plus any loss from deprival of use, which-
ever is the lesser." 65 N.W.2d at 125; McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Machine Co., 214
F.2d 608 (3d Cir. 1954) (recovery allowed when insured's employees were installing
a machine and it was severely damaged as a result of their negligence); Meiser v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 233, 98 N.W.2d 919 (1959) (insured allowed to
recover for damage to windows resulting from the removal of defective plaster). See
also Swillie v. General Motors Corp., 133 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1961) (recovery allowed
for negligent installation of brake linings).
15. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 281 F.2d 538 (3d Cir.
1960). The court said concerning recovery for the defective paint, "Once the paint
has been baked on the steel and aluminum parts of the jalousies, the paint is no
longer identifiable as a separate entity but is intended to and does become a part/ of
the finished product." 281 F.2d at 541.
16. Note 14 supra.
17. 298 F.2d at 151.
18. The court said, "The failure of the tubing in the heating system in a relatively
short time was unforeseen, unexpected and unintended. Damage to the property was
therefore caused by accident." 298 F.2d at 153.
19. Note 1 supra.
20. "Under this clause no recovery may be had for the value of the defective
tubing or the cost of new tubing to replace it." 298 F.2d at 153.
21. 29& F.2d at 154.
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against liability for his failure to perform faithfully his contractual
obligations regardless of the showing of any accident.22
The court in the instant case seems to have reached a proper and
logical decision, although convincing arguments can be made for
the other position.P A layman might find it difficult to understand
the coverage, purpose, and construction meant to be given this type
of policy,24 but this alone does not warrant a distortion of the risks
undertaken. It is true that ambiguities should not be searched for
where none exist, but if there is any doubt as to the intention of the
parties the policy language should be construed strictly against the
insurer. The policy language here involved, while not ambiguous in
the strict sense of the word, can be troublesome, and therefore any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the insured. It is evident that a
person would never buy a home with such tubing installed if he
knew that it would last only a very short time; thus the failure of
the tubing may be said to be unforeseen, unexpected, and unintended
and therefore accidental.2 Damage is "caused by accident" in the
sense used in this and other types of insurance policies if it naturally
flows from an accident without any intervening cause; as one court
has said, it is the cause "whose share in the matter is most conspicuous
and is most immediately preceeding and proximate in the event."2 7
Damages sustained while replacing a defective product are quite
clearly "caused by accident" since such damage would not have been
22. "I am unable to agree that the words, 'damages because of injury to or de-
struction of property ... caused by accident" should be held to encompass an insured
manufacturer's liability for the cost of repair or replacement of its product which
failed to function as expected or warranted." 298 F.2d at 154.
23. The majority of the courts seem to look to what they feel was the intention
of the parties, reasoning that coverage for such damages was not contemplated by
the insurer or the insured, and secondly that such damage is not "caused by accident,"
but rather that the accident ceases when the repair and replacement begins. Other
courts seem to reason that because installation of a product and any expenses incurred
as a result thereof are, as a general rule, incidental to the sale of such product these
damages are more directly related to the product itself than to the accidental event.
Therefore, liability is excluded under the policy provisions. For cases accepting this
position see note 12 supra.
24. In Ocean Ace. & Guarantee Corp. v. Aconomy Erectors, 224 F.2d 242 (7th
Cir. 1955) the court said, "The true meaning of the policy is difficult to determine. An
examination of it involves a physical effort of no mean proportions." 224 F.2d at 247.
See also Arnold, Products Liability Insurance, 25 INS. CouNsEL J. 42 (1958); 7a
APPLEmAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 98: "People in the insurance business, and prac-
tioners of law, ought to be aware of such coverages, their purposes, and their con-
struction."
25. In Kendall Plumbing, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 189 Kan. 528, 370 P.2d
396, 399 (1962) the court said, "Although ambiguities in the wording of an insurance
contract are to be construed in favor of the insured, this rule of construction has no
application whatever to language that is clear in its meaning. Unless a contrary
intention is shown, words used in an insurance contract are to be given a natural and
ordinary meaning that they convey to the ordinary mind."
26. Note 14 supra.
27. Maryland Clay Co. v. Goodnow, 95 Md. 330, 51 Atl. 292, 298 (1902).
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necessary had it not been for the defective nature of the product2
Furthermore, it is apparent that an insured having both public and
products liability coverage intended damage of this nature to be
covered by his products liability policy, since a public liability
insurer would not be liable for damage resulting after the insured's
duties in connection with the installation of a product have been
completed.2 9 Of course, it is wrong to extend one type of coverage
to fit a completely different situation from that which was contem-
plated by the insurer, but it would be equally unjust to deprive a
purchaser of the protection to which he is entitled.
Labor Law-Federal Courts Have No Jurisdiction To
Enjoin the Breach of a No-Strike Provision of a
Collective Bargaining Agreement Calling for
Arbitration
Plaintiff employer brought suit under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)' to enjoin defendant
union and its agents from strikes and slowdowns in violation of a
collective bargaining agreement containing no-strike and obligatory
arbitration provisions. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the injunctive relief sought had been removed from
the jurisdiction of the United States courts by the Norris-LaGuardia
28. See Protane Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 343 Pa. 189, 22 A.2d 674 (1941). It
was there held that where the negligence of the plaintiff was the actual and proximate
cause of a casualty, the lapse of time and the distance from the original cause to the
casualty are unimportant. This same principle is applied in the interpretation of fire
insurance policies. 5 APPLEMAN, INSuRANcE LAw AND PRACTICE § 3083, at 220
(1941). "Where a peril specifically insured against sets other causes in motion which,
in an unbroken sequence and connection between the act and final loss, produces the
result for which recovery is sought, the insured peril is regarded as the proximate
cause of the entire loss." See e.g., Frisbie v. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 133 Mo. App. 30,
112 S.W. 1024 (1908); Cova v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 100 S.W.2d 23 (Mo.
App. 1937); Hall v. Great American Ins. Co., 217 Iowa 1005, 252 N.W. 763 (1934).
29. See 7a APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 98. The author there said, "An
injury or a loss may result while an activity is in progress, and prior to the comple-
tion thereof, either as the result of an act of negligence or an ommission. That is what
is embraced within the ordinary liability aspect of a public liability policy."
1. "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 61 Stat. 156 (1947),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
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Act.2 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed 3 the
order of dismissal by the district court.4 On certiorari5 in the Supreme
Court of the United States, held,6 affirmed. The express limitations
in section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act may not be "accommodated"
to section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act so as to allow an injunction
against activities breaching a no-strike provision of a collective bar-
gaining agreement under which there was an obligation to submit the
dispute to arbitration. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195
(1962).
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was a response to public opinion that the
federal courts were making excessive use of the injunction, in order to
void labors' effective use of the strike.7 Section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction to issue
injunctions against strikes as such in any case involving any labor
dispute. 8 Following World War II, public reaction to union activity
deemed to be excessive, culminated in the passage of the Taft-Hartley
Act.9 Section 301 of this act provides that "suits for violation of con-
tracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . may be
brought in any district court of the United States .... ,,'0 In one of
2. "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
disputes (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert,
any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of em-
ployment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute,
whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving
fraud or violence;
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence the
acts heretofore specified. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 104
(1958).
3. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 290 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1961).
4. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 187 F. Supp. 22,5 (N.D. Ind. 1960).
5. Certiorari was granted because the decision presented a conflict in the circuits.
Compare W. L. Mead, Inc., v. Teamsters Local 25, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954),
Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, 173 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1949), In re Third Ave. Transit
Corp., 192 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1951), and A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l
Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), with Chauffeurs Local 795 v. Yellow Transit
Freight Lines, 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960), rev'd per curiam, 370 U.S. 711 (1962).
6. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the court joined by Mr. Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Clark, Stewart, and White. Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no
part in the consideration of the case. Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas
and Harlan, dissented.
7. FRANx-RTER & GREN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 199-205 (1930). Feinsinger,
Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A New Era in Collective Bargaining, 43 VA. L.
REv. 1261, 1263 (1957).
8. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
9. Feinsinger, supra note 7, at 1265.
10. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
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the first cases under this section, Mr. Justice Frankfurter denied that
section 301 or its legislative history implied the existence of a body of
general federal substantive law for application to suits under Taft-
Hartley." Two years later, however, the majority of the Court held
in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills2 that the "substantive law
to be applied in suits under section 301(a) is federal law which the
courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws."13 As
a part of this national labor policy the Court held that an agreement
to arbitrate may be enforced by a mandatory injunction in federal
court, since a failure to arbitrate was not one of the abuses which
led to the restrictions in Norris-LaGuardia. 14 Recently the Court has
exhibited a policy of encouraging arbitration on a widespread basis,
indicating that the courts should refrain, insofar as possible, from
interfering with the arbitration process.'5 Thus, a union may even
specificially enforce an agreement to arbitrate which is stated in per-
missive terms.16 However, Taft-Hartley did not affirmatively repeal
the Norris-LaGuardia Act which deprived federal courts of jurisdic-
tion to enjoin peaceful striking, even for breaches of a collective
bargaining agreement.'7 In situations analogous to the instant case,
the Court has held in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River
11. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
348 U.S. 437 (1955).
12. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
13. Id. at 456.
14. Id. at 457-59. See also Independent Petroleum Workers v. Standard Oil Co.,
275 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1960); Local 1912, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United States
Potash Co., 270 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1959); Local 201, Intl Union of Elec. Workers
v. General Elec. Co., 262 F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1959); American Lava Corp. v. Local
Union No. 222, UAW, 250 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1958); Couch v. Prescolite Mfg. Corp.,
191 F. Supp. 737 (W.D. Ark. 1961); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Local 512,
United Rubber Workers, 191 F. Supp. 911 (D.R.I.), aff'd per curiam, 294 F.2d 957
(1st Cir. 1961); Johnson & Johnson v. Textile Workers, 184 F. Supp. 359 (D.N.J.
1960); Freight Drivers 557 v. Quinn Freight Lines, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 180 (D. Mass.
1961); Employee's Labor Ass'n v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 172 F. Supp. 210 (D.
Kan. 1959); Food Handlers Local 425 v. Pluss Poultry, Inc., 260 F.2d 835 (8th Cir.
1958), affirming 158 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. Ark. 1958); Local Union 1055, Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. Gulf Power Co., 175 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Fla. 1959); Butte Miners'
Union, UMW v. Anaconda Co., 159 F. Supp. 431 (D. Mont. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 267
F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1959).
15. Section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act has been cited as a basis for this policy.
United Steelworkers, v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See also NATIONAL AcimyvrY
OF ApmrrRATOns, AnBrrATIoN AN PUmc PoLIcY 1-29 (1961); Kovarsky, Comment:
The Enforcement of Agreements To Arbitrate, 14 VAND. L. REv. 1105 (1960); 74
Hnv. L. REv. 81, 178-82 (1960).
16. Local 19, Warehouse Workers Union v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776
(6th Cir. 1956).
17. A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957);




& Indiana R.R.'8 that section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 19 must
be accommodated to the Railway Labor Act20 so that federal courts
may enjoin strikes designed to defeat the jurisdiction of the National
Railway Adjustment Board2' over minor disputes.22 The Court did so
on the ground that only through this accommodation could the obvious
purpose of the mediation provisions of the Railway Labor Act be
given effect.P
In the instant case the Court held that the alleged work stoppage
constituted a labor dispute within the meaning of section 13 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and that it could not therefore be enjoined even
though the stoppage breached the collective bargaining agreement.24
The Court concluded that section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act was
not intended to have any partial repealing effect upon Norris-La-
Guardia for two principal reasons. First, section 301 contains no
language of direct repeal; if Congress had intended that section 301
suits should not be subject to the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-
LaGuardia, it would have made its "intent" known as it did in sections
101(h) and 208(b)25 of the Taft-Hartley Act which expressly re-
moved the anti-injunction bar of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.2 Second,
the Court pointed out that the legislative history of section 301 in-
dicated that Congress had considered repealing the Norris-LaGuardia
Act in so far as it pertains to suits for breach of collective bargaining
agreements, but expressly rejected the proposal.2 7 To the employer's
argument that Congress had impliedly left it to the courts to accom-
modate the two statutes when they found it expedient, the Court
replied simply that this was "a wholly unrealistic view of the manner
in which Congress handles its business."2 It distinguished Chicago
Rive,29 by stating that the provisions for settlement of disputes under
the Railway Labor Act are significantly different from those which
have grown up under the Taft-Hartley Act. 0 To the contention that
18. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
19. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
20. 44 Stat. 577 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958) and 44 Stat. 578
(1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. 153 (1958).
21. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., supra note 18, at
39-42.
22. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960)
(denial of specific performance of no-strike agreement in the case of a major dispute).
23. 353 U.S. at 39-42.
24. 370 U.S. at 195-99. Contra, GREcoRY, LABOR AND THE LAW 456 (2d rev. ed.
1958) (to the effect that "insofar as . . . [a] strike involves a breach of the collective
agreement, to that extent and in that respect; it is not a labor dispute ...... ).
25. 61 Stat. 146, 155 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(h), 178(b) (1958).
26. 370 U.S. at 204-05.
27. Id. at 205-10.
28. Id. at 209.
29. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., supra note 18.
30. 370 U.S. at 210-12.
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Lincoln Mills3' was controlling, the Court replied that the injunction
granted in that case, to carry out an agreement to arbitrate, "did not
enjoin any one of the kinds of conduct which the specific prohibitions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act withdrew from the injunctive powers of
the United States Courts."3 2 Further, the cases implementing section
301 could not be said to have freed the Court from the plainly ex-
pressed congressional purpose in Norris-LaGuardia.-3 The majority
concluded that effect had to be given to discernible legislative intent
and that the changes to be made, if any, in the present law were up
to Congress.-"
The dissent, conceding that Taft-Hartley did not repeal Norris-
LaGuardia in whole or in part,35 considered that the Court had
reached the wrong decision because it failed to grasp the full import
of petitioner's second argument: that the two statutes should be
accommodated. 36 Stressing the fact that Taft-Hartley does not specify
remedies, and that enjoining a strike may be indispensible to the
effective enforcement of an arbitration scheme, the dissent reasoned
that the same basic purpose would be served by accommodating
Norris-LaGuardia to Taft-Hartley, as when the Court accommodated
it to the Railway Labor Act.3 7 Since federal law strongly favors the ef-
fective enforcement of arbitration agreements, the dissent argued that
injunctive relief was called for even more in the instant decision, be-
cause of the express contractual agreement not to strike, than it was in
the Chicago River case.38 Moreover, to refuse the relief asked for by
petitioner would seem to create a considerable inequity in labor-
management relations. Lincoln Mills 9 held that section 7 of Norris-
31. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 12.
32. 370 U.S. at 212.
33. Id. at 213. But see the statement in Lincoln Mills: "[Wie see no
justification in policy for restricting § 301(a) to damage suits, leaving specific per-
formance of a contract to arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite procedural
requirements of that Act." 353 U.S. at 458.
34. 370 U.S. at 213-15.
35. 370 U.S. at 215-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. "Our duty, therefore, is to seek out that accommodation of the two which will
give the fullest possible effect to the central purpose of both." 370 U.S. at 216
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. 61 Stat. 155 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 178(b) (1958).
38. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., supra note 18.
This is true when the agreement calls for obligatory arbitration as the dissent realized.
However, since the decision of the instant case, one similar fact situation has come
before the Court. The court of appeals in Chauffeurs Local 795 v. Yellow Transit
Freight Lines, supra note 5, enjoined a strike in breach of a collective bargaining
agreement containing no-strike provisions. The three justices who dissented in the
instant case concurred in reversing the circuit court's decision, on the grounds that
"the collective bargaining agreement involved in this case does not bind either party
to arbitrate any dispute .. " Chauffeurs Local 795 v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines,
370 U.S. 711, 712 (1962).
39. Textile workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 12.
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LaCuardia would not be construed to limit the power of the courts
to grant specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under section
301 of Taft-Hartley. Therefore, it should follow that section 4 of
Norris-LaGuardia would not be used to curtain the court's power to
grant specific performance of no-strike agreements under the same
section of Taft-Hartley.40 The dissent denied that elimination by the
conference committee of the proposed repeal of Norris-LaGuardia
necessarily meant that the Congress was hostile to allowing accommo-
dation of the two statutes; no accommodation alone was before the
committee and it never ruled on such an approach .41 Finally, the
dissent concluded that the instant decision would tend to channel
labor actions into state rather than federal courts, thereby imperilling
the effective creation of a uniform national labor policy. 4
2
Under the instant decision an employer will be unable to obtain a
federal court injunction barring a union from breaching a no-strike
provision of a collective bargaining agreement which calls for arbi-
tration. The employer will be left to his remedies at law, which
would appear to be inadequate." Previously the Court has reached
substantially similar results under the Railway Labor Act and the
Taft-Hartley Act, and it was widely felt that this would be true in the
situation presented by the instant case." Since the Court decided
40. 370 U.S. at 219-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court in Lincoln Mills
stated that the agreement to arbitrate is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to
strike. Furthermore the Court held that a district court could properly decree specific
performance of the agreement to arbitrate. See also United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., supra note 15; United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra
note 15; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., supra note 15. How-
ever, in Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Amer. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 261
(1962), decided the same day as the instant case, Mr. Justice White speaking for
the Court stated that "[T]his Court has prescribed no such inflexible rule rigidly
linking no-strike and arbitration clauses of every collective bargaining contract in every
situation."
41. 370 U.S. at 223-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. 370 U.S. at 225-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see Charles Dowd Box Co.
v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S.
95 (1962).
43. 370 U.S. at 220 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "A damage action, tried years later
to the vagaries of a jury, is small recompense to the employer denied business because
he cannot deliver. Equitable relief is not only the most appropriate remedy, but also
the only effective one." Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 Micn.
L. REv. 673, 675 (1961). "Damages are inadequate because the injury to the business
cannot be measured accurately. Furthermore, an employer can rarely afford to
exacerbate labor-management relations by suing a union made up of his employees
after the end of the strike." Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitra-
tion, 30 RocKn MT. L. REv:. 247, 255 (1958). See generally, Mangum, Taming Wild-
cat Strikes, in Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1960, p. 88, at 95-96.
44. GnEGoRY, LABOR AND T=E LAw 455-56 (2d rev. ed. 1958); Cox, supra note 43,
at 256; "'an absolute prohibition of strikes' would surely seem to be enforceable by
injunction, particularly if the duty to arbitrate ind the duty to comply with an award
can be specifically enforced." Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law October Term
1959, 60 CoLum. L. REv. 901, 918 (1960); "The application of the Norris-LaGuardia
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that under the two acts different rules must be applied, it would seem
preferable for the Court to have spelled out what differences it felt
were controlling on this precise point, instead of relying almost en-
tirely on a somewhat ambigious legislative history.45 In taking this
course, the Court may have ignored the stronger argument for its
decision: that the Railway Labor Act provides a congressionally ap-
proved mechanism for the settling of disputes while under Taft-
Hartley a wide variety of arbitration clauses, some much less satis-
factory than others, are the chief means of settling disputes. It would
appear that the instant decision leaves open three important areas
for future litigation. First, can a similar suit (within the purview of
section 301) be brought in a state court and an injunction secured
there? 6 Second, can an employer secure a federal court order to
compel arbitration of a union's violation of a no-strike clause? Third,
can an employer enforce in federal court an arbitrator's order in the
nature of an injunction against a strike?4 7
Obscenity-Mailability of Magazines Which
Appeal to Homosexuals
Petitioners, publishers of three magazines,' deposited copies of their
magazines in the United States Post Office at Alexandria, Virginia,
whose postmaster detained these parcels pending an administrative
hearing before the Judicial Officer of the Post Office, on suspicion that
the publications were obscene and hence nonmailable under 18
United States Code section 14612 These magazines contained pic-
Act to breaches of contracts creates a serious inconsistency between it and our national
labor policy of promoting collective bargaining to the formation of contracts." Rice, A
Paradox of Our National Labor Law, 34 MAEQ. L. RFv. 233, 236 (1951); Feinsinger,
supra note 7, at 1275; Comment, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 496, 506-07 (1958). See
generally, for the proposition that no-strike clauses should be specificaly enforced in
federal courts, Mangum, supra note 43, at 95-96; CI-AvFx, SOME PROBIEMS OF EQurrY
364-80 (1950).
45. Compare 370 U.S. at 205-10, with 370 U.S. at 220-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45,
315 P.2d 322 (1957).
47. Ruppert v. Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129 (1958).
1. MANual, Trim, and Grecian Guild.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1461. "Mailing obscene or crime inciting matter.
"Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter,
writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character ...
"Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or
notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from
whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters, articles, or things may
be obtained or made....
1962]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tures of nude and seminude male "models"3 and advertisements4
which gave information where other such materials might be obtained.
The magazines were, by the publisher's admission, slanted toward
homosexual appeal.5 The Judicial Officer found that the pictures,
taken as a whole, had as their dominant theme an appeal to the
prurient interest of homosexuals, 6 that the advertisements gave in-
formation where more such materials could be obtained, and that
the magazines were therefore nonmailable.8 Petitioners thereupon
sought injunctive relief in the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia which affirmed the Judicial Officer's ruling and denied injunctive
relief;9 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed. On certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States,
held, reversed. Both patent offensiveness, judged in the light of a
national standard of decency, and prurient interest must be proved
to sustain a finding of obscenity. MANual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370
U.S. 478 (1962).1o
That obscene materials are not protected by the freedom of expres-
sion provision of the Constitution seems well settled. The legal stand-
ard, however, by which writings and pictures are to be declared
obscene has been a source of continuing controversy.' The famous
"Is declared to be nonmailable and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered
from any post office or by any letter carrier.
"Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this
section to be nonmailable, or knowingly takes the same from the mails for the purpose
of circulating or disposing thereof, or of aiding in the circulation or disposition thereof,
shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
3. According to expert psychiatric testimony at the hearing, the poses, clothing worn,
and props used in the pictures would tend to arouse great prurient interest in a
homosexual, would have possible detrimental effects on young readers, and would not
be likely to arouse prurient interest in normal male adults. See Record, vol. 1, pp.
2-65, MANual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962). Each picture was
accompanied by a caption giving names of model and photographer. MANual
Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 289 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
4. These advertised materials, admittedly hard core pornography, were not placed
by petitioner but by independent advertisers; while petitioner had notice from postal
authorities that some of these advertisers were under prosecution, he was never shown
any of this material. 370 U.S. at 491 n.15, 493.
5. Record, vol. 1, p. 85. See also letter from petitioner to Mercury Photographic
Service wherein petitioner writes "physique fans want their 'truck driver types' already
cleaned up, showered, and ready for bed." Id. at 89 (Government's exhibit G).
6. Id. at 87 (Government's exhibit A).
7. Ibid.
8. Id. at 88.
9. Id. at 78.
10. Mr. Justice Harlan joined by Mr. Justice Stewart announced the decision with
Mr. Justice Black concurring in the result; Mr. Justice Brennan joined by the Chief
Justice concurred in a separate opinion on separate procedural grounds; Mr. Justice
Douglas concurred in the result but on different grounds; Mr. Justice Clark dissented;
and Justices Frankfurter and White took no part in the decision.
11. See generally PAUL & ScnwAnTz, FEDEAL CENSORsHIP: OBSC-trr IN THE
MAIL (1961); Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Con-
stitutional Standards, 45 MmN. L. REv. 5-13 (1960); Zuckman, Obscenity in
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English case of Regina v. Hicklin'2 announced in 1868 that tendency
to deprave and corrupt the minds of those into whose hands the
material might fall was the proper test. This standard was quickly
adopted in the United States 3 and followed, though sometimes re-
luctantly,14 by the majority of courts' 5 until the decision in United
States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses."'6 Therein the court declared
that obscenity was matter which had a tendency to stir the sex
impulses and lustful thoughts of "a person with average sex in-
stincts."'' The Ulysses case established that the standard to be applied
was not that of any specific group, as would be the case under Hicklin,
but the standard of a general idealized "average man." This test,
though often applied, 8 was greatly criticized by legal writers for
its vagueness 19 and by judges for its propensity for crowding the ap-
pellate dockets.20  The search for definiteness21 continued through
the Mails, 33 So. CAL. L. REv. 171, 184-88 (1960); Note, 11 VAND. L. REv. 585
(1958).
12. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). The proper test was stated to be "whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of
this sort may fall." L.R. 3 Q.B. at 371.
13. Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896); McFadden v. United States, 165
Fed. 51 (3d Cir.), writ of error denied, 213 U.S. 288, cert. denied, 214 U.S. 511
(1909); United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093, 1103-04 (No. 14571) (2d Cir.
1879).
14. United States v. Kennerly, 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Learned Hand,
while reluctantly applying the Hicklin test on the basis of stare decisis, proposed
that, "If there had been no abstract definition, such as I have suggested, should not
the word 'obscene' be allowed to indicate the present critical point in the compromise
between candor and shame at which the community may have arrived here and now"?
209 Fed. at 121. See generally Lancaster, Judge Hand's Views on the Free Speech
Problem, 10 VANrD. L. REv. 301 (1957).
15. See Annots., 1 L. Ed. 2d 2211 (1957), 4 L. Ed. 2d 1821 (1960).
16. 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934); Note, 33
So. CAL. L. REv. 171, 173 (1960).
17. 5 F. Supp. at 184. "The meaning of the word 'obscene' as legally defined by
the courts is: Tendency to stir the sex impulses and lustful thoughts .... Whether a
particular book would tend to excite such impulses and thoughts must be tested by the
court's opinion as to its effect on a person with average sex instincts .... ." Ibid.
18. "Our state decisions tend to adhere to the 'dominant effect' test. United States
v. One Book Entitled Ulysses .... The question is whether the dominant note of the
presentation is erotic allurement 'tending to excite lustful and lecherous desire,' dirt
for dirt's sake only, smut and inartistic filth, with no evident purpose but 'to counsel
or invite to vice or voluptuousness."' Adams Theatre Co. v. Keenan, 12 N.J. 267,
272, 96 A.2d 519, 521 (1953). See, e.g., Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
19. See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 11, at 72-73.
20. In argument before the Supreme Court the following verbal exchanges occured
concerning Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948) (Whitney North
Seymour, counsel for the publisher):
"Mr. Justice Jackson: 'This is not a question of geography, but a question of whose
standards you adopt. A book written in Greenwich Village might be considered
obscene in the vicinity of 50th Street and Fifth Avenue.'
[Mr. Seymour] 'I don't think there is that much difference.'
[Mr. Justice Jackson] 'I had reference to the vicinity of St. Patrick's Church ..
[Mr. Seymour] 'I respectfully submit that a statute could be drawn to ban the
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1957 when, in Roth v. United States, 2 the Supreme Court declared
that "whether to the average person, applying community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken as whole appeals to a pruri-
ent interest.... [This test] provides safeguards adequate to with-
stand the charge of constitutional infirmity."2 The per curiam
decisions which followed close on the heels of Roth2 suggested that
those who urged codification and certainty in the law of obscenity
might take heart, for these decisions seemed to have indicated that
the Court was able to judge the various tests applied in the lower
courts in light of the standard, well established and clearly defined-
at least in the minds of the Court-in the Roth case. However,
criticism of the vagueness of the term "community standards" per-
sisted on the ground that no one but the Supreme Court knew the
term's meaningas and at least one district court still found it necessary
as late as 1959 both to synthesize law and review facts in order to
sale to minors of picture postcards having representations of nude male and female
figures.,
[Mr. Justice Jackson] 'Don't show me any respect on this subject, I don't pose as
an expert on it.'
Counsel continued with a statement that it was impossible to determine from the
statute either the substantive evil or the applicable standards....
Mr. Justice Jackson: 'Does your argument mean that we would have to take every
obscenity case and decide the constitutional issues on the merits of the literary work?
It seems to me that would mean we would become the High Court of Obscenity."
17 U.S.L. W= 3117, 3118-19 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1948).
21. For a discussion of a problem related to the evolving standard, see Note, 11
VANeD. L. Rtv. 585, 588-90 (1958) (freedom of expression).
22. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). For an extensive discussion of the facts and holding in
this case, see generally Lockhart & McClure, supra note 11, at 19-29; Note, 11 VAND.
L. Rzv. 585, 591 (1958).
23. "In Roth, the trial judge instructed the jury: 'the words obscene, lewd and
lascivious as used in the law, signify that form of immorality which has relation to
sexual impurity and has a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.' (Emphasis added) In
Alberts, the trial judge applied the test laid down in People v. Wepple, 78 Cal. App.2d
Supp. [sic] 959, 178 P.2d 853, namely, whether the material has 'a substantial
tendency to deprave or corrupt its readers by inciting lascivious thoughts or arousing
lustful desires.' (Emphasis added)" 354 U.S. at 486. "Obscene material is material
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest." Id. at 487. "Some
American courts adopted this standard [the Hicklin test] but later decisions have
rejected it and substituted this test: whether to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest.. . .On the other hand, the substituted standard provides
safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity. Both trial
courts below sufficiently followed the proper standard." Id. at 489.
24. E.g., One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958) (per curiam); Adams Newark
Theater Co. v. City of Newark, 354 U.S. 931 (1957) (per curiam); Klaw v. Schaeffer,
251 F.2d 615 (1958) (per curiam). See generally Lockhart & McClure, supra note
11, at 32-39.
25. E.g., Kalven, Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, in THE SvPnmmn Coun'r lr-
viEw 15 (1960); Lockhart & McClure, supra note 11, at 13; Note, 11 VANm. L. REv. 585
(1958); 14 VAND. L. RE . 1525 (1961).
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determine the standard for declaring obscenity.2
In the instant case, the Court declared that the Roth case did not,
as the court of appeals had ruled,27 make prurient interest the sole
test of obscenity. Declining to attribute to Congress an intent to bar
from the mail all non-patently offensive material which stimulates
impure desires relating to sex,8 the Court ruled that a finding of
obscenity requires proof of two distinct elements: patent offensive-
ness, and prurient interest.2 9 In addition, the Court ruled that
the relevant community standard to be used in finding patent offen-
siveness is a national standard of decency3Q-not merely appeal to
the prurient interest of any significant group, such as homosexuals.
Moreover, the Court refused to say that only hard core pornography
is barred (as is suggested by the case of People v. Richmond County
News, Inc.31 and writers Lockhart and McClure32 ), saying only that
26. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd,
276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960). Where a book is written with honesty and seriousness
of purpose, and the portions which might be considered obscene are relevant to the
theme, it is not condemned by the statute even though 'it justly may offend many'...
Roth v. United States, supra, . . . did not deal with the application of the obscenity
statutes to specific material. It laid down general tests circumscribing the area in
which matter is excludable from constitutional protections because it is obscene, so as
to avoid impingement on First Amendment guarantees." 175 F. Supp. at 498. "Both
cases [Roth and UlyseesJ held that, to be obscene, the dominant effect of the book
must be an appeal to prurient interest. ...The material must be judged in terms of
those it is likely to reach who are conceived of as the average man of normal sensual
impulses.... The material must also exceed the limits of tolerance imposed by current
standards of the community with respect to freedom of expression in matters concerning
sex and sex relations. Moreover, a book is not to be judged by excerpts or individual
passages but must be judged as a whole." Id. at 499. "The tests of obscenity are not
whether the book or passages from it are in bad taste or shock or offend the sensibilities
of an individual, or even of a substantial segment of the community." Id. at 501. "Thus,
this is an honest and sincere novel of literary merit and its dominant theme and effect,
taken as a whole, is not an appeal to the prurient interest of the average reader."
Id. at 502. See generally MoDEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962);
PAuL & Sc-wAluz, op. cit. supra note 11, at 165-66.
27. MANual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 289 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1961). "The proper
test in this case, we think, is the reaction of the average member of the class for
which the magazines were intended, homosexuals. The testimony of record was clearly
to the effect that these magazines would arouse prurient interest in the average
homosexuals." 289 F.2d at 456.
28. "We decline to attribute to Congress any such Quixotic and deadening purpose
as would bar from the mails all material, not patently offensive, which stimulates
impure desires relating to sex. Indeed such a construction of § 1461 would doubtless
encounter constitutional barriers." 370 U.S. at 487 (1962).
29. Id. at 486.
30. "There must first be decided the relevant 'community' in terms of whose standards
of decency the issue must be judged. We think that the proper test under this federal
statute, reaching as it does to all parts of the United States whose population reflects
many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, is a national standard of decency." Id.
at 488.
31. 9 N.Y.2d 578, 586, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 375, 175 N.E.2d 681, 685 (1961), For
clarification of the Richmond case, see People v. Finkelstein, 11 N.Y.2d 300, 229
N.Y.S.2d 367, 183 N.E. 2d 661 (1962).
32. Lockhart & McQlure, supra note 11, at 58-60.
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the pictures at issue could not, under any permissible standard, be
deemed to transcend contemporary notions of rudimentary decency.3
By finding that the pictures were not obscene and that scienter,
requisite for conviction regarding the advertisements, was not proved,
the Court obviated the necessity of reaching the issue of the con-
stitutionality of restraining matter from mail prior to a judicial de-
termination of obsceity-a field of law as unsettled and controversial
as the standard of obscenity.3 The opinion makes clear, however,
that where, as here, factual matters of allegedly obscene materials are
entangled in a constitutional claim, that issue is ultimately one for
the Supreme Court a
The Court, in a conscious effort to refine the Roth test,6 has once
again felt constrained not to define in precise language the criteria
by which obscenity is found. Rather, it has merely numbered the
component parts of the test in Roth, and declared that patent ob-
scenity is that which lies beyond the pale of contemporary notions of
decency,37 judged in the light of a national standard of decency.38
Clarification of what the Court considers to constitute this national
standard is not to be found in the instant decision. One may question
the assertion that the Justices do "have something fairly definite in
mind-something they apparently are not yet able or ready to de-
scribe,"39 but it cannot be denied that the task of promulgating a
definitive test presents many difficulties.40 Few topics exist on which
public and private views are so divergent, yet the Court must express
a sober public view. The issue is imbued with all the contingencies
of free speech and free press, and the variables treated by such a
33. 370 U.S. at 489.
34. The issue of prior restraint under 18 U.S.C. § 1461 is discussed in Mr. Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion in the instant case, wherein he concludes that: (1) §
1461 was not intended by Congress to authorize administrative censorship (370 U.S.
at 510); (2) congressional legislation subsequent to § 1461 stripped the postmaster
of power to issue interim orders prior to a judicial hearing in a federal district court
(id. at 513); and (3) that while Congress could constitutionally authorize an adminis-
trative process, it has not done so, and § 1461 remains a wholly criminal statute (id.
at 519).
For an indication of the controversy surrounding prior restraint, see PAUL & Scm-
wAKIz, FEDERAL CENsoRsmp: OscmErrN =n THE MAnL (1961); Paul, The Post Ofice
and Non-Mailability of Obscenity, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 44 (1961); Zuckman, Obscenity
in the Mails, 33 So. CAL. L. BREv. 171 (1960); Comment, 27 U. Cm. L. Riv. 354
(1960).
35. "That issue, involving factual matters entangled in a constitutional claim, see
Grove Press, Inc., v. Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433, 436, is ultimately one for this
court." 370 U.S. at 488.
36. Id. at 486-87.
37. Id. at 489.
38. Id. at 488.
39. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 11, at 58.
40. Id. at 121; MopEr. PENAL CODE § 207.10, comment, at 8 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1957); PAuL & ScnwART;z, op. cit. supra note 34, at 206, 210.
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decision are multitudinous.41 However, recognizing that a modern
law of obscenity must reflect man's changing views of the importance
of freedom of expression and the proper purposes and fields of opera-
tion of criminal law, the American Law Institute has proposed a
test of obscenity which is strikingly similar to the Roth test with
one important exception: where it is shown that the material is
consciously slanted toward children or other specially susceptible
audiences, prurient interest will be judged with reference to that
group.43  It is submitted that the six pertinent variables therein
proposed go far toward eliminating the vagueness which has been
the basic source of criticism of the Roth test, as it now stands. How-
ever, it might very well be concluded that under the "specially
susceptible audience" provision of the Model Penal Code, the Court
would have reached an opposite decision in the instant case since
the publications were admittedly slanted toward homosexuals.
45
Finally, the instant case leaves unanswered the question of reviewa-
bility of findings of fact under proper instructions of obscenity.4
41. "The difficulties have, I think, three main strands .... Finally they perform
their roles in an institutional context that necessarily raises issues about federalism,
about judicial review, about holding statutes unconstitutional on their face or only
in their application, about de novo review of constitutional fact, about whether they
should ever decide any more issues than they are compelled to, and about whether
they are obliged to give legislative draftsmen advice on how to cure the defects the
Court may find in their work." Kalven, supra note 25, at 45.
42. MoDr PENAL CODE § 207.10, comment, at 7-8 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
43. "Material is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to
prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest, in nudidity, sex, or excretion,
and if in addition it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing
or representing such matters. Predominant appeal shall be judged with reference to
ordinary adults unless it appears from the character of the material or the circumstances
of its dissemination to be designed for children or other specially susceptible
audience." MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). But see
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
44. "(4) ...
(a) the character of the audience for which the material was designed
or to which it was directed;
(b) what the predominant appeal of the material would be for ordinary
adults or any special audience to which it was directed, and what effect, if any, it
would probably have on the conduct of such people;
(c) artistic, literary, scientific, educational or other merits of the material;
(d) the degree of public acceptance of the material in the United States;
(e) appeal to prurient interest, or absence thereof, in advertising or other
promotion of the material; and
(f) the good repute of the author, creator, publisher or other person from
whom the material originated." Ibid.
45. See notes 3, 5-9 supra.
46. See note 35 supra.
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Tax Liens-Federal Tax Lien Subordinated to
Local Lien Which Was Included as an
Expense of Sale
The defendant mortgagor executed a real property mortgage to the
plaintiff bank. The United States filed a tax lien against the defendant
and, subsequent to this, local taxes and assessments became liens upon
the property. This action was commenced to foreclose the mortgage.
Upon plaintiff's motion, the Erie County Court granted summary
judgment and directed the referee to include all local taxes and as-
sessments as expenses of the sale, thereby subordinating the prior
federal lien to the subsequent local lien' in accord with an applicable
state statute.2 This judgment was modified by the appellate division
to the extent that the local tax liens were not to be included as ex-
penses of sale.3 On appeal, held, reversed, and judgment of the county
court reinstated. The direction to pay local taxes as expenses of the
sale was proper within a state statute, and the federal tax lien is thus
subordinated to the local lien. Buffalo Savings Bank v. Victory, 11
N.Y.2d 31, 181 N.E.2d 413 (1962), rev'd, 83 Sup. Ct. 314 (1963).*
In considering the problem of whether state procedure can be used
indirectly to subordinate federal liens to local liens, the Supreme
Court has held that the relative priority of federal tax liens as against
state or local tax liens is always a federal question.4 The current view
*While this article was undergoing editorial process the Supreme Court handed down
a per curiam opinion, 83 Sup. Ct. 314 (1963), reversing the New York Court of
Appeals relying primarily upon the same principles as are enunciated herein. See notes
16-20 infra and accompanying text.
1. In initial proceedings, the county court held that the land should be sold free of
the United States tax lien, but subject to local taxes. On appeal, the appellate division
reversed and remitted to the county court, stating that the discretionary authority to
have the property sold subject to local taxes could not be exercised in a case involving
circular priorities. Buffalo Say. Bank v. Victory, 11 App. Div. 2d 158, 202 N.Y.S.2d
70 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
2. N.Y. Civ. P1Ac. AcT § 1087: "Where a judgment rendered in an action to fore-
close a mortgage upon real property directs a sale of the real property, the officer
making the sale must pay out of the proceeds, unless the judgment otherwise directs,
all taxes, assessments and water rates which are liens upon the property sold, and
redeem the property sold from any sales for unpaid taxes, assessments or water rates
which are liens upon the property sold, and redeem the property sold from any
sales for unpaid taxes, assessments or water rates which have not apparently become
absolute. The sums necessary to make these payments and redemptions are deemed
expenses of the sale within the meaning of that expression as used in any provision
of this article."
3. Buffalo Savings Bank v. Victory, 13 App. Div. 2d 207, 215 N.Y.S.2d 189 (Sup. Ct.
1961).
4. "The relative priority of the lien of the United States for unpaid taxes is . . .
always a federal question to be determined finally by federal courts. The state's
characterization of its liens, while good for all state purposes, does not necessarily bind
this Court." United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211, 213 (1955). See also United States
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of the Supreme Court, as expressed in United States v. City of New
Britain,5 one that has withstood the test of time, is that "a prior lien
gives a prior claim, which is entitled to prior satisfaction, out of the
subject it binds .... "6 Since the Supreme Court feels that the priority
of the competing liens is governed by time rather than statute,7 the
fact that state law has been allowed to ascertain the taxpayers'
property rights8 is not determinative even though the local liens attach
to the mortgagor's interest in the property.9 The scattered New York
cases that uphold this section of the statute in question against federal
liens interpret it as a procedural statute defining expenses of sale
rather than controlling the priority of federal liens, 10 and therefore
inapplicable in contesting the relative priority of federal and local
liens." Another argument in support of the statute is that its purpose
is to protect purchasers by enabling them to obtain clear tides at
foreclosure sales.'2 Some courts in similar situations urge that the
v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); United States v. Security Trust & Say.
Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950); Dunkirk Trust Co. v. Dunkirk Laundry Co., 182 N.Y.S.2d
381 (Chautagua County Ct. 1959); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 9
App. Div. 2d 356, 194 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
In Stadelman v. Hornell Woodworking Corp., 172 F. Supp. 156, 158 (W.D.N.Y.
1958), the court made a more specific statement: "New York State cannot impair the
standing of federal liens without the consent of Congress." The Supreme Court
put forth its position in an analagous situation in United States v. Gilbert Associates,
345 U.S. 361 (1953). In this case, New Hampshire treated its tax assessments as
judgments for state purposes, putting the state in the position of a judgment creditor
which would take priority over an unrecorded federal tax lien. While the Court said
this may be fine for state purposes, nevertheless, the states, by declaring themselves
judgment creditors did not make them such within § 3672 of the United States Code, so
as to defeat an unrecorded federal tax lien. Since a cardinal principle of Congress in its
tax scheme is uniformity, it would seem that the term "expenses of sale," as well as
"judgment creditor," should have the same application in all states. Cf. Dice v. Akron,
C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
5. The leading case in this area is United States v. City of New Britain, supra note
4, which set forth the "first in time, first in right" doctrine.
6. Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. 175, 179 (1827).
7. United States v. City of New Britain, supra note 4.
8. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
9. United States v. City of New Britain, supra note 4.
10. Rikoon v. Two Boro Dress, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 591, 171 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct.
1957); Kronenberg v. Ellenville Nurseries & Green Houses, Inc., 22 Misc. 2d 247, 196
N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
11. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, supra note 4. See also Dunkirk
Trust Co. v. Dunkirk Laundry Co., supra note 4.
12. "It [§ 1087J merely provides that taxes and assessments 'which are liens upon
the property sold ... are deemed expenses of the sale within the meaning of that ex-
pression as used in any provision of this article. . . .' The purpose of this section is
to protect, not the mortgagee, but the purchaser on a foreclosure sale, who is entitled
to a clear title. ... Wesselman v. Engel Co., 309 N.Y. 27, 127 N.E.2d 736, 737
(1955). This same case said that the term "expense of sale" had often been inter-
preted to include taxes. One interpretation of § 1087 of the Civil Practice Act is that
it was enacted to protect purchasers, rather than state or local governments, by making
possible the transfer of clear titles. Without this procedural device, a purchaser would
be asked to accept a title clouded by unpaid liens. See Kronenberg v. Ellenville Nurser-
ies & Green Houses, Inc., supra note 10.
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position of the United States in this matter threatens the stability of
the mortgage business, for the mortgagee is not assured of being made
whole in a foreclosure action.13
In deciding the Buffalo Savings Bank case, the court declared that
the respective competing liens were not comparable since the mort-
gagee had an absolute preference, while the federal government, as a
creditor of the mortgagor, can look only to the surplus proceeds. The
Buffalo court further held that a local lien is not a levy against the
mortgagee, but a charge against the land that must be paid together
with the other costs of the sale. The Buffalo court declined to follow
the New Britain case, declaring that the Supreme Court did not indi-
cate that Congress intended to upset established state procedure or
curtain the absolute preference given to mortgagees. In further dis-
tinguishing New Britain, the court said that there the contest was
between the local and federal governments regarding the surplus
proceeds, while in the instant case, the contest is between the mort-
gagee and the federal government. Here the federal lien attached
to the mortgagor's interest in the property, which could only be
determined after the expenses of sale and the mortgagee's share had
been subtracted from the proceeds. The court puts much emphasis
upon a case in which the Supreme Court allowed state law to control
the procedure of foreclosure and payment of liens. 14 The court's
strong policy argument is that the overriding of state procedure in
this instance would make it difficult to transfer property free and clear
of liens and that this same uncertainty would affect the credit rating
of municipal bonds and impair the borrowing power of municipali-
ties.15 The majority states that precedent demands the reaffimance
of the principle that state procedure governs the matter of the relative
priority of liens.
The ruling in the instant case is inconsistent with the New Britain
case and with the general trend of federal decisions. It allows an
exercise of state power to override a uniform policy of the United
States. This holding permits the priority laws of the individual states
to frustrate the federal government in the collection of revenue. The
consequences in this area could be far reaching, for if the state is
allowed to advance a local tax lien ahead of a federal lien by a mere
procedural step, the doctrine of "first in time, first in right"' 6 will be
nullified and the status of the relative priority of liens will be thrown
13. See Rikoon v. Two Boro Dress, Inc., supra note 10. The argument on this point
is that if these local liens were not paid out of the expenses of sale, the federal lien
might consume the remainder of the proceeds and force the mortgagee to pay the
local taxes out of his supposedly protected share of the proceeds.
14. United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960).
15. The court feared the municipality would become liable for the debts that tax
delinquent property owners owed the government, thus hindering its borrowing power.
16. Note 5 supra.
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into confusion. The characterization of a lien by an individual state
is not conclusive against the federal government 7 for the federal
revenue statutes require a uniform application of the terminology
involved.'8 Allowing a state to classify local liens as expenses of sale
would render these statutes ineffective. 19 The weight of cases and
the current view of the Supreme Court seem to suggest that state pro-
cedure will not be allowed to function as a means of circumventing
federal tax lien priority. If a state were allowed to declare a local tax
lien an expense of sale, there would seem to be no reason why it could
not similarly legislate mechanic's liens, attorney's liens, and all other
claims into the same category, thereby making them superior to prior
federal liens. The Supreme Court has previously frowned on a similar
practice in United States v. Gilbert Associates,20 where a state tried to
achieve priority over a federal tax lien by the simple expedient of
treating a local tax claim as a judgment, when, in fact, the tax claim
had not been reduced to judgment. Following the view contrary
to the Buffalo case would result in a more uniform application of the
federal revenue laws among the states, thereby upholding a strong
principle of tax policy.
Taxation-Inheritance, Estate & Gift Taxes-A
Specific Dollar Amount Held To Be a Specific
Portion So as To Qualify for Marital Deduction
A surviving spouse was given by will a life interest in a residuary
trust with a general testamentary power of appointment over a
variable portion of the "trust funds."2 In addition, the will named the
spouse as a co-trustee of the trust. The estate tax return, filed under
the auspices of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,3 claimed the
17. United States v. City of New Britain, supra note 4.
18. INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, §§ 6321, 6323.
19. Ibid.
20. 345 U. S. 361 (1953).
1. As life beneficiary, the spouse was granted an annual income of $10,000 to be
derived from trust income and, if necessary, an invasion of corpus. As a practical
matter, the court of appeals took notice that the trust assets had never realized in
excess of $3,500 income and regular corpus invasions were anticipated by the deceased.
2. The life interest of the spouse was subject to a maximum withdrawal of $5,000
annually from the funds of the trust for the support and education of the younger of
the deceased's two daughters, at the discretion of the trustees.
3. Testator died November 16, 1953.
1969]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
residuary trust as a marital deduction.4 The Commissioner rejected
the inclusion of the trust in the marital deduction since the power to
appoint was not over the entire corpus, or a "specific portion," i.e., a
"fractional or percentile share" of it. The Tax Court upheld the
Commissioner.5 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held, reversed and remanded. A general power
to appoint what the court construed to be in effect a "specific dollar
amount of a residuary trust," is a power over a specific portion and
qualifies, under section 812 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as
a marital deduction. Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.
1962).
Generally, the 1939 Code taxed the gross estate of a decedent
with few deductions.6 This tax was severely criticized by the common
law states as presenting a tax inequality which favored the com-
munity property states since only one-half of the "community estate"
was taxable upon the death of a marital partner.7 The ensuing federal
efforts at equality, although directed primarily at a solution through
the use of an income tax provision,8 resulted also in a congressional
revision of the 1939 Code to include "community interests." Rather
than quieting the agitation for tax reform, the inclusionary measure
served only to enlist the now disgruntled community property states.10
Through joint efforts, in 1948 these interests achieved the repeal of
the 1942 Act" and an equality between the two through an act
allowing an optional marital splitting of the estate into taxable and
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a) allowed as a marital deduction from the
estate tax "[T]he value of the taxable estate . . . determined by deducting from the
value of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any interest in property
which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse .... "
5. Gelb v. Commissioner, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 987 (1960).
6. INT. REV. CoDE oF 1939, § 812.
7. In Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), the Court recognized the states'
concept of community property as a limitation on the federal taxing authorities. Con-
sequently, in community property jurisdictions, only that property representing the
equity of the testator was taxable.
8. See the Statement of Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Hearings
on the Revenue Revision of 1942 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1942), recommending the mandatory filing of joint income tax
returns by married couples in community property states.
9. Revenue Act of 1942, tit. IV, § 402(b)(1)(e) (2), 56 Stat. 942 amending the
INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1939, § 811 to include in the value of the gross estate of the
decedent, the "community interest, to the extent of the interest therein held as com-
munity property by the decedent and surviving spouse under the law of any state .... "
10. Community property states criticized this result contending that it merely
reversed the inequity. Now the common law jurisdictions allowed the testator to
give the spouse a life interest in the entire estate and by such action postpone any
tax until the death of the beneficiary. Whereas, in the community property states,
the testators one-half would be taxed upon his demise, as well as upon the demise of
the grantee-spouse. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1948).
11. Repealed, April 2, 1948, ch. 168, § 351(a), 62 Stat. 116.
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non-taxable halves.'2 The apparent congressional objective was to
allow a postponement of the tax, by permitting a tax free bequest to a
surviving spouse, provided the amount given would be subject to tax
on the death of the survivor.13 One of the most widely used methods
of qualifying estates in respect to this objective became the trust with
a general power of appointment in the life beneficiary, commonly re-
ferred to as the "marital deduction" trust.'4 The courts, however, in a
strict interpretation of the 1948 Act, denied as a qualifying deduction,
any interest less than an entire one as to either the trust income, 5
or the corpus.16 This potential pitfall in estate planning was recog-
nized by the 1954 Code which extended the marital deduction to a
specific portion of the entire interest, so that a general power to
appoint need only prevail over a specific portion of the entire trust.17
In 1958, the specific portion provision was made applicable to the
1939 Code, for estates arising subsequent to April 1, 1948, and before
August 17, 1954.1' Yet, the strict interpretation of the marital deduc-
tion which sired the specific portion provision was revived by the
Treasury Department to bridle the legislative foal, i.e., by interpreting
the provision to apply only to such portions of an entire interest as
were representative of a fractional or percentile share, expressly ex-
cluding a specific sum.19
The court of appeals, Judge Friendly writing the opinion, recog-
nized that in the case at hand the surviving spouse did not have the
12. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 351(a), 62 Stat. 116.
13. See H.R. REP. No. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948); S. REP. No. 1013, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1948). See generally the Statement of Allan H. W. Higgins, on
behalf of the American Bar Association, Hearings on Revenue Revisions 1947-48 Before
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3361 (1948); Estate
of Reilly v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 797 (3d Cir. 1957).
14. BowE, ESTATE PLANNING AND TAXATION § 4.17, at 81 (1961).
15. Cf. Estate of Tingley, 22 T.C. 402 (1954); Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d
163 (1st Cir. 1955); Estate of Shedd, 23 T.C. 41, 46 (1954), aff'd, 237 F.2d 345, 359
(9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1024 (1957).
16. Estate of Hoffenberg, 22 T.C. 1185, aff'd per curiam, 223 F.2d 470 (2d Cir.
1955).
17. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b)(5).
18. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1668, amending Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 812.
19. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)(5) (a) (1959) further stated that requisite to
Code compliance, all of the five conditions set forth below must be satisfied:
"(1) The surviving spouse must be entitled for life to all of the income from
the entire interest or a specific portion of all the income from the entire interest.
"(2) The income payable to the surviving spouse must be payable annually or at
more frequent intervals.
"(3) The surviving spouse must have the power to appoint the entire interest or the
specific portion to either herself or her estate.
"(4) The power in the surviving spouse must be exercisable by her alone and
(whether exercisable by will or during life) must be exercisable in all events.
"(5) The entire interest or the specific portion must not be subject to a power in
any other person to appoint any part to any person other than the surviving spouse.'
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power to appoint the entire trust corpus.20 Rather, the provision as
to the trustee's discretionary withdrawal was held to be an additional
power to invade corpus.21 But the invasionary power was held
estimable by actuarial calculation 2 and, as a result, a specific sum
out of a larger fund ascertainable. The specific sum was recognized
by the court as a specific portion under the 1939 Code, as amended,"
and as such a portion, allowable as a marital deduction. In arriving
at this result, the court expressly disapproved Treasury Regulation
105, section 81.47a(c) (3),24 insofar as it would limit a specific portion
to a fractional or percentile share. As to the Commissioner's argu-
ment that the congressional reports regarding the 1954 Code and the
1958 amendment to the 1939 Code use only examples of fractional or
percentile shares,2 the court failed to attribute such significance to
the examples as would warrant an exclusive construction. 6 The
Commissioner's contention that in order for a portion of a trust to
qualify as a deduction it must be susceptible to "a proportionate
share of the increment or decline in the whole of the property"27 in
trust, was equally unacceptable.28 Recognizing that Congress spoke
of specific portion and not fractional or percentile share, the court
found no sympathy for, or justification of any such "elaboration of
20. Counsel for taxpayer had insisted that since the surviving spouse as life
beneficiary with the power to appoint, also was one of two trustees by whom the
discretionary power in question could be negated, there was in practicality an entire
corpus under the life beneficiarys control. However, the court observed the possible
existence of a "successor trustee" and the consequent frustration of the theory of
control by the beneficiary. In addition the court cited the exercise of an equitable
restraint as a remedy for a prejudiced beneficiary. Starrett v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d
163 (1st Cir. 1955); 1 ScoTT, TRuSTS § 25.2, at 194-95 (2d ed. 1956).
21. Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1962). Both the Com-
missioner and the Tax Court had regarded the provision as violative of the INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 2056, requiring that the surviving spouse must be "entitled for
life to all the income from the corpus of the trust"; Judge Friendly reversed their
factual finding and held the provision an unequivocal power to invade corpus, "not one
to divert income from the widow."
22. The use of actuarial computation has long been sanctioned by the Commissioner.
See Commissioner v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 190-92 (1955) (a gift to
charity made subject to a life estate); BOUTWELL, MANUAL 203 (1863) (legacies);
Art. 20, Regulations 37 (1919) (charitable remainders). See generally 4 MEnTENS,
FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAxAnoN § 28.30 (1959).
23. Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1668, amending Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, § 812.
24. As to the 1954 Code, the Regulation is § 20.2056(b)(5)(c).
25. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5119 (1954); S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5029, 5030
(1958).
26. 298 F.2d at 551.
27. The Commissioner based this argument upon the rationale expressed by
Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47a(c)(3), example (1) (1942).
28. "Congress . . . nowhere indicated any policy that deductability of a 'specific
portion' should be governed by the possibility that the spouse's portion will change




the statutory language."2 19 Rather, the court found that the 'iberaliza-
tion" in the provision as to the marital deduction trust allowed by the
1954 Code was "designed to permit certain normal testamentary
dispositions without the total forfeiture of the deduction that the
1939 Code had occasioned in some instances."30 The case was there-
upon remanded to the Tax Court for a determination of that por-
tion of the residuary trust qualifying for the marital deduction.
31
Code section 2056(b) (5) allows a marital deduction for what is
essentially a terminable interest if the surviving spouse is entitled to
all the income for life with a general testamentary power to appoint
either (1) the "entire interest," or (2) "a specific portion thereof."
The legislative intent and word symbols implementing it indicate
that the term, "a specific portion thereof," is one pertaining to only a
relative share of the entire interest. 2 The Treasury Regulation reflects
this intent by regarding a specific portion as a fractional or percentile
share.33 Is it possible to say that a power to appoint a specific sum,
e.g., $100,000 is a power to appoint a specific portion of a larger fund?
This is the problem in the Gelb case. At first glance it would seem
that a specific sum would always be a specific portion of a larger fund,
because the specific sum is but the numerator over the whole of the
larger fund and therefore a stated fraction of it ($100,000) at that($200,000)
time-the time of H's death. Yet, the denominator varies with eco-
nomic circumstances, e.g., inflation may appreciate the trust corpus
to $350,000 by the time of W's death. The sum over which the
appointive power may be exercised has remained constant, but the
portion has varied by a relative diminution-hardly remaining a
specific portion. To argue an alternate contention that an express
power to appoint $100,000 of a previously valued estate of $200,000 is
also an implied power to appoint one-half of the appreciated estate($175,000)thdeiino asae
($5,000) is to challenge the probable decision of a state probate
($350,000)
court and to incur the wrath of the residuary legatee(s). A distinc-
tion between the residuary trust less a specific sum as compared to
a specific sum, would be no more successful in satisfying the statutory
29. Id. at 550.
30. Id. at 551.
31. The Tax Court was also asked to consider whether the power in respect to
the trustees discretionary withdrawal was not a qualifying power to the extent that
it was exercisable during the recipient's minority. See Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47a(c)
(9) (1942).
32. "The bill makes it clear ... that a right to income plus a general power of
appointment over only an undivided part of the property will qualify that part of
the property for the marital deduction." See generally H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 92 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1954); S. REP. No.
1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
33. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47a (1942).
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requirements. The suggestion4 that this provides a method of cir-
cumventing the underlying Treasury objections to a variable portion
is beside the point; the problem is a compliance with the statute.
Consequently, an estate planner aware that federal taxation is not
a common law subject will find little in the Gelb decision to justify
any hope for acquiring the marital deduction for a power to appoint
a specific sum of a larger fund.15
Torts-Negligent Misrepresentations in Business
Transactions-Persons to Whom Duty Is Owed
Plaintiff entered into a subcontract to dig a sewer tunnel through a
hill for the city. It based its price on information contained in draw-
ings prepared for the city by defendant consulting engineers. Through
"oversight or at most simple and unintentional carelessness,"' informa-
tion concerning the amount of rock to be encountered was omitted
from the drawings, thus leading the plaintiff to believe the job could
be done for substantially less than its ultimate cost. Actual working
time was almost double the estimated time based on the drawings.
Plaintiff sought to recover damages sustained as the result of reliance
on negligent misrepresentation. Held, judgment for plaintiff. An
action will lie where a misrepresentation is merely negligent and not
intentionally false, and furthermore the action can be maintained by
a member of a class of persons whom the act may foreseeably affect.
Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.
Tenn. 1962), appeal docketed, No. 15,075, 6th Cir., 1962.
The case of Derry v. Peek,2 the fountainhead of the modern action
of deceit, established scienter, or something akin thereto, as a neces-
sary element of that action.3 Deceit and, where it exists, the kindred
action of negligent misrepresentation are confined to actions for injury
34. See Covey, New Doctrines on Marital Deduction, 101 TRusTs & ESTATES 322,
392 (1962).
35. "There is coming to be a significant amount of common law of federal taxation,
but federal taxation is not a common law subject." GiuswoLD, CASES ON TAXATION
ch. 1, at 15 (4th ed. 1955).
1. Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F. Supp. 821, 826 (E.D. Tean.
1962), appeal docketed, No. 15,075, 6th Cir., 1962.
2. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
3. "First, in order to sustain an action of deceit, there must be proof of fraud, and
nothing short of that will suffice. Secondly, fraud is proved when it is shown that
a false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its




to commercial or financial interests.4 Statements 'approving the rule
of Derry v. Peek5 can be found in most jurisdictions;6 but when justice
requires it, many courts will find a remedy for a negligent mis-
representation made directly to the plaintiff.7 A minority of jurisdic-
tions have repudiated the criterion of Derry v. Peek." Where recovery
is allowed, it might be under either of two theories: abolition of the
scienter requirement for deceit,9 or allowance of a separate action for
negligent misrepresentation."°
4. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Hedley Byrne
& Co. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd., [1962] 1 Q.B. 396, 411 (C.A.); GREEN, JuDGE AND
JuRy 280 (1930); 1 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS 528 (1956); PRossER, TORTS 521 (2d
ed. 1955); 3 RESTATEmNT, TORTS, scope note to ch. 22, at 56-57 (1938); cf. Vartan
Garapedian, Inc. v. Anderson, 92 N.H. 390, 31 A.2d 371 (1943).
There are several other theories upon which a party who suffers financial loss
caused by negligent or fraudulent representation may proceed: warranty (PaossEn, op.
cit. supra at 523, 525-26), equitable relief when plaintiff is able to restore what he
has received (ibid.), quasi-contract (ibid.), third party beneficiary (see Equitable
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Bank of Commerce & Title Co., 118 Tenn. 678, 102 S.W. 901
(1907); Roady, Professional Liability of Abstracters, 12 VAND. L. REv. 783, 788-89
(1959)), or by statute (CAL. Civ. CODE § 1710 (Deering 1961), as interpreted by
Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954), which equated negligence
with "no reasonable ground" for belief). The Gagne case is particularly interesting in
that it discusses the applicability of warranty, deceit, and negligence to the same
set of facts. It would seem that the plaintiff in the instant case would have been on
more solid ground had it rescinded the contract for mistake, sued the city in restitution
for benefits conferred, and left the city to pursue its remedy against the engineering
firm in a contract action.
5. Note 3 supra.
6. See, e.g., Dundee Land Co. v. Simmons, 204 Ga. 248, 249 S.E.2c1 488 (1948);
Newman v. Kendall, 103 Vt. 421, 154 AUt. 662 (1931).
7. E.g., Clark v. Haggard, 141 Conn. 668, 109 A.2d 358 (1954); Davis v. Central
Land Co., 162 Iowa 296, 143 N.W. 1073 (1913); Becker v. McKinnie, 106 Kan. 426,
186 Pac. 496 (1920); GREEN, JuDGE AND JuRy 284-93 (1930); PiossEn, ToRTS 537,
547 (2d ed. 1955); Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HaRv. L. REv. 184,
191 (1900). Cf. 1 HmiaPE & JAmEs, ToRTs 528-29, 536 (1956). PRoSSER, op. cit.
supra, at 547 lists some of the fictions used to avoid the scienter requirement: duty to
know, imputed knowledge, intentional misstatement of extent of knowledge, conclusive
presumption of knowledge.
8. See, e.g., Weston v. Brown, 82 N.H. 157, 131 Ad. 141 (1925); Brown v.
Underwriters at Lloyd's, 53 Wash. 2d 142, 332 P.2d 228 (1938).
9. Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N.W. 581 (1908).
10. Weston v. Brown, supra note 8; Brown v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, supra note 8.
At the time of the instant decision, some cases indicated this to be the situation in
Tennessee, whose law the court was bound to follow in this diversity action. See
Figuers v. Fly, 137 Tenn. 358, 193 S.W. 119 (1917); Denton v. Nashville Title Co.,
112 Tenn. 678, 102 S.W. 901 (1904); Dickle v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431,
14 S.W. 896 (1890), allowing recovery for negligent misrepresentation. But compare
these cases with Shwab v. Walters, 147 Tenn. 638, 251 S.W. 42 (1922) where the
court, without mentioning the earlier cases, expressly approves Derry v. Peek. The
court in the Shwab case was not called upon to consider the negligence question,
though, because the facts fell well within the traditional deceit formula. Likewise,
it is said in Crouch v. Gray, 154 Tenn. 521, 290 S.W. 391 (1926), that actual fraud is
necessary to support an action for deceit, but there was nothing to indicate negligent
conduct in that case. A recent opinion effiectively dispels any controversy by stating
that a cause of action does lie "in tort for negligent misrepresentation." Howell v. Betts,
362 S.W. 2d 924 (Tenn. 1963).
1962]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The court here justified its holding that an action will lie for
negligent misrepresentation largely by showing an absence of any
Tennessee law to the contrary. The only case dealing directly with
the scienter requirement" was explained by pointing out that the
court there, while purporting to follow Derry v. Peek, actually laid
down a negligence standard and lowered the traditional degree of
proof required for fraud.' 2 Also some language was found in an
earlier case 13 indicating a recognition of a duty of care-the common
law negligence standard.14 The conclusion was that the more accurate
interpretation of the law in this field disregards the rule of Derry v.
Peek and the various fictions derived for getting around it.15 It should
be noted that the court considered the action to be based on deceit
and then proceeded to discuss it in terms of negligence. Since there
was a failure to differentiate between the two theories, it is not clear
whether the holding is that scienter is not necessary in the action of
deceit or that there is a separate action for negligent misrepresenta-
tion causing damage to financial interests.
When, as here, the plaintiff is not the party to whom the representa-
tion was made, a slightly different problem is presented. Most early
precedent sharply restricted the ambit of defendant's responsibility,0
but many courts have been willing to broaden this ambit in the case
of fraudulent misrepresentation to include those whose reliance the
defendant might reasonably have anticipated.17 However, they have
11. Shwab v. Walters, 147 Tenn. 638, 251 S.W. 42 (1922). Cf. Crouch v. Gray,
supra note 10, not cited by this court.
12. 204 F. Supp. at 827-28.
13. Dickle v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890).
14. 204 F. Supp. at 829. This conclusion is weakened by the statement in Equitable
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 118 Tenn. 678, 686, 102 S.W.
901, 904 (1907) that such an action sounds "in contract, and not in tort ....
However, the court in the instant case did not mention the case of Figuers v. Fly,
137 Tenn. 358, 193 S.W. 119 (1917), where a notary was held liable to the grantee
of a deed by application of the traditional proximate cause principles of negligence.
15. 204 F. Supp. at 830. See examples of fictions in note 7 supra. See, Pnossnn,
ToRTs 537 (2d ed. 1955). Cf. 1 HARPEa & JAMEs, TORTS § 7.6 (1956); WINFrIELD,
TORTS 460, 463 (6th ed. 1954). The court also notes the anomaly of allowing re-
covery when the injury is to the person but not when it is financial loss. 204 F. Supp.
at 830.
16. The principal such case is Peek v. Gurney, 6 H.L. 377, 412-13 (1873) (liability
only to those the representor intended to influence and only for such damage as was
intended). Accord, Cheney v. Dickinson, 172 Fed. 109 (7th Cir. 1909); Mackworth v.
State Say. Bank, 212 Iowa 954, 237 N.W. 471 (1931); Wells v. Cook, 16 Ohio St. 67
(1865).
17. E.g., Hindman v. First Nat'l Bank; this case involved two court of appeal de-
cisions, 98 Fed. 562 (6th Cir. 1899), and 112 Fed. 931 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 186
U.S. 483 (1902); Cleveland Wrecking Co. v. Struck Constr. Co., 41 F. Supp. 70
(W. D. Ky. 1941); Crystal Pier Amusement Co. v. Carman, 219 Cal. 184, 25 P.2d 839
(1933); Highland Motor Co. v. Heyburn Bldg. Co., 237 Ky. 337, 35 S.W.2d 521
(1931); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 448-50 (1931);
Cohen v. Glassman, 110 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See Keeton, The Ambit of a
Fraudulent Representers Responsibility, 17 TExAs L. Rlv. 1 (1938).
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been more reluctant to fashion a remedy in favor of members of that
class in the case of negligent misstatement.18 Where such action is
allowed the status of the law permits no general statement as to the
class of plaintiffs entitled to rely on the defendant's misrepresenta-
tions.' 9 A recent California case20 indicates the reason for this appar-
ent confusion is that the ability of a third party to recover "is a matter
of policy and involves the balancing of various factors."21
Some of the precedent for the instant case seems to indicate that
privity is a prerequisite to recovery,2 but these cases were distin-
guished.2 The court having already decided that the action sounded
in negligence, rejection of a privity requirement was held to follow
naturally.2 Once free of this requirement it was possible to make a
choice between the negligence doctrines of duty to a specifically
contemplated plaintiff2l and duty to a foreseeable class of persons.2
The court, after a thorough examination of the authorities, chose the
broader concept of a duty to a foreseeable class of persons.
27
The application of usual negligence standards to determine whether
18. E.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, supra note 17, at 444-48. Categorical state-
ments in this regard are apt to be misleading, however, since the scope of the plaintiff's
responsibility is a matter of degree, varying with the individual circumstances. Com-
pare Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922), with Ultramares Corp.
v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). See Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647,
320 P.2d 16 (1958); 3 REsTATEMENT, ToRTs §§ 533, 552 (1938).
19. See note 18 supra. Compare Weston v. Brown, 82 N.H. 157, 131 Ad. 141 (1925),
and Dickle v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890), with
Vartan Garapedian Inc. v. Anderson, 92 N.H. 390, 31 A.2d 371 (1943) and Equitable
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 118 Tenn. 678, 102 S.W.
901 (1907).
20. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
21. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d at 19. Among the factors to be considered are "the
extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of
harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness
of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm."
Ibid. See 3 RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 552 (1938).
22. See Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 118
Tenn. 678, 102 S.W. 901 (1907) denying recovery on the ground that privity was
lacking and distinguishing Denton v. Nashville Title Co., 112 Tenn. 320, 79 S.W. 799
(1904) and Dickle v. Nashville Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890) by
finding privity in them. In Howell v. Betts, supra note 10, it is affimed that privity
is no longer required in an action for negligent misrepresentation. This case also
furnishes an example of how the factors set out in note 21 supra, mitigate against
recovery. Here the misrepresentation was a surveyor's error; 24 years and several
grantees later the plaintiffs purchased the property relying on the survey; they
subsequently discovered the error and attempted to recover for the injury caused by the
erroneous survey; recovery was denied.
23. 204 F. Supp. at 829. The relevance of the distinction is questionable, since
it was on the ground that they were suits "in equity for an accounting."
24. Id. at 832.
25. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
26. 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 552 (1938).
27. 204 F. Supp. at 834.
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this plaintiff was within the class to whom this defendant owed a
duty to protect from financial loss requires careful analysis. Any
negligence standard should be derived from a balancing of the basic
interests involved.28 If, in this situation, a comparison of the value
of insulating the individual from liability with the value of protecting
the interest of the injured party leads to the same result as in the
situation where the injury is to the person or tangible property, then
the scope of duty should be the same. There is significant social
utility in providing a person some degree of immunity from certain
consequences of his negligent acts, particularly when the act is the use
of language. But there seems to be no logical basis for saying that
the quantitative value of this utility varies as the result of the negli-
gence changes from injury to property or personality to injury to
financial condition 9 Heretofore, the law has attached a greater value
to a person's tangible interests.3 ° Herein lies the unsoundness in the
distinction between so-called tangible interests and financial interest,
at least insofar as those tangible interests are property and not the
person. Thus, the court was correct in looking to the established law
of negligence to determine the scope of defendant's liability for non-
fraudulent misrepresentation. It may be suggested that since the
defendant here offered a professional service to the public, both his
duty to refrain from making misstatements and the scope of his
liability may be greater than in the ordinary case. This is probably
so, not, however, because the standard is different, but because these
are merely factors to be taken into consideration in applying the
standard.31
28. See Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1915); cf. GnRE, RATONALE or
PROXIMATE CAUSE 5, 6,8, 12-14 (1927).
29. In opposition to this conclusion one might argue that (1) there is a significantly
greater utility in protecting the individual from the "liability in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class" envisioned by Judge Cardozo in
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. at 444, and (2) the sum total
of possible liability hanging over an individual is already great enough, thus it should
not be increased by the addition of a new basis of liability. It may be answered that
the usual negligence doctrines of actual and legal causation should be sufficient to
hold the liability vithin reasonable bounds, and the second argument does not address
itself to this particular problem-maintenance of a logical inconsistency is not the
way to cure the ill, if it in fact exists.
30. "Thus the law protects human life and bodily safety, the safety of property,
and various other valuable objects. To some extent it protects pecuniary condition, i.e.
the avoidance of pecuniary loss is generally, but ... not always, a legal object." Terry,
supra note 28, at 44; 3 RESTATEmmNT, ToaTs, scope note to ch. 22, at 56-57 (1938).
31. See Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, 12 VAND. L. REv.
535 (1959); cf. 1 HAPER & JAmEs, ToRTs 546-47 (1956).
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Torts-Recovery for Emotional Distress Resulting
From Fear of Injury to Another
Plaintiff, standing near her infant son, observed defendant's truck
negligently run over the child. Incurring physical illness from the
shock, she brought an action, stipulating that the fright which re-
sulted in her illness was for her child's safety, not her own. The trial
court sustained defendant's general demurrer and entered judgment
against the plaintiff. On appeal' to the California District Court of
Appeal, held, reversed. A parent who witnesses the exposure of his
child to danger caused by defendant's negligence is included within
the class of persons to whom the defendant owes a duty. Amaya v.
Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 205 Cal. App. 468, 23 Cal. Rptr. 131
(Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
In the past, courts refused to allow compensation for mental dis-
tress on the ground that the damage was too remote, that is, there was
not such an injury as would naturally result from the defendant's
conduct. This rule and its explanation, being obviously inadequate,
gave way to recovery where contemporaneous physical impact was
shown.3 An increasing number of courts, however, have repudiated
the necessity of impact when physical injury results from the fright,
apparently reasoning that the physical consequences sufficiently
guaranteed the substantiality of the claim.4 But where the distress
was not caused by the plaintiffs fear for his own safety, courts have
generally denied recovery under the concept of duty, saying that
"the plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong personal to her, and
not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another."5 The
reason for this conclusion was that the defendant's responsibility must
be restricted to some reasonable bounds;6 thus, the "unforeseeable
1. The orginal complaint included a cause of action for the child's injuries. Judgment
was entered against both plaintiffs, and only the mother appealed.
2. See, e.g., Victorian Ry. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222, 225 (P.C. 1888).
3. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), since over-
ruled in Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961),
the court saying of the Mitchell doctrine, "[I]t is well to note that it has been
thoroughly repudiated by the English courts which initiated it, rejected by a majority
of American jurisdictions, abandoned by many which originally adopted it, and
diluted, through numerous exceptions, in the minority which retained it." Id. at 730.
Of impact jurisdictions, Dr. Smith says, "They object, not to a psychic link in the
chain of causation but to pit-falls of proof involved when physical injury must be
traced solely through internal mental and pyschic reactions." Smith, Relation of
Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv.
193, 232 (1944).
4. PRossER, ToRTs 179 & n.19 (2d ed. 1955).
5. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 342, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
Accord, Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
6. "It is still inconceivable that any defendant should be held liable to infinity for
all of the consequences which flow from his act, and some boundary must be set."
Pnossnn, op. cit. supra note 4, at 262.
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plaintiff' 7 encountered only infrequent success in the courts.8 Indeed,
bystanders, other than near relatives, were always denied recovery.9
A majority of courts0 in the United States, including those of Califor-
nia," also denied recovery to near relatives, following Waube v.
Warrington,12 where the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
defendant was under no duty to a parent since no harm to her was
anticipated. The minority view found expression in Hambrook v.
Stokes Brothers,13 an English case, which has been cited with approval
by text writers.14 There were American cases, similar to Hambrook,
in which parents recovered for fear for their children, but only
where they, too, were in immediate physical danger. In those cases,
the courts would not attempt to separate the simultaneous fears in
order to compensate only for the plaintiff's fear for himself. 15
In the instant case, the court first found that California precedent
7. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 170.
8. Principally, the exception to the general rule against recovery for such plaintiffs
has been found in the rescue cases, where the defendant has endangered one man and
been held liable for injuries sustained by the victim's rescuer. Wagner v. International
Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921). "It may be asked how the cases protecting
one who goes to the rescue of another imperilled by the negligence of the defendant
can be justified . . . . Common sense is necessary in the administration of any
principle of law." Campbell, Duty, Fault, and Legal Cause, 1938 Wis. L. RFv. 402,
409.
9. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 313, at 10 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960).
10. See, e.g., Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959); Lessard
v. Tarca, 20 Conn. Supp. 295, 133 A.2d 62.5 (Super. Ct. 1957); Southern Ry. v.
Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 S.E. 28 (1916); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d
879 (1952); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950); Nuckles v. Tennessee
Elec. Power Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927); Carey v. Pure Distrib. Corp.,
133 Tex. 31, 124 S.W.2d 847 (1939); and collected cases in Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 220,
224-34 (1951).
11. In Maury v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 532, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1956), where
parents sued for mental distress resulting from seeing their child die in a fire caused
by defendant's negligence, the federal court, in applying California law, said: "Thus
far the California courts have not permitted damages in any case where there was not
some element of physical injury to, or reasonable fear of injury to the claimant,
except in cases of intentional torts, outrageous conduct, or interference with some
interest in real property." See also Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d
80 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Minkus v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 44 F. Supp. 10 (N.D.
Cal. 1942); Kelley v. Fretz, 19 Cal. App. 2d 356, 65 P.2d 914 (Dist. Ct. App.
1937). Compare Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440 (1918) and Easton
v. United Trade School Contracting Co., 173 Cal. 199, 159 Pac. 597 (1916).
12. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
13. [1925] 1 K.B. 141. King v. Phillips, [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, has since emasculated
the doctrine in that jurisdiction.
14. See, e.g., PRossza, TORTS 181-82 (2d ed. 1955); Goodhart, The Shock Cases
and Area of Risk, 16 MOD. L. REv. 14, 23 (1953). Contra, Magruder, Mental and
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv. 1033, 1041 (1936).
15. See Lindley v. Knowlton, supra note 11. "[F]ear for another was not the only
cause of injury. . . . [Tjhere is nothing . . . to indicate that she was not concerned
for her own safety." Id. at 441. Accord, Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58
So. 927 (Ct. App. 1912); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 At. 182 (1933),
overruled in Resavage v. Davies, supra note 10.
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supported recovery for physical injury resulting from emotional
distress,16 and then considered the scope of the duty of the defendant.
Dismissing the earlier theories 7 for denying relief as inapplicable to
the central issue, whether defendant owed a duty because of the fore-
seeability of the plaintiffs shock,'8 the court said: "The need for
delineating the area of liability does not justify the obliteration of the
liability."' 9 Thus, while objective bystanders may be excluded, the
court found that the parent is not, for it is a reasonable expectation
that a mother will fear for her child.20 To ascertain the limits of duty,
the court adopted Dean Prosser's standards-the injury threatened or
inflicted upon the third party must be a serious one; the shock must
result in actual physical harm; the plaintiff must be a close relative;
and the plaintiff must be present, or at least the shock must be fairly
contemporaneous with the injury.21
In denying the premise that plaintiff can recover for fear of injury
to another, courts have enunciated a restricted approach to duty based
on limited liability and prevention of fraudulent claims. While these
"practical considerations offer the strongest arguments against re-
covery," 2z it has been said:
If it is reasonable and just that a person should be held liable in such
circumstances, why should he escape liability merely because there is a
possibility that others, in similar circumstances, will also be held liable? If
it is argued that such an extension may lead to illegitimate claims, the
answer is that similar fears, expressed when shock was first recognized as
a cause of action, have proved to be groundless. Fear is an unsatisfactory
foundation on which to build a legal doctrine.2
As the instant case notes, the question remains one of duty, a
concept usually defined in terms of foreseeability.2 4 Employing the
16. See, e.g., Sloan v. Southern Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 44 Pac. 320 (1896); Emden
v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App. 2d 313, 198 P.2d 696 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Easton v. United
Trade School Contracting Co., 173 Cal. 199, 159 Pac. 597 (1916); Lindley v. Knowl-
ton, supra note 11.
17. 23 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
18. Id. at 140.
19. Ibid.
20. Id. at 140-41. "Most of the decisions denying recovery have said that there is
no duty to the plaintiff on the Palsgraf theory, because no harm to the plaintiff was
reasonably to be foreseen. This sounds unreasonable; if a small child is run down in
the street, it is not at all unlikely that the mother may be somewhere in the vicinity,
and suffer severe mental disturbance resulting in bodily harm." REST"ATEMENT, Torms,
Explanatory Notes § 313, at 10 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960).
21. 23 Cal. Rptr. at 140; PRosszn, ToRTs 182 (2d ed. 1955).
22. Hallen, Damages for Physical Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock, 19 VA.
L. Rnv. 253, 270 (1933).
23. Goodhart, supra note 14, at 23.
24. PaossEn, ToRTs 289 (2d ed. 1955). Some courts, however, hold a defendant
liable for all the proximate results of his negligent act, regardless of foreseeability.
See In Re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560. For criticisms of that
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foreseeability formula,2 the court properly held that the invasion
of a parent's emotional tranquility under these circumstances was
reasonably foreseeable2 The American courts which have allowed
recovery to plaintiff parents have done so on the basis of the "zone
of danger" test as a means of limiting liability.2" But why deny re-
covery to the parent who confesses that his injury occurred solely
through concern for his child?- The policy arguments against recovery
lose much of their effectiveness when reasonable limitations can be
drawn and applied. The problem therefore narrows into one of
drawing reasonable limitations in order to allow meritorious claims,
while protecting the defendant from exaggerated ones.29 In departing
from the "zone of danger" theory, the court rejected a test for limit-
ing liability which is easy to apply and objective. However, instead
of applying one test, which might so easily preclude a valid claim, the
court rested its decision on several limiting factors that will allow
recovery to worthy claimants, while rejecting the unworthy.
case and comments on the overruling case, Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Morts
Dock & Eng'r Co., [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C. Austl.), see Comment, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
1043 (1961); Comment, 35 TuL. L. REv. 619 (1961); and for a discussion of the prob-
lems of a foreseeability formula, see Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61
COLUi. L. REv. 1401 (1961).
25. 23 Cal. Rptr. at 134, 135, 140. "The foreseeability of harm or probable con-
sequence formula has a legitimate place in translating a negligence case to a jury. It
has become crystalized and probably serves as well as any other ritual that could be
devised." Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 COLUM. L. Rnv. 789, 800 (1930).
26. 23 Cal. Rptr. at 140. "Numerous American cases have gone beyond the bounds
of foreseeability of consequences, except as it is employed to determine the issue of
negligence, and for that purpose it is only necessary that harm to plaintiff from
defendant's conduct, not the specific consequences, should have been foreseen." Green,
supra note 24, at 1424.
27. See note 15 supra. "[Tihere is neither logic nor reason to hold . . . that a
distinction is to be taken so that, if a party suffer an injury . . . through fears of
safety for self, a recovery may be had for the negligent act of another; but may not
recover under similar circumstances, if the fear be of safety for another." Bowman v.
Williams, supra note 15, at 183.
28. "It would result in a state of the law in which a mother, shocked by fright for
herself, would recover, while a mother shocked by her child being killed before her
eyes, could not . . . In my opinion such distinctions would be discreditable to any
system of jurisprudence in which they formed part." Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., supra
note 13, at 157.
29. The question may be asked, how far would this court extend Prosser's limitations
that "the injury threatened or inflicted upon the third person must be a serious one"
and "the shock must be fairly contemporaneous"? For example, could a mother re-
cover for shock through learning from a neighbor that the mother's infant barely




Workmen's Compensation-Recovery for Suicide
Induced by Work-Connected Mental Disorder
Decedent, an employee of a state mental hospital, became de-
pressed' when repeatedly questioned2 during an extensive legislative
investigation of the hospital.3 After learning the investigation would
be resumed, decedent committed suicide.4 The Michigan Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board affirmed an award of compensation to
decedent's widow. On certiorari in the Supreme Court of Michigan,
held, affirmed by an equally divided court. Suicide induced by work-
connected mental disorder is an accidental personal injury arising
out of and in the course of employment. Trombley v. State, 366
Mich. 649, 115 N.W.2d 561 (1962).
It is well settled that mental injuries are compensable under work-
men's compensation when it can be shown that they arise out of and
in the course of employment, even though no physical injury is
involved.5 But when suicide is the end product of the mental disorder,
three interrelated objections have been raised against compensation.
First, most state statutes require a compensable injury to stem from
an "accident" or that the injury must be "accidental" to satisfy the
causation requirement.6 With this in mind, courts have often denied
compensation, saying suicide is not an accident because it results from
intentional conduct. 7 But the idea of an untoward or unexpected event,
1. Prior to the investigation, decedent was described as a relatively happy man,
the epitome of a good father and husband. It appears that subsequent to the
investigation he lost interest in his home, children, and life in general, undergoing
a drastic change in personality.
2. Decedent felt he was being unjustly accused of misconduct by the committee.
His feelings did not manifest themselves in anger or lack of mental control, showing
themselves instead through the personality change and continued depression. De-
cedent's health was generally good prior to the investigations although he suffered
periodically from bronchial asthma and had once spent two months in an army
psychiatric hospital during World War ii for treatment of asthma and for "neurosis."
Nothing more is said about the neurosis.
3. Included among patients in the cottage at the mental institution where decedent
worked was Joseph Kibiloski, who died as a result of injuries sustained at the institution.
Kibilosi's injury and death triggered highly publicized investigations of the incident
which included the legislative committee probe.
4. Decedent learned from an evening television newscast that the committee would
return to the institution. He quietly arose early the next morning, drove to a secluded
spot a short distance away and fatally shot himself with his rifle. Ironically, it appears
that investigators other than the legislative committee had absolved decedent in
Kibiloski's death. Decedent was to be informed of the finding the day of his death.
5. Horovitz, Workmetes Compensation: Half Century of Judicial Developments, 41
NEB. L. Rnv. 1, 8-9 (1962). Contra, Young v. Melrose Granite Co., 152 Minn. 512,
189 N.W. 426 (1922); Bekeleski v. 0. F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741
(1942); Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953). See note
20 infra.
6. 1 LAnSON, WonmvrEa's ComiENsAioN LAW § 37.10 (1952).
7. See e.g., McGill Mfg. Co. v. Dodd, 116 Ind. App. 66, 59 N.E.2d 899 (1945)
(physician attributes neurosis to claimant's work); Star Publishing Co. v. Jackson, 115
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either in cause or result, is the core of the accident concept-not the
question of intent. The requirement of accident may then be met if
the suicide is an unexpected result of a work-connected mental injury.9
Second, compensation has been denied on the ground that suicide
does not arise out of the employment.10 And third, compensation has
been denied because nearly all workmen's compensation statutes ex-
pressly prohibit compensation for self-inflicted injuries." It is argued,
however, that if the suicide victim was insane and without control
over his will at the time of the suicide, the act is neither wilful nor
intentional. 2 This volitional test is employed by the majority of
American jurisdictions to decide the insanity question by attempting a
subjective look into the mind of the victim to determine absence or
presence of volition at the time of the act.13 A small minority has
Ind. App. 221, 58 N.E.2d 202 (1944) (neurosis prevents printer from operating lino-
type machine); Voss v. Prudential Ins. Co., 14 N.J. Misc. 791, 187 At. 334 (1936)
(woman suffers mental injury after being called "idiot"); Chernin v. Progress Serv. Co.,
9 App. Div. 2d 170, 192 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1959) (taxicab driver suffers psychological
trauma after hitting pedestrian).
8. Unexpectedness is the basic, indispensable ingredient of an accident; but it also
has been held that a definite time, place, and cause must be pinpointed. Larson
breaks down the component parts of an accident into unexpectedness and definiteness
in time-of either cause or result. He concludes that the requirement of unexpected-
ness is met if either the cause or result is unexpected. 1 LAnsoN, op. cit. supra note 6,
§ 37.20.
9. In the principal case, the end result-the suicide-was unexpected, although
the cause of the suicide-the investigation-could not be said to be unexpected. The
definite time and place of suicide can be accurately determined although the investi-
gation leading to the suicide extended over a period of about two weeks.
10. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Brooks, 158 Md. 149, 148 Ad. 276 (1930); Joseph v.
United Kimono Co., 194 App. Div. 568, 185 N.Y. Supp. 700 (1921); Shewezuk v.
Contrexeville Mfg. Co., 53 R.I. 223, 165 Ad. 444 (1933); Veloz v. Fidelity-Union
Cas. Co., 8 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1928).
11. This is no such problem in the instant case although reference is made to the
Michigan statute in the dissenting opinion. 115 N.W.2d at 566. Michigan along with
Connecticut, Illinois, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Wyoming are the
only American jurisdictions that do not specifically prohibit by statute any compensa-
tion for suicide or self-inflicted injuries. 1 LAnsoN, op. cit. supra note 6, § 36.10.
12. E.g., In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466 (1915).
13. "[Wlhere there follows as the direct result of a physical injury an insanity of
such violence as to cause the victim to take his own life through an uncontrollable im-
pulse or in a delirium of frenzy 'without conscious volition to produce death, having
knowledge of the physical nature and consequences of the act,' then there is a direct
and unbroken causal connection between the physical injury and the death. But where
the resulting insanity is such as to cause suicide through a voluntary willful choice
determined by a moderately intelligent mental power which knows the purpose and
the physical effect of the suicidal act even though choice is dominated and ruled by a
disordered mind, then there is a new and independent agency which breaks the chain
of causation arising from the injury." In re Sponatski, supra note 12, at 530, 108 N.E.
at 468. This test is characterized by the neat classifications it makes possible, basing
decisions on the victim's outward manifestations of volitional ability prior to the
suicide. Suicides which are gory, violent, or eccentric in method have as a rule been
held compensable. On the other hand, suicides marked by quiet depression and a
period of time in which it may have been planned chronically have been held non-
compensable. 1 LARsoN, op. cit. supra note 6, § 36.20.
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adopted the chain-of-causation test 14 following the English view that
if the injury does produce insanity and the insanity results in suicide,
the suicide is compensable. 15 Both tests demand insanity, but dis-
agree on exactly how and where to draw the line.
16 The difficult
question is one of causation-can the act of suicide be directly linked
to a work-connected mental injury.'7 Problems involving insanity and
mental injuries are not peculiar to the field of workmen's compensa-
tion, but also harrass criminal law 8 and torts. 19
Speaking for the three justices voting to affirm, Justice Souris re-
lies on this court's earlier ruling that a work-connected mental
disorder, unaccompanied by physical injury, is compensable 20 This
ruling is extended in the instant case to encompass suicide resulting
from work-connected mental injuries. 2 Justice Souris concludes the
14. See Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1949); Harper v.
Industrial Comm'n, 24 Ill. App. 2d 103, 180 N.E.2d 480 (1962); Prentiss Truck &
Tractor Co. v. Spencer, 228 Miss. 66, 87 So. 2d 272 (1956); Nohe v. Sheffield
Farms Co., 4 App. Div. 2d 711, 163 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1957).
15. Marriott v. Maltby Main Colliery Co., [1920] 13 B.W.C.C. 353 (C.A.); Graham
v. Christie, [1916] 10 B.W.C.C. 486 (Scot.); Fanning v. Richard Evans & Co.,
[1923] 16 B.W.C.C. 43.
16. "The only controversy involves the kind or degree of mental disorder which will
lead a court to say that the self-destruction was not an independent intervening
cause." 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 36.10.
17. "The issue boils down to one of proximate versus independent intervening cause.
At the outset, you must find an injury which itself arose out of and in the course of
employment, and then trace the suicide directly to it. If there is no such employment-
connected injury setting in motion the causal sequence leading to the suicide, the
suicide is a complete defense. . . . The basic legal question seems to be agreed upon
by almost all authorities: it is whether the act of suicide was an intervening cause
breaking the chain of causation between the initial injury and the death." 1 LARsoN,
op. cit. supra note 6, § 36.10.
18. "Indeed, it is probably no exaggeration to say that this subject is receiving
more attention today than any other subject in the criminal law." Commonwealth v.
Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 150 N.E.2d 914, 919 (1958). For criticism of the subjective
M'Naghten Rule, the classic measure of criminal insanity, which is closely analogous to
Sponatski's Rule used in workmen's compensation, see ROYAL CowvnsxssION ON CArrAL
PumssmrrNT (1953); WEmoFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRsmlmAL LAW (1933);
ZILBOORG, TnE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRrMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT (1954). Despite
inroads and continual criticism, M'Naghten, like Sponatski, still retains vitality as
evidenced by two recent decisions relying on the M'Naghten formula. Chase v. State,
369 P.2d 997 (Alaska 1962); State v. Esser, 115 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1962).
19. "Mental disturbance is easily simulated, and courts which are plagued with
fraudulent personal injury claims may well be unwilling to open the door to an even
more dubious field." But Dean Prosser also notes: "The very clear tendency of the
recent cases is to refuse to admit incompetence to deal with such a problem, and to
find some basis for redress in a proper case." PNossER, TonTs § 37 (2d ed. 1955).
See Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961).
20. The Michigan court rejected the time-worn distinction between mental and
physical injuries and treated the emotional pressures arising from ordinary work as
mental stimuli sufficient to produce a compensable mental injury. Carter v. General
Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
21. "I would affirm the appeal board on the gound that the evidence discloses
Trombley's mental disorder was caused by the legislative committee's investigation and
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suicide would be compensable under either test.22 He then rejects
the subjective volitional test in favor of the chain-of-causation test.24
On the other hand, Justice Carr defends denial of the claim by relying
squarely on the volitional test, 2 contending decedent's suicide was
a planned event.26 Further, he argued that if there was present an
"uncontrollable impulse," it did not satisfy the volitional test because
it did not result from a compensable physical injury or occupational
disease.27
that it so impaired his reasoning faculties that his act of suicide was not voluntary
.... 115 N.W.2d at 571.
22. Justice Souris said there was ample evidence to support the finding of the
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board that "Trombley reacted to an uncontrollable
impulse in committing suicide .. . which was the product of ... depression and
drastic personality change caused by his involvement in . . . occurrences at his place
of employment ...." 115 N.W.2d at 570.
23. "[A]pplication of Sponatski's rule in other states has produced such apparently
absurd results that I would reject it." 115 N.W.2d at 570. For instances where
compensation was denied because the court was unable to find an uncontrollable
impulse, see Rusehetti's Case, 299 Mass. 426, 13 N.E.2d 34 (1938) (hanged self six
months after amputation of arm); Konazewska v. Erie R.R., 132 N.J.L. 424, 41
A.2d 130 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 133 N.J.L. 577, 45 A.2d 315 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946)
(hanged self two months after head injury); Industrial Comm'n v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio
St. 617, 196 N.E. 409 (1935) (suicide followed one week after hip injury); Jones
v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 599, 169 S.W.2d 160 (1943) (drank lye after
foot infection); Barber v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 462, 6 N.W.2d 199 (1942)
(killed self after injury caused sexual impotence and bladder trouble).
24. Justice Souris cited Harper v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 14, in which the
Supreme Court of Illinois adopted the chain-of-causation test. 115 N.W.2d at 570-71.
In the Harper opinion, Justice Schaefer concludes: "The evidence shows a clear
connection between Harper's injury, his operation, the resulting pain and physical
and mental changes, and his ultimate suicide. We find it unnecessary, therefore, to
attempt to assess the precise quality of his mental condition at the time of his suicide,
or to determine if his conduct was the result of 'an uncontrollable impulse,' or occurred
during a 'delirium of frenzy."' 180 N.E.2d at 483.
25. In citing various courts which have applied the Sponatski test, Justice Carr
noted: "The inquiry has been ... whether death occurred because of an uncontrollable
impulse... or whether suicide was the result of a voluntary choice determined by the
exercise of mental powers sufficient to realize the purpose and effect of the act." 115
N.W.2d at 563. E.g., In re Sponatski, supra note 12; Tetrault's Case, 278 Mass. 447,
180 N.E. 231 (1932); Karlen v. Department of Labor & Indus., 41 Wash. 2d 301,
249 P.2d 364 (1952).
26. "Deliberate planning of an act of suicide, with mental ability to understand the
nature of the act, involves the introduction of an intervening cause in the chain of
circumstances to which cause of death must be attributed." 115 N.W.2d at 566. Contra,
"The [suicide] was an intervening act but not an intervening cause. An intervening
cause is one occurring entirely independent of a prior cause. When a first cause
produces a second cause that produces a result, the first cause is the cause of that
result." Barber v. Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 462, 6 N.W.2d 199, 202 (1942)
(Fowler, J., dissenting).
27. Justice Carr appears to cling to the idea that a suicide can have no causal con-
nection with decedent's work unless it grows out of compensable physical injury
as called for in the Sponatski test or a compensable occupational disease. But see
Burnight v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 5 Cal. Rptr. 786 (Cal. App. 1960); Wilder v.
Russell Library Co., 107 Conn. 56, 139 Ad. 644 (1927); Anderson v. Armour & Co.,
275 Minn. 281, 101 N.W.2d 435 (1960); 1 LABsoN, op. cit. supra note 6, § 36.40.
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This holding does not appear to radically change fundamental
concepts of the law; rather, it contributes to the continuing erosion of
the volitional test.2 Taking a wider view, it notes the reality of
mental injury as recognized by advanced medical thought 9 and
expands the concept of personal injury by accident 0 in harmony with
the remedial nature of workmen's compensation. 31 With the chain-of-
causation test practically changing the question of insanity from one
of law to one of fact, there remains the formidable problem of assess-
ing contradictory testimony of medical experts2 and the problem of
additional time and expense required to marshal such evidence.3 The
difficulties should not deter courts from making a forthright effort at
solution with the best medical evidence available.- In adopting what
appears the better reasoned position of the minority, it is believed
this progressive decision correctly mirrors future trends in this field.
36
Zoning-Municipal Corporations-Acquisition by One
Local Governmental Unit of Property Within
Another Such Unit for a Function Which
Violates Zoning Ordinances
The plaintiff, a municipal corporation, owned property on which
it planned to construct a sewage disposal plant and which was within
the corporate limits of the defendant, also a municipal corporation.
The land was acquired by purchase for this purpose prior to its an-
28. The equally divided court is a factor, indicating that a change in personnel on
the court might tip the scale either way. It is worthy of note, however, that of the
five justices affirming in Carter v. General Motors Corp., supra note 20, only three
sat in the instant case. The three dissenting justices in the Carter case are the same
as the three dissenting justices in the case at hand.
29. "[The Sponatski test] seems to assume that a man's capacity to choose is a
constant, unvariable factor, unaffected by whatever stresses may be brought to bear
against it, and so it minimizes to the point of exclusion the possibility that capacity to
choose may itself be impaired as the result of a compensable injury. . . . [T]his
underlying assumption of the Sponatski test is dubious, both from a medical and from
a legal point of view .... As far as the law is concerned, it regularly recognizes ...
under the concept of duress, that freedom of choice may be so impaired by extrinsic
pressures, physical and mental, as to deprive conduct of its normal legal significance."
Harper v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 14, 180 N.E.2d at 481, 482. See also 26-27
NACCA L.J. 287, 291-93 (1961).
30. Carter v. General Motors Corp., supra note 20.
31. 1 LAosoN, op. cit. supra note 6, § 5.
32. MoacAN, BAsIc PROBLEMS OF EviDEN E 202 (1954).
33. Maguire & Hahesy, Requisite Proof of Basis for Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L.
REv. 432, 448 (1952).
34. Cf. note 1 supra.
35. See note 14 supra.
36. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 6, §§ 42.20, 42.30.
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nexation by the defendant city.' Although the defendant refused to
issue plaintiff a use permit for the construction of the disposal plant,
plaintiff began construction, and was subsequently cited by de-
fendant's Municipal Court for violation of its zoning laws.2 There-
after, this original proceeding for an alternative writ of prohibition
was brought before the Arizona Supreme Court, seeking to prohibit
the Municipal Court of defendant city from enforcing its local ordi-
nances against plaintiff's property.3 Held, the alternative writ of
prohibition should be made permanent. A municipal corporation
may, by purchase or eminent domain, acquire property located within
another municipality and use it in discharging governmental functions
free from restrictions imposed by the zoning ordinances of the city in
which the land is located. City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court, 368
P.2d 637 (Ariz. 1962).
Since the Supreme Court decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,4 courts have recognized the rights of municipalities to
enact comprehensive zoning ordinances when authorized by statutes
or constitutions, 5 but this use of police power has created problems
in intergovernmental relations.6 Litigation between local units of
government has increased as new municipalities have been incor-
porated and older ones have expanded to accommodate the population
explosion.8 One source of this litigation has been the conflict between
the power of eminent domain and the police power that arises when
one governmental body acquires property within the confines of an-
other governmental unit.9 These disputes occur most frequently over
the location of airports, water-works, recreational facilities, and sew-
1. Plaintiff, the city of Scottsdale, had for some years owned and operated a disposal
plant in this locality near the Salt River. An additional twenty acres 'were purchased
to expand its facilities in 1958. Thereafter, in 1960, Tempe annexed land including
both the plant and the twenty acres.
2. There was no contention by Tempe that the sewage facilities would constitute a
nuisance.
3. The Fisher Contracting Company, which was constructing the facilities, was also a
party plaintiff.
4. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). This case upheld the right of a municipality to enact
zoning ordinances.
5. See 8 McQUMIUN, MUMMcAL CoRonTIONS § 25.05 (3d rev. ed. 1957).
6. See generally Evans, Overlapping, Duplication and Conflicts Among Municipal
Corporations, 7 VND. L. RIv. 35 (1953); Kneier, The Use of the Police Power by
Local Governments and Some Problems of Intergovernmental Relations, 8 J. Pun. L.
109 (1959).
7. Kneier, supra note 6.
8. The 1957 Census of Governments revealed there were 3,050 counties, 17,198
townships, 17,215 municipalities, 14,424 special districts, and 50,454 school districts
in the United States. U.S. DEP'T OF ComIN. ucE, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcTs or T=. U.S.
413 (83d ed. 1962).
9. Evans, supra note 6; Kneier, supra note 6.
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age disposal systems. 0 While it is generally recognized that federal
and state governments are not subject to local zoning regulations,"
disputes between political subdivisions of the state are fraught with
grave difficulty.'2 Although most of the conflicts have been between
counties and municipalities or between cities and villages, a few cases
involve co-equal political subdivisions.13 As a general rule local
governments are said to be immune from their own zoning laws when
engaged in a governmental function.14 Courts have usually applied
this same rule when statutes 5 have been passed permitting a sub-
division of the state to condemn private property 6 without local
boundaries and within the limits of another county or municipality.'
7
10. See Antieau, The Powers of Municipal Corporations, 16 Mo. L. REv. 118, 126
(1951). For a good discussion and a comprehensive listing of municipal activities
causing disputes, see Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 970 (1958).
11. See, e.g., Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575, 292 S.W.2d 777 (1956)
(state not bound by local zoning laws in locating a state hospital). See 8 McQunr.UN,
op. cit. supra note 5, §§ 25.15, 25.16; 1 YOKELY, ZONING LAW AND PACncE §§ 39,
40 (2d ed. 1953).
12. Antieau, supra note 10; Evans, supra note 6; Kneier, supra note 6; Sales, The
Applicability of Zoning Ordinances to Governmental Land Use, 39 TEXAS L. REv.
316 (1961); 11 VANM. L. REV. 642 (1957).
13. For a general annotation with an extensive compilation of cases showing the
problems and the parties involved in intergovermnental disputes, see Annot., 61
A.L.R.2d 970 (1958).
14. Pruett v. Dayton, 168 A.2d 543 (Del. Ch. 1961) (disposal of garbage by
city); Mayor of Savannah v. Collins, 211 Ga. 191, 84 S.E.2d 454 (1954) (erection of
fire station by city); O'Brien v. Town of Greenburgb, 239 App. Div. 555, 268 N.Y. Supp.
173 (1933), aff'd, 266 N.Y. 582, 195 N.E. 210 (1935) (erection of garbage incinera-
tor). "Whether or not an activity or property of the city is subject to zoning has
been made to depend upon the proprietary or governmental capacity of the city
relative to that activity or property." 8 McQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 5, § 25.15.
"A well established rule grants immunity from zoning ordinances to the city enacting
the ordinance." Sales, supra note 12, at 317.
15. Authority must be given to a city by the state's statutes or its constitution be-
fore it can acquire property outside its boundaries. "Under proper authority, private
property may be taken for public purposes by a municipality even beyond the
corporate limits thereof." 3 YOKELY, MUNICI.A CORORnnONS § 486 (1958). "To
acquire such outside properties municipal corporations often receive grants of extra-
territorial powers of eminent domain which are regularly upheld." 1 ANTIEAu, Mtmxcr-
PAL CORPORATION LAw § 5.09 (1961). For an example of such a statute see note 24
infra.
16. There have been few cases where there has been an attempt to condemn public
property of another municipality. See Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10
S.E.2d 190 (1940) where the court allowed streets of an adjoining municipality to be
taken for the building of an airport. But see Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati,
182 N.E.2d 557 (Ohio 1962) in which a grant of power to the city to condemn land
without its corporate limits for public utilities, as airports, was held not to extend to
the appropriation of a public street in another municipality.
17. Petition of City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 480, 14 N.W.2d 140 (1944); State ex
rel. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960); Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Board
of Adjustment, 20 N.J. 275, 119 A.2d 761 (1956); Union Free School Dist. v. Village
of Hewlett Bay Park, 198 Misc. 932, 102 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1950); State ex rel.
Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 79 N.E.2d 698 (Ohio Com. Pl.), affirming 83
Ohio App. 388, 78 N.E.2d 694, appeal dismissed, 149 Ohio St. 583, 79 N.E.2d 911
(1947). "Zoning restrictions cannot apply to the state or any of its agencies vested
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Furthermore, no distinction is made as to whether the property is
purchased rather than condemned, provided there exists a power of
eminent domain.18 The basis for the above rule appears to rest in
the belief that the power of eminent domain is inherently superior
to the police power.19 Some authorities reject this position, believing
the two powers can be reconciled.20 Although most courts allow
zoning ordinances to be ignored when a governmental function, as
opposed to proprietary or corporate activities,2 ' is involved, there is
criticism that this test is improper and outdated.22 Authorities are
with the right of eminent domain in the use of land for public purposes." 8 Mc-
QUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 5, § 25.15. "Such acquisition outside the corporate limits of
the condemnor may be of private property situate in another municipality .. .
NibHoLs, EMINENT DoMAIN § 2.24 (1950). See also 2 MEENBAUMt, LAW OF ZONING
1280 (2d ed. 1955).
18. Mayor of Savannah v. Collins, supra note 5; State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, supra
note 17, at 889 (immaterial whether city purchased or condemned the property as
long as it had "the right to condemn"); State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County
Comm'rs, supra note 17.
19. See Petition of City of Detroit, supra note 17; State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of
County Comm'rs, supra note 17; State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, supra note 17.
20. In construing statutes allowing a jail to be constructed outside the city, the
court in City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 101 S.E.2d 641 (1958)
said, "They protect the city in the performance of an extraterritorial Act . . . .They
do not ... expressly or impliedly authorize the city to establish a penal institution
at any place, inside or outside of the city, in violation of the zoning ordinance of such
place." Id. at 646. The court said there is no conflict in requiring a city to conform
to zoning regulations, when it condemns property in another municipality; the two
powers can be reconciled. Although the court in Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Board of
Adjustment, supra note 17, allowed property to be taken in another village for an
airport against the zoning regulations, it said, "this court would not condone arbitrary
action in the establishment or operation of airport facilities within the domain of
another governing power. ... Id. at 767. The same court followed this two years
later by refusing to allow a water tower to be constructed in a neighboring village
when no consideration was given to alternate sites. Washington Township v.
Ridgewood Village, 46 N.J. Super. 152, 134 A.2d 345 (Super. Ct. 1957). After
allowing property to be taken in a township for a county airport, State ex rel. Helsel
v. Board of County Comm'rs, supra note 17, said, "It is not to be understood from
the foregoing that the Court is indicating an opinion that municipalities . . . are
powerless to prevent counties or other public bodies from constructing public im-
provements in neighborhoods within municipalities that are palpably unsuited to the
proposed public use." Id. at 705. Also, certain writers have suggested that zoning
laws should be followed by public units within a municipality's borders. "Whether
one municipality should have police power over the property and activity of another
within its boundaries should in general be answered in the affirmative and zoning
ordinances should be obeyed by all units which come in some way into another
municipality's confines." Evans, supra note 6, at 52.
21. See Mayor of Savannah v. Collins, supra note 14. Nehrbas v. Incorporated
Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 140 N.E.2d 241 (1957;
State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, supra note 17. For a good discussion
and definition of governmental and proprietary functions see Sales, supra note 12, at
318. There is often confusion and disagreement as to whether certain activities are
governmental or proprietary in nature. For a collection of decisions reaching different
conclusions see Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 970 (1958).
22. Some courts point out that certain functions have been classified as governmental
for one purpose and proprietary for another. Courts have classified a function as
governmental for tort actions and proprietary in zoning cases. Jefferson County v.
RECENT CASES
divided upon whether a sewage disposal plant is properly classified as
a governmental or proprietary functionPs
The court in the instant case first determined that the Arizona
statute authorized a municipality to acquire land for a sewage dis-
posal plant within or without its corporate limits. Eminent domain
was then described as "a necessary, constant and unextinguishable
attribute" of sovereignty which is not created but merely limited by
constitutional provisions&25 Proceeding upon this basis, the court
adopted the view of other authorities that the power of eminent
domain is superior to police power enforced through zoning laws.
Without discussion of the position's merits, reasonableness, or con-
sequences, decisions from other jurisdictions were cited and followed26
which extend immunity from zoning regulations to property acquired
by one municipality within another municipality. Although it was
recognized that this immunity generally depends upon whether the
use of the land is classified as governmental or proprietary, the court
decided that operation of a sewage disposal plant is a governmental
function. The rationale for this classification was that the "preserva-
tion of the public health is one of the duties that devolves upon the
state as a sovereignty"2 7 and the subsequent discharge of this duty by
the state or a municipality constitutes a governmental function. The
operation of proper sewage facilities was described as vital and
necessary to protect the health and welfare of the people. The dis-
senting judge objects to the majority opinion, charging that "the
principles laid down therein are unsound because they embrace legal
conclusions of other courts, without careful analysis of the bases of
such conclusions."28 The dissent further suggests that eminent domain
Birmingham, 256 Ala. 436, 55 So. 2d 196 (Ala. 1951) (sewage disposal plant a pro-
prietary function although previously considered as governmental in a tort action);
State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, supra note 17, at 890 (refusal to apply the governmental
and proprietary test saying it is "a distinction useful and most usually invoked in
determining questions of tort liability"); Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment,
supra note 17 (refusal to apply this test in a condemnation case involving airport
property). Cf. Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or
Proprietarj Test, 22 VA. L. REy. 910 (1936).
23. Jefferson County v. Birmingham, supra note 22 (sewage disposal plant held
proprietary); State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, supra note 17 (dictum) (sewage disposal
plant would be regarded as governmental).
24. Am. REv. STAT. ch. 5, § 9-522 (1956). "A. In addition to its other powers,
a municipality may: 1. [W]ithin or without its corporate limits, construct, improve,
reconstruct, extend, operate, maintain and acquire, by gift, purchase or the exercise
of the right of eminent domain, a utility undertaking.
25. 368 P.2d at 638.
26. The court relied on four leading cases for this proposition. Petition of City of
Detroit, supra note 17; State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, supra note 17; Aviation Servs.,
Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, supra note 17; State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County
Comm'rs, supra note 17.
27. 368 P.2d at 640.
28. Id. at 640.
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statutes should be construed strictly, while police powers should be
expanded to accomplish general objectives. It is finally argued that
courts have not been "so much concerned with a conflict between
eminent domain and the police power, as they are with which is the
ascendant or superior right in the particular fact situation. 29 Thus,
the dissent wishes to examine each factual situation, compare the
conflicting public interests, and thereby determine which is more
beneficial in promoting the general welfare.
Decisions such as that reached by the Arizona court in the instant
case may encourage municipalities to acquire land located within
the boundaries of other municipalities, particularly if more accessible
and less costly. It may also result in undesirable utilities being re-
moved from one municipality and located within another political
subdivision. Courts would do well to examine carefully the conse-
quences, reasonableness, and fairness of such procedure. One ele-
ment of reasonableness that is found when the rule is applied to
condemnation proceedings of the state or federal government or by a
municipality within its own boundaries, is lacking when disputes are
between co-equal units. In each of the former situations the govern-
mental authorities will weigh the advantages and disadvantages of
condemning property for use in violation of zoning ordinances, since
such officials represent all those persons and are responsible for the
general welfare of the community. As public officials they must
answer to the people for their actions. However, where property is
condemned in another municipality as in the present case, the con-
demning officials are primarily concerned with the welfare and
interest of their own citizens. Also, to follow the view that the
power of eminent domain is inherently superior to the police powers
and then to say proprietary functions are subject to zoning laws,
seems inconsistent since property for proprietary uses can be obtained
by eminent domain. Taking into account the municipalities' need
for acquiring property for utilities, there would seem to be three
alternative methods which would eliminate the harshness of the
arbitrary rule of the present case. They are: (1) allow the exercise of
eminent domain, but require it to be consistent with zoning regula-
tions;30 (2) examine the facts in each case to establish which power
is inconsistent with the public interest;31 and (3) allow the use of
eminent domain subject to the approval of the governmental unit
29. Id. at 643.
30. See the discussion of this theory as advanced in City of Richmond v. Board of
Supervisors, supra note 20.
31. This is the position taken by the dissent in the instant case. See also note 20
supra for other cases with similar language. Washington Township v. Ridgewood
Village, supra note 20; Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, supra note 17;
State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of County Comm'rs, supra note 17.
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in which the land is located or of local regulatory boards.12 Finally,
it is submitted that the court in the instant case reached the proper
result, the plaintiff having acquired the property for the proposed use
prior to its annexation by the defendant.33 On these facts it would
appear equitable to permit the plaintiff to go ahead with the planned
use.
32. New Jersey has passed statutes embodying this principle. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 40.63-2 (1940) which is entitled "Location and erection of sewerage works
in other municipalities; consent required." This section reads, "No work shall be
undertaken, or land acquired, or any public street, highway, alley or other public
place occupied or any sewer or drain outlet, or system thereof, filtration plant, sewerage
disposal works or receptacles acquired, occupied or used under this article in any other
municipality, without the consent, expressed by resolution, of the governing body and
of the board of health of such other municipality, upon application made therefor in
writing to each of them."
33. See note 1 supra.
